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Abstract 
 
River blockages formed by rock avalanches appear to pose a higher hazard potential than other landslide 
dams, given the extreme run-out distances and volumes of rock avalanche deposits. Recent research has 
identified rock avalanche deposits to have internal sedimentology consisting of a coarse surficial material 
(carapace) and a finer fragmented interior (body) potentially of critical importance to rock-avalanche dam 
stability. Physical scale modelling of overtopping failure and breach development in rock avalanche dams 
was used to quantify the influence of this sedimentology on critical breach parameters, and their 
prediction using existing embankment dam breach technologies. Results from this study indicate that the 
time to failure for rock avalanche dams is approximately twice that observed for homogeneous dams due 
to the armouring properties of the carapace; and that peak discharge is not significantly affected by 
sedimentology. While application of empirical, parametric, dimensional and physically based models 
indicated that uncertainty associated with predicted dam break discharges could range from ±19% to 
±107%, no modelling technique was able to simulate the armouring phenomenon adequately. Comparison 
of actual and simulated breach evolution shows linear assumptions of breach depth and width 
development (as observed in homogeneous dams) to be incorrect. In the context of hazard management, 
the results suggest that empirical regression relationships should be used for rapid assessment of potential 
dam break flood magnitude.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
	

Rock avalanches are catastrophic mass movements derived from the failure of a volume of > 1x106 m3 of 
bedrock in regions of predominantly steep terrain worldwide. The deposits of these events often cause 
temporary or permanent blockages of mountain drainage networks due to their high volume and ability to 
run-out for considerable distances both across- and along-valley. Of the many landslide types that 
generate natural dams, rock-avalanche deposits pose perhaps the greatest hazard, given their runout 
distances, volumes and elevations. 
 
Many landslide dams are ephemeral features on the geo(morpho)logical timescale owing to their rapid 
formation and generally short lives; they are usually initiated by excessive precipitation, snowmelt or 
seismicity. The temporary blockage of river channels by landslide dams can pose a substantial hazard to 
infrastructure and settlements downstream due to the potential for catastrophic failure (usually from 
overtopping). Failure often occurs a short time after formation; 50% of breached landslide dams 
documented worldwide failed within 10 days of formation (Costa and Schuster, 1988). Very large natural 
dams however, can remain intact for millennia: life expectancy of natural dams has therefore ranges from 
several minutes to several thousand years, depending on factors including valley shape, volume, size, 
shape, composition and sorting of blockage material, rates of seepage through the blockage and rates of 
sediment and water flow into the newly formed lake. When a dam is emplaced it is very difficult to 
predict when, or whether, it will fail; hazard management must be based on the conservative assumption 
that it will fail. Consequently, understanding how the characteristics of natural dams influence the peak 
outflow of resulting dambreak floods is of critical importance for effective hazard management. 
 
Managing hazards such as landslide dams requires an understanding of the temporal and spatial scales on 
which such phenomena operate. Much previous work on landslide dams has been mainly descriptive in 
character, and has produced a multitude of documented case studies and inventories (e.g. Costa and 
Schuster, 1988; Costa and Schuster, 1991). More recent work has focussed on quantitative methods of 
determining the post-formation development, in particular the controls on dam longevity (Ermini and 
Casagli, 2003; Manville, 2001; Korup, 2004, 2005; Schuster, 2000). 
 
Although the failure mechanisms of landslide dams are relatively well understood (overtopping, piping, 
seepage, etc) from extensive engineering research on artificial dams, little is known about the actual 
processes involved given the few direct observations of and data on landslide dam failures. Landslide 
dam failure is still frequently modelled as a homogenous earthen dam failure, because the mechanism of 
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breach formation is considered very similar, despite obvious differences in dam geometry and material 
properties.  
 
Lithological composition and barrier geometry have been found to influence landslide dam longevity 
(Dunning, 2005), and grain-size distribution influences the primary failure mechanism (overtopping). 
Estimating breach development rate and shape, particularly in large volume rock avalanche barriers, is 
also problematic given the heterogeneous internal fabric. 
 
With the potential for catastrophic failure shortly after emplacement, management of dambreak flood 
hazards requires rapid forecasting of potential peak discharge based on minimal parametric information 
such as dam and lake geometry and inflow rates. Given the severity of downstream flooding from dam 
breaching, affecting both natural and human environments, a model may be considered effective if 
estimates of peak discharge (Qp) and breach development time (tb) lie within ± 30% of the actual values. 
Obtaining such accuracy from rapid processing of limited parametric data, even without consideration of 
the dam sedimentology, presents a major challenge. Estimation of the potential flood hydrograph from a 
breaching dam is complicated by dependence on four inter-related factors; the volume of the lake, the 
height of the dam, the average width of the breach, and the breach development time. Four main 
techniques have been developed in the past two decades to assess the magnitude of potential dam break 
floods: (a) empirical regression relationships; (b) parametric models; (c) dimensionless analysis and (d) 
physically based computer models. This research aims to identify models which best simulate breach 
development in landslide dams for the prediction of peak outflow, using a dataset of failures obtained 
from scaled physical modelling. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effect of rock avalanche material heterogeneity and 
structure on dam stability, peak discharge and breach development time. This research will attempt to 
characterise the influence of variable grain size and sedimentology on the breach development process 
and resultant peak outflow. This will be achieved through physical scale modelling of overtopping failure 
in non-cohesive, heterogeneous landslide dams. 
 

Landslide dams occur in high alpine environments and therefore pose considerable hazard to human 
systems in New Zealand. New Zealand occupies a complex geological setting, derived from convergence 
of the Australian and Pacific plates, promoting rapid uplift and high seismicity within mountainous terrain. 
These conditions, combined with high precipitation levels, are conducive to the development of large 
scale slope instability and stream blockages in the Hawkes Bay, Northwest Nelson, North Westland, 
South Westland, Western Canterbury and Fiordland regions (Perrin and Hancox, 1992). Within the past 
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decade, four short-lived landslide dammed lakes have been recorded (Figure 1.1) occurring on the Poerua, 
Greenstone, Waitotora and Turakina rivers (Manville, 2001).  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Recent landslide dams in New Zealand  
 
The recent formation and failure of the 1999 Mt Adams rock-avalanche dam on the Poerua River 
(Hancox et al., 1999; 2005) highlighted the susceptibility of foreland communities in South Westland to 
an intrinsic alpine geomorphic process which may recur with higher magnitude and frequency in the 
future. 
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On 6 October 1999 an estimated 10-15 million m3 of schist and colluvium fell 1800m from the northern 
peak of Mt Adams into the Poerua River valley on the West Coast of the South Island, New Zealand. The 
landslide formed a dam ~10 x 106 m3 in volume, 85m high with a crest length of 450m impounding a lake 
1200 m long and 80 m deep, and holding 5 – 7 million m3 of water (Hancox, 1999).  
 
Dam material consisted of large boulders (up to 4m in diameter) observed to armour the dam surface, 
spillway, and outflow channel. The average block size diameter for the whole dam (d50) was ~ 6mm 
(Hancox et al.,2005). Initial overtopping of the dam crest occurred approximately 24 hours after 
formation. Rapid breach development was triggered 6 days after initial overtopping, during a rainfall 
event in which 80mm precipitation was recorded over a 12 hour period (Hancox et al.,2005). This event 
caused partial failure of the dam, eroding a 300m long trapezoidal breach channel, to a depth 
approximately half the original dam height and reducing the original lake volume by approximately 75%. 
The resulting flood peaked between 500-1000 m3/s ~ 8km downstream of the dam causing significant 
channel aggradation proximal to the gorge exit, but no casualties (Hancox et al.,2005).  
 
	  	
The potential hazard posed by the emplacement of a rock avalanche into a valley upstream of human 
settlement and infrastructure is subject to management under two pieces of legislation in New Zealand; 
the Resource Management Act (1991) and the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act (2002).  
 
!
 "
The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) promotes the sustainable management of New Zealand's 
natural and physical resources at local, regional and national scales. These three levels have different 
responsibilities to assume, depending on the resources being managed (Appendix B1, RMA Sections 24, 
30, 31). Section 2 of the RMA defines a natural hazard as  
 
…any atmospheric, or earth, or water related occurrence (including earthquake, tsunami, erosion, 
volcanic and geothermal activity, landslip, subsidence, sedimentation, wind, drought, fire or flooding), 
the acting of which adversely affects or may affect human life, property or aspects of the environment. 
 
The RMA states that regional councils have primary responsibility to avoid and mitigate natural hazards. 
Local authorities are also required to maintain data such as fault line mapping, flood plains and natural 
disaster history on property documents. The RMA also binds development through a resource consent and 
consultation processes. The RMA is linked to the CDEMA in a requirement to consider natural hazards. 
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In December 2002, the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEMA) replaced the Civil 
Defence Act 1983. The CDEMA creates a framework within which New Zealand must address hazards 
and prepare for, deal with, and recover from local, regional and national emergencies. The new approach 
integrates traditional civil defence (response and associated planning) with risk reduction as provided by 
the RMA. The CDEMA encourages coordination between a wide range of agencies (central government, 
local authorities, emergency services and lifeline utilities) providing clear specification of their individual 
roles and responsibilities.  
 
The CDEMA requires Regional Councils to identify specific hazards and sustainably manage them to 
achieve acceptable levels of risk and plan and prepare for emergency response and recovery by forming 
regional Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups. The CDEMA (s48) states that each 
CDEM Group “must prepare and approve a civil defence emergency management plan”. The Regional 
CDEM Plan must also have the ability to be integrated into the National CDEM Strategy (CDEMA s37 
(1) and s53 (1). 
 
A hazard is defined in the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 as  
 
"any happening, whether natural or otherwise including, without limitation, any explosion, earthquake, 
eruption, tsunami, land movement, flood, storm, tornado, cyclone, serious fire, leakage or spillage of any 
dangerous gas or substance, technological failure, infestation, plaque, epidemic, failure of or disruption 
of emergency service or lifeline utility, or actual or imminent attack or warlike act which may occur and 
causes or may cause loss of life or injury or illness or distress or in any way endangers the safety of the 
public or property" 
 
Inconsistency between the definitions used for hazard in the RMA and CDEMA may also hinder 
management. 
 
  
As landslide dams are largely ignored by definition in current legislation, NZSOLD dam safety guidelines 
and the Building Act have little legal relevance to their management. Such guidelines could however be 
applied to landslide dams to describe the hazard in the context of current dam management policy, in the 
absence of specific regulations for landslide dams. 
 
&'()($ *
	
The acceptable level of risk to a downstream community from landslide dam break flooding is put in 
perspective by comparison with acceptable levels of risk for dam design in New Zealand. The New 
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Zealand Society of Large Dams (NZSOLD) considers the hazard potential of a dam to be influenced by 
the dam height, storage volume, downstream conditions (degree of habitation, public assets) and 
surrounding environment (ie. precipitation, seismicity of a region). 
 
The NZSOLD Dam Safety Guidelines (2000) for classification of potential impact from dam failure 
(Table 1) primarily consider dam height and reservoir volume in the assessment of damage potential. 
  
        Table 1.1 Classification of Potential Impact from dam failure (NZSOLD Safety Guidelines). 

 
NZSOLD designates a high potential impact classification for dams impounding water to a height 
greater than 20m and a storage volume exceeding 106m3. All landslide dams fall into this category since 
their average height ranges between 40-80m and reservoir volume usually exceeds 5 x 106m3.  
 
Suggested guidelines for societal risk with regard to dam safety have been published by several 
organisations including USBR (1997) and ANCOLD (1998). Finlay and Fell (1997) report similar ranges 
for acceptance of risk from landslides, concluding that for a risk to be perceived as low or very low, the 
annual loss of life frequency would need to be between 10-5 and 10-6. 
 
Such studies can be used to define the acceptable level of societal risk with regard to outburst flood 
hazards. A recent study commissioned by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
(Optimex, 2003) investigating the societal risk to the Franz Josef Township from an outburst flood 
resulting from breaching of a landslide dam, concluded that the current probabilities of fatalities range 
from 2 x 10-3 to 10-2, allowing for the current warning and response systems. These probabilities are 
significantly greater than the acceptable ANCOLD limit of 10-5. 
 
However, it is emphasised that the use of acceptable risk guidelines to convey the hazard potential of 
landslide dam outbreak floods on downstream communities and infrastructure, particularly in a legislative 
context is limited given there are as yet no societal risk criteria for natural hazards widely endorsed by 
any regulatory agency in New Zealand. 
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+
	",--./
Section 161 of the Building Act (2004) requires all regional authorities to adopt a policy on dangerous 
dams. A dangerous dam is defined in section 153 as: 
  
(a) a high potential impact dam or a medium potential impact dam; and 
(b) likely to collapse - 
(i) in the ordinary course of events; or 
(ii) in a moderate earthquake; or 
(iii) in a moderate flood; or 
(c) a leaky dam. 
 
Industry best practice has been assessed in terms of design of dams to cope with earthquake events using 
the annual exceedence probability (AEP). This is an accepted concept for describing earthquake or flood 
events and has been found suitable for consistent application across New Zealand.  
 
A moderate earthquake (s153) is defined according to AS/NZS 1170.0. 2002 Structural Design Actions 
(Appendix A) which requires a 1 in 2500 AEP earthquake shaking to be used for structures with 
importance level 3. While high potential impact dams (importance level 5) are not covered by this 
standard, studies of the regional seismic hazard in New Zealand suggest that such dams should be 
designed to withstand a 1 in 10,000 AEP seismic hazard (an event 1.3 times larger than the 1 in 2500 
AEP seismic hazard event). 
 
A moderate flood (s153) is defined for a high potential impact dam as a flood flowing into the reservoir 
created by the dam that is associated with 1.4 x 1 in 100 annual exceedence probability (AEP) flood flow. 
This definition is based on the requirement for high impact dams to pass a minimum design flood usually 
between 1 in 10,000 AEP and the probable maximum flood (PMF). A 1 in 100 AEP flow or high 
intensity rainfall distribution is also commonly used in hydrological designs.  
 
Non-engineered natural barriers are only subject to dam management legislation (Building Act, 2004), if 
“a natural feature has been significantly modified to function as a dam” (Section 7). Currently, only the 
Waikaremoana landslide dam, due to its use as a hydropower facility is subject to Dam management 
legislation specified in Subpart 7; s134-162 of The Building Act (2004). Dam owners and operators must 
also comply with NZSOLD Dam Safety Guidelines (2000). 
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The CDEMA is the only piece of legislation that requires specific identification of hazards by councils. 
However, the scope of this identification is limited to the hazards already identified through the Resource 
Management Act (RMA) process and for which building works have been undertaken in hazard zones. 
Hazard identification can only be inferred from other pieces of legislation such as the Building Act and 
RMA. Development control outside recognised hazard zones is limited; therefore unless hazard 
identification and zonation is frequently evaluated, the provisions of the various acts concerning land use 
cannot be effectively applied.  
 
Complication exists in the designation of responsibility for management of natural barrier type natural 
hazards (as defined by the RMA Section 2). Occurrence of such a natural hazard within the boundary of a 
National Park (i.e Crater Lake Tephra Barrier, Mt Tongariro National Park) requires the Department of 
Conservation (DOC) to assume responsibility and co-ordinate hazard management. All other areas are 
subject to hazard management by a Regional Council. The interpretation of who is responsible for 
constructed dam safety is inconsistent at both District Council and Regional Council levels and also 
varies between regions.  
 
While hazard categorisation of dams for statutory management in public arenas is necessarily simplistic, 
current approaches generalise hazard potential using broad assumptions on the impact of a failure for a 
given dam, which are not always supported by science. 
 
To adequately classify and manage the potential hazard from landslide dam failure, ongoing estimates of; 
failure mechanism, potential flood hydrograph, event probability, CDEM response methodology, and 
overall social, economic and environmental impact forecasting are required. The development and 
refinement of technical methods for the analysis of dam failures is therefore important to public safety, 
enabling better classification of dam hazard potential. 
 
01
As increasing land pressures force human settlement and development into upland regions, the risk of 
human fatality and damage to assets and infrastructure from the rapid failure of large stream blocking 
events increases. 
 
This research investigates the applicability of contemporary embankment dam technology to modelling 
overtopping failure in a non-cohesive rock avalanche dam. To communicate the findings, the thesis will 
be laid out in the following format: 
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Chapter 2 backgrounds the formation and failure of landslide dams based on published research in both 
global and local contexts. Particular emphasis is given to the recent identification of specific facies within 
rock avalanche deposits and the implications of internal structure and heterogeneous fabric for dam 
behaviour under overtopping conditions.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology of the research design and the necessity for Froude-scale modelling. 
The criteria for the model design and its inherent limitations are presented. 
 
Chapter 4 details the experimental design used to represent prototype conditions. Descriptions of the 
resources and instrumentation used in the modelling are provided. Six different dam structures with a 
range of internal sedimentologies are tested under different inflow and saturation conditions.  
 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the key observations and results from scale modelling of the breaching 
process. Results are presented for each dam type tested, in the form of outflow hydrographs and evolving 
cross sectional area profiles for two specific cross sections within the breach. Investigation into the breach 
formation mechanism is presented through a description of the failure chronology.  
 
Chapter 6 backgrounds the current state of dam breach modelling technology, in the context of selecting 
models applicable to breach development in rock avalanche dams. To date most information on breach 
development in landslide dams has been derived from engineering research on artificial earthen or rockfill 
dams, without consideration of grainsize distributions and sedimentology of non-engineered dams.  
 
Chapter 7 critically reviews breach development models commonly used to predict both peak discharge 
and breach development time, using the dataset obtained from physical modelling. Limitations to the 
accuracy and applicability of empirical, parametric, dimensionless and physical methods are presented. 
Uncertainty analysis of the physical model dataset is also presented. 
 
Chapter 8 presents the models most applicable to primary and secondary rapid response for effective 
hazard management of rock avalanche dams.  
 
Chapter 9 summarises the main objectives and results from this study.    
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review of Rock Avalanche Dams 
 
	

Rock avalanche dams are a particular type of landslide dam. They often pose a higher hazard potential 
than other landslide dams, given the extreme volumes and runout distances of rock avalanche deposits. 
Research into landslide dams and their associated phenomena has only recently become established as a 
critical component in understanding the interaction between fluvial and hill slope systems (Korup, 2002), 
often requiring a multidisciplinary approach involving the application of both geomorphic and 
engineering principles. The effects of landslide dams can be subdivided into short and long-term impacts. 
Short term impacts involve upstream and downstream flooding; downstream flooding is the most 
hazardous to populated areas and infrastructure in the potential flood path and therefore receives 
significant attention. Rapid initial assessment of a landslide dam to identify the probability of catastrophic 
failure associated with impounded water is essential for emergency management. Current research is 
therefore focussed on predicting a dam’s post-formation development for early identification of its 
potential for catastrophic dam failure through use of dam break modelling techniques. Long-term impacts 
receive less attention because they concern the effects of landslide dam has on sediment transport and 
overall hydrological impacts, which do not pose any immediate threat to populated areas downstream of 
the landslide dam.  
 
Much previous work on landslide dams has been descriptive in character, and has produced a number of 
documented case studies (Korup, 2002). This reflects not only the difficulty of data acquisition, but the 
diversity of its application. This chapter attempts to summarise and evaluate the current state of 
knowledge of rock avalanche emplacement, landslide dam formation and failure characteristics, dam 
breach hydraulics and available technology.  
 
!2"#
Rock avalanches are high magnitude, low frequency mass movements involving the failure of over 106 m3 
of bedrock and weathered mountainside. These events are often triggered by localised seismicity, high 
intensity or prolonged rainfall, human activity or accelerating creep, but the trigger mechanism apparently 
has no influence on the form of the resulting deposit (Korup, 2002). Rock avalanches have been reported 
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to transport material remarkable distances, beyond that expected from the normal laws of friction; the 
precise mechanisms operating during motion and emplacement are still poorly understood. 
 
$$
The term “Sturzstrom” (rock-fall stream) was first used by Albert Heim to describe the observed 
behaviour of the mass movement event which destroyed the town of Elm, Switzerland in 1881 (Hsu, 
1978). McConnell and Brock (1904) applied this description of motion to the Frank slide in Alberta, 
Canada, labelling the event as a rock avalanche. This has since become a common term describing the 
process (Evans, et al., 1989).  
 
Classification schemes have been used by various researchers, notably Varnes (1996; see Table 2.1) and 
Hutchinson (1965; 1988) to describe landslides, however the variation in definitions and terminology 
between these schemes contributes to ambiguity in a universal working definition. Smith (2003) 
highlighted that a rock avalanche is not derived from remobilization of debris as inferred by Varnes (1996) 
rockfall / rock slide debris avalanche, but rather from first-time failure of a relatively large (> 106 m3) in-
situ intact rock mass (Whitehouse and Griffins, 1983). Failure generally initiates along pre-existing 
defects, a process Davies and McSaveney (2002) refer to as collapse; however the subsequent behaviour 
involves intense comminution of rock debris to grains as small as nanometres.  
 
   Table 2.1. Varnes and Cruden (1996) landslide classification scheme 
 
Although velocity classes give poor division of landslide type, Hungr et al.,(2001) suggested that velocity 
is the most important measure of hazard intensity to people. Therefore human response has been 
incorporated into both classification and definition. Table 2.2 illustrates human vulnerability to a rock 
avalanche (velocity class 7).  
 
Type of Movement  Type of Material Engineering Soils 
 
Bedrock Predominantly Coarse Predominantly Fine 
Fall Rockfall Debris Fall Earth Fall 
Topple Rock Topple Debris Topple Earth Topple 
    
Slides  -rotational Rock Slump Debris Slump Earth Slump 
 -transitional Rock Slide Debris Slide Earth Slide 
    
Lateral Spreads Rock Spread Debris Spread Earth Spread 
    
Flows Rock Flow Debris Flow Earth Flow (soil creep) 
    
Complex Combination of two principal types of movement 
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         Table 2.2. Probable human response with regard to variable landslide velocity 
 
Based on the description proposed by Hungr et al.,( 2001) the preferred definition of a rock avalanche in 
this investigation is as follows “A rock avalanche is an extremely rapid, massive, mobile, flow- like 
motion of fragmenting rock derived directly from a large bedrock failure.”   
 
 
Rock avalanches can be triggered by rock weathering, earthquakes, storm events, removal of toe support 
and human interference. A primary requirement for the formation of a rock avalanche is the rapid 
detachment of rock mass, as can be caused by the propagation of seismic energy within the epicentral 
area of Mw > 6 magnitudes (Eisbacher and Clague, 1984). Seismic shaking can widen fractures and 
defects within a rock mass reducing cohesion or shear strength of failure surface asperities and 
roughnesses. In of areas prone to frequent, smaller earthquakes, shear strength can be progressively 
reduced to increase susceptibility to fatigue-related failure mechanisms (Erismann and Abele, 2001). 
Furthermore, studies of topographic amplification (Zaslavsky and Shapira, 2000) document the effect 
relief has on the amplification of seismic waves. A tendency exists to assign the triggering of a rock 
avalanche to a seismic source rather than precipitation (Voight, 1978). 
 
In the Southern Alps of the Central South Island, New Zealand, oversteepening of valley sides by glacial 
erosion has resulted in relaxation within the rock mass and a redistribution of stress and strain causing 
joint dilation, crack enlargement. While Whitehouse and Griffith (1983) consider oversteepening to be a 
precondition rather than a trigger of failure, climate change has been postulated as a destabilisation 
mechanism that may initiate some rock avalanches in isolated cases (McSaveney, 2002). The distressing 
and disaggregation of rock mass is often attributed to periglacial activity, however Erismann and Abele, 
(2001) and McSaveney (2002) consider freezing to be a fatiguing process and argue that ice also protects 
mountain faces, acting as a barrier against erosion.  
 
While the role of precipitation in slope destabilisation processes is well documented (usually associated 
with soils and superficial failures, Kilburn (1998), Melosh (1987) noted that few historic rock avalanche 
Velocity Class Description Velocity mm/sec Typical Velocity Human Response 
7 Extremely Rapid 5x10 3 > 5m / sec Nil 
6 Very Rapid 5x10 1 3m / sec Nil 
5 Rapid 5x10
-1
 1.8m / hr Evacuation 
4 Moderate 5x10-3 13m / month Evacuation 
3 Slow 5x10-5 1.6m / year Maintenance 
2 Very Slow 5x10-7 16 mm / year Maintenance 
1 Extremely Slow < 5x10-7 - - 
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events are actually triggered by precipitation. Collapse can occur as a deep-seated brittle failure, with 
instability occurring when gravity loading and fracture growth exceed the shear strength within the rock 
body. Often such weakening of asperities is assisted by high internal water pressures and chemical 
weathering. 
 
$!2"#
The rock avalanche process exhibits characteristics which distinguish it from other forms of landslide and 
types of flow. The mass volume is often dry, displaying high mobility and extremely rapid velocity 
(Varnes and Cruden, 1996; Hungr et al.,2001). Such properties enable the debris to travel abnormal 
distances and overrun topographic obstacles, with super elevation where impeded or deflected. 
Entrainment of surface material on the run out path combined with dilation of the rock mass during 
collapse and fragmentation, often cause rock avalanche deposits to generally exceed their ‘source’ 
volume. 
 
The volume of the displaced mass has significant influence on the geometry and spread of the resultant 
deposit (Davies and McSaveney, 1999). Runout simulations conducted by Okura et al., (2000), 
demonstrated that runout distance (spread) is directly related to the volume of the displaced mass. Okura 
et al., (2000) concluded that long runout could be attributed to inter-block impacts causing increased 
dispersion of kinetic energy rearward of the debris front while resulting in a retreat of the centre of mass, 
preservation of stratigraphy and ultimately an increase in the distance reached by frontal blocks. These 
results are consistent with the conclusions of Davies et al.,(1999) concerning fragmenting granular 
avalanches where increased dispersive stresses caused amplified spreading, runout and desposition 
thickness in proximal areas. Davies et al., (1999) chose to normalise fall height, length and volume ratios 
and interpreted a size effect occurring at volumes greater than 107 m3. This was attributed to the onset of 
rock fragmentation driving the mass, suggesting fragmenting induced long runout occurred at volumes 
≥ 106 m3. 
 
The initial phase of motion has been termed collapse (Eisbacher, 1979, McSaveney and Davies 2002), 
where the trigger releases a volume of bedrock that dilates along preexisting discontinuity surfaces such 
as jointing or foliation during the initial fall and / or slide to the valley floor. The mechanism of motion 
driving the dispersion and runout of the rock avalanche at high speeds remains controversial. Previous 
explanations for long runout of rock avalanches have focused on reducing basal friction or internal 
friction, however neither has been successful in explaining the phenomenon as it occurs in nature (Davies 
et al.,1999) The dynamic fragmentation hypothesis proposed by Davies and McSaveney (2002) is 
consistent with the observed pulverized internal sedimentology of rock avalanche deposits. This theory 
involves a confined explosive disintegration of rock occurring at a smaller scale than that of insitu 
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jointing or structural discontinuities; a process very similar in mechanism to an explosive failure of an 
unconfined compression tests (Davies and McSaveney, 2002). The confinement of the high kinetic energy 
released from innumerable continuous explosions on surrounding clasts causes dilation of the rock mass, 
resulting in exceptional spreading and longer run out. The boundary between static-dynamic 
fragmentations is a function of the size of the fracturing mass, and decreases in size exponentially as the 
volume of mass increases (Davies and McSaveney, 2002). 
 
.!2"#3
Detailed sedimentological data for rock-avalanche deposits are sparse. Recent work has attempted to 
characterise the sedimentology of rock-avalanche deposits using either a facies approach or direct 
measurement (Hewitt, 1999; Casagli and Ermini, 2003). Direct measurement of rock-avalanche deposits 
has been hindered by both natural impediments such as internal exposure availability and accessibility 
and, crucially, sampling methodology (Dunning, 2005). Previous sedimentological data have been 
collected as part of other rock avalanche research and so have often, necessarily, been limited to single 
small samples (McSaveney, in press; Hewitt, 1999) from the main body of deposits without detailed study 
of the surrounding exposure to set the sample in a structural context. 
 
Grain-size distributions of rock avalanches from New Zealand and worldwide (Table 2.3) have a fractal 
dimension close to 2.58, a value found by Sammis et al.,(1987) to correspond to a three-dimensional 
geometry that equalises and minimises the probability of fracture of all particles. Thus all grains present 
in a rock avalanche are equally likely to fragment at any given time.  
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Figure 2.1. Falling Mountain Rock Avalanche deposit, New Zealand 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Grain Size Distribution for the Falling Mountain  
Rock Avalanche deposit (Dunning et al., 2005)  
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Table 2.3. The range of values for selected descriptive statistics based on five rock avalanche deposits in 
varied lithologies (Dunning, 2005). 
 
 
0(	 
The deposit resulting from a rock avalanche is sedimentologically distinctive and can thus form an 
important basis for classification (Dunning, 2004). Common results based on both observation and direct 
measurement indicate the presence of highly fragmented but undisaggregated clasts (McSaveney, in 
press), preservation of original source stratigraphy (Strom, 1999) interactions with the deposit substrate 
and accounts of crude inverse grading (Cruden and Hungr, 1986), which Dunning et al., (2005) attribute 
to lithological variation.  
 
McSaveney et al., (2000) describe the deposit of the 1929 Falling Mountain rock avalanche in Arthur’s 
Pass National Park, New Zealand (Figure 2.1). About 55 x 106 m3 of rock fell from the north face of the 
1900m mountain, bulking to a volume of 60 x 106 m3 before travelling 4.5 km down valley. Detailed field 
investigations at Falling Mountain in combination with grain size distribution of interior samples (Figure 
2.2) by Dunnning (2004) and Dunning et al., (2005) reveal that the deposits are not inversely graded but 
show three distinct facies composed of angular, highly fragmented clasts reflecting source stratigraphy 
with variation only due to lithology. McSaveney et al., (2000) noted that at Falling Mountain, upper 
deposits are collapsed and clast supported, but not fragmented, while underlying deposits are matrix 
supported with extensive fragmentation. The grain-size distributions segregate based on lithological 
variation (Figure 2.2) and become finer with distance travelled from the source. Dunning (2004) proposed 
a facies model consisting of the surficial, coarse, Carapace facies: a fragmented interior Body facies; and 
the Basal facies of entrained debris. 
 
4"1 	$(


The Carapace facies (surface/near-surface material) is an assemblage of large, angular interlocking 
blocks created during the collapse of the bedrock slope and transported near the surface of the rock 
avalanche (Figure 2.3). The geometry of the carapace material is controlled by original rock properties 
such as strength and discontinuities, and runout distance. The carapace is the coarsest unit of a rock-
avalanche deposit accounting for as much as 30 % of deposit thickness, but for considerably less by mass 
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due to void spacing and clast-supported fabric (Dunning et al., 2005). Consequently the carapace is 
characterised by high hydraulic conductivities, in the region of 0.1 ms-1 for a relatively fine carapace of 
argillite (Falling Mountain, New Zealand). The facies is clast-supported and retains source stratigraphy as 
discrete bands without mixing. The Carapace facies is potentially of critical importance to rock-
avalanche dam stability because it is the material forming the dam surface (Figure 2.4), and the only 
visible basis for rapid hazard assessment (Dunning et al., 2005a). The high permeability of the carapace 
has also been reported to inhibit overtopping failure (Hewitt, 1999); on the other hand, turbulent free-
surface flow between large blocks of carapace at the interface between the carapace and body facies can 
cause internal erosion and the carapace destruction. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.Diagram of fragmentation in rock avalanche; dimensions refer to Falling Mountain situation  
(Davies et al., 2002) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.The coarse carapace observed at the dam crest (left) and downstream toe (right) at the Tsatichhu rock 
avalanche dam Bhutan (Dunning et al., 2005)  
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The Body facies (Figure 2.5) has been identified as a “graded” boundary underlying the Carapace below 
which material is intensely fragmented but relatively undisaggregated, matrix supported and showing 
fragmentation derived features (Dunning et al.,2005b; McSaveney et al.,2000). This unit accounts for the 
greatest thickness within rock-avalanche deposits and is usually the most voluminous in valley-confined 
deposits. Dunning et al., (2005a) report bands of fragmented material showing preserved stratigraphy 
relative to the source to be intrinsic features of rock avalanche deposits. Due to preservation of 
stratigraphy, grain-size distribution and material properties such as hydraulic conductivity for the interior 
vary based upon the lithology. For the basis of comparison an argillite sample in the body facies of the 
Falling Mountain rock-avalanche deposit yielded hydraulic conductivity values of around 3 x 10-3 ms-1 
and porosity of around 20% (Dunning, 2005b).  
 
The basal facies is the smallest unit by volume within a rock-avalanche deposit, and represents material 
altered by the passing rock avalanche that has interacted with the substrate. This includes entrainment of 
soft, erodible valley fills and surface vegetation into the base of the moving event, and also subsequent 
deposition of modified mixes of substrate and rock-avalanche material, which can cause superficial 
erosion to bedrock. The boundary between the Basal facies and the Body facies is often indistinct and 
variable in its height. 
 
With more accurate knowledge of the sedimentology of rock-avalanche dam deposits, the failure of 
landslide dams can be modelled with more certainty. The information gained from sedimentological 
investigation, geomorphic data and landslide inventories allows distinct categories of dam geometry, 
sedimentology and associated failure styles and timing to be identified. 
 
  
                       
Figure 2.5..Rock avalanche deposits indicating the presence of different sedimentological facies (Source; Dunning et al., 2005 and T. Davies) 
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Rock avalanche dam morphology has been documented to be largely a function of lithology and the 
valley geometry into which the deposit is emplaced, (Strom, 1999). Ollett (2001) used small scale 
physical modelling to assess the influence of bed slope, valley geometry and angular drop height, on the 
geometry of the rock avalanche dam. Valleys with moderate geometries (slopes between 40-48%) were 
found to produce a higher dam crest, whereas shallow (<40%) and steep (>48%) geometries encouraged 
deposition concentration on the release side of the channel, and a lower dam crest. Upstream dam slope 
was observed to decrease linearly with increasing bed slope, for all channel slope angles. Similarly the 
downstream slope was observed to increase linearly with increasing bed slope. Correct modelling of slope 
roughness promoted batter steepening by up to 9%. The volume of displaced material did not influence 
geometry. The model closely simulated the geometric characteristics of well documented case studies. 
 
5$
The landslide dam classification most commonly used (Ermini and Casagli 2003) is that of Costa and 
Schuster (1988), in which six morphologies of possible valley blocking landslides are described, of which 
four are commonly formed by rock avalanche. Using cross-sectional profile and the distribution of mass, 
(Strom 1999) developed a classification system based upon Stalled, Secondary Two-Phase, and Spread 
morphological types. Both the Costa & Schuster (1988) and Strom (1999) classifications consider entry of 
a rock avalanche at near right angles into the main river drainage, and its subsequent effect on that major 
drainage. This research will focus on modelling the breaching potential from impoundments typical of 
stalled rock avalanche morphologies characteristic of Type II and III blockages. 
 
5(	 3
Stalled rock avalanche deposits are generated through the restriction of radial spread by direct impact (at 
near right angles) on opposing valley slopes, consequently freezing the mass due to the high rate of 
energy dissipation. Such impacts have also been observed to produce super-elevation of debris, which can 
collapse back onto the deposit causing the initial surface texture to be obscured by finer material. Lobate 
features from progressive phases of failure can significantly affect the pathways available for overtopping 
water before discharges are reached whereby carapace blocks cannot resist erosion.  
 
			
+2
	
The term “landslide dam” refers to a natural blockage of a drainage basin caused by slope movements 
(Casagli and Ermini, 1999). The river blockage may be complete or partial; in both instances, an 
impoundment may be formed upstream. Hazards from landslide dams are related to their rapid failure and 
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variable longevity. The temporal variation associated with the stability of landslide dams is highlighted by 
Costa and Schuster (1988), who sampled 73 landslide dams with known time to failure and found 85% to 
fail within a year of formation. In contrast, blockages can also impound sediment and water for millennia 
due to their natural stability and resistance to erosion (Adams, 1981; Hewitt 1996). In general, however, 
landslide dams have a low resistance to both internal erosion and overtopping by the impounded water. In 
many cases failure may be catastrophic, causing major downstream flooding, or in others, it may be slow 
resulting in minimal downstream damage (Schuster, 2000). Additional hazards, such as backwater 
flooding, occur upstream of a landslide dam as the impoundment fills; filling is generally a slow process 
depending on the size of the catchment above the point of the blockage; however, it can potentially 
inundate communities and valuable agricultural land (Costa and Schuster, 1986).  
 
(36
$		
Schuster et al., (1998) listed four groups of factors that govern the spatial distribution of landslide dams: 
(1) seismic intensity (peak acceleration, duration of strong shaking), (2) slope gradient and topography, (3) 
lithology and weathering properties and (4) soil moisture and groundwater content. Figure 1.1 (previous 
chapter) outlines the spatial distribution of recent New Zealand landslide dams.  
 
 
Figure 2.6..Trigger mechanisms involved with the formation of  
 landslide dams in New Zealand (Korup, 2004). 
 
Dam forming landslides are generally initiated by mechanisms that act to reduce the internal strength of 
the rock mass. Analysis of 394 historical cases of landslide dam formation with a known triggering 
mechanism by Schuster (1993) suggests that the most important natural processes influencing the 
initiation of dam forming landslides are excessive rainfall, snowmelt and earthquakes which, when 
combined represent 90% of the landslide dams investigated. Korup (2004) suggests 39% of New Zealand 
landslide dams are seismogenically triggered (Figure 2.6). 
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Rock and debris avalanches form 19% of landslide dams worldwide (Ermini and Casagali, 2003), with 
generally larger volumes and higher velocities than earth slumps or debris/ earth flows. In addition there 
is often a continuum between a rock or earth slide and a rock and debris avalanche, with the former 
disintegrating into the later upon down slope movement (Nash, 2003). In New Zealand extremely rapid 
landslides involving rock avalanching are the most common type and account for 27% of the data (Figure 
2.7).  
 
 
Figure 2.7.. Landslide types involved with the formation of landslide dams in 
 New Zealand (Korup, 2004) 
 
.*3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$		
The potential for landslide induced blockage of a drainage basin is a function of the lithological type, 
volume and distribution of displaced material as well as the channel width and flow velocity. Swanson et 
al., (1986) proposed a geomorphic classification scheme for landslide dams based on geometric relations 
with the valley floor. This classification was further modified by Costa and Schuster (1988) who were 
able to distinguish six types of landslide dam from a dataset of 184 case studies. Based on their relations 
with the valley floor Costa and Schuster (1988) classified landslide dams into six types of dams (Figure 
2.8): 
Type I: Partial obstruction of channel forming shallow non hazardous dams. 
Type II: Complete obstruction of channel, spanning valley floor, high hazard potential.  
Type III: Complete obstruction of channel, highest material volumes with extensive runout distances, 
impounding large hazardous lakes and blocking valley tributaries. 
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Type IV- V: Simultaneous failure of material from two sites in the same valley to obstruct the channel. 
Potentially hazardous if large volumes are emplaced in narrow valleys. The Poerua Landslide Dam was of 
this type. 
Type VI: Dams of this type have a failure surface that extends under the river channel. They pose least 
threat of downstream flooding because a complete blockage seldom results. Water storage is small and 
rapid incision of the dam unlikely. 
The most frequently documented types of landslide dam are types II (44%) and III (41%).  
Figure 2.8..Types of Landslide dam (Costa and Schuster, 1988) 
 
0*3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	
In addition to the classification systems outlined above, a number of indices and statistical relationships 
based upon geomorphic parameters are available to provide information on the configurations that create 
an ‘unstable’ or ‘stable’ landslide dam (Casagli and Ermini 1999, Ermini and Casagli 2003, Korup 2002). 
Such an empirical approach provides no indication of the possible future evolution of ‘stable’ dams into 
the ‘unstable’ field. Instead, they are a measure of simply of whether the dam is stable or unstable at the 
time of measurement. The approach is, however, deemed useful (Korup, 2002) for the first approximation 
of the stability of landslide dams and as a comparison of the conditions necessary for the formation of 
stable dams between regions with varied geomorphic and bounding conditions.  
 
Casagli and Ermini (1999) developed a set of geomorphic indices using a combination of dam volume, 
dam height, lake volume and catchment area above the point of blockage to predict the post-formation 
development of a landslide dam. While such systems are useful in providing approximations of dam 
stability, they do not consider the influential role of material properties and the grain size. Nash (2003) 
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attributes the poor performance of the applied geomorphic indices for stability prediction in landslide 
dams in the Nelson Region, New Zealand, to the inability of the index to account for dam composition 
and resistance to erosion, thus highlighting the importance of material heterogeneity and material 50% 
finer by weight (d50) as critical parameters in dam stability. Furthermore Nash (2003) found the Casagli 
and Ermini (1999) index to incorrectly assign stability to failed dams based on an inability of parameters 
used in the indices to represent the erodibility of the landslide debris.  
 
4+
Nash (2003) identified the critical parameters required for assessment and modelling of landslide dams 
for pre (Figure 2.9) and post breach (Figure 2.10) conditions. 
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Figure 2.9.. Pre-breach landslide dam parameters in plan and sectional view (Nash, 2003) 
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Figure 2.10.. Post-breach landslide dam parameters in plan and sectional view (Nash, 2003) 
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		
The physical properties of the material comprising the landslide dam are critical to correctly simulate dam 
breaching in numerical models.  
 
• There is significant variation between the median particle size (d50) within a rock avalanche 
deposit, ranging from 10-10 000 mm (Davies, pers. comm) within the carapace and 0-9mm within 
the body. The d50 from documented rock avalanche deposits can be highly variable, ranging from 
0.35-200mm (Dunning et al., 2005). 
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• Cohesive Strength (kPa); The rock avalanche material does not undergo compaction and 
therefore has low cohesion; cohesive strength may be in the region of 20 kPa. 
 
• Porosity is also variable throughout the rock avalanche deposit due to the internal structure. 
Turner and Schuster (1996) suggest an average swell factor of 33%, to account for bulking 
processes in rock avalanches. From the physical scale modelling, the silica sand used to simulate 
the body facies had a porosity of 45%. The high void density of the carapace produced higher 
porosity values of 60%. 
 
.# 	(6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As indicated in Figure 2.11, landslide dam longevity is highly variable ranging from minutes to millennia 
(Costa and Schuster, 1988). Two examples illustrate this variability; a dam-forming debris flow on the 
East Fork Hood River, Washington, breached in 12 minutes, to cause US $13 million damage (Korup, 
2002). In contrast, a dam created by a rock avalanche on the Tegermach River, Kyrghizstan, which 
formed Lake Yashingul in 1835, failed 131 years after formation to cause widespread downstream 
damage (Korup, 2002). 
 
Schuster (1993) reported that 35% of the 187 investigated breached landslide dams failed within one day 
of formation while 89% failed within one year. Ermini and Casagli (2003) found similar results upon 
investigating 205 failed landslide dams; c.20% failed within one day and c.80% within one year of 
formation.  
 
The longevity of a landslide dam depends on factors such as (1) the rates of sediment and water flow into 
the upstream reservoir; (2) physical characteristics of the dam and valley such as geometry, volume and 
the geotechnical properties; and (3) the amount of water loss via seepage through the dam, evaporation 
and groundwater recharge into abutment rocks.  
 
Rock avalanche dam longevity is directly proportional to its ability to resist erosion (externally from 
overtopping or slope heave and internally from piping). At the grain size scale, resistance to erosion 
within a rock or soil material is dictated solely by geotechnical properties (d50, cohesion and friction angle) 
and mass characteristics such as weathering, strength and grading of the rock material. However, it is the 
volume and distribution (spatial variation) of such materials within the structure of the rock avalanche 
deposit that determines stability. Field-based recognition of various run-out based morphologies 
producing variable carapace thickness and distribution, influence the ability of the rock avalanche deposit 
to impound water indefinitely (Dunning et al., 2005).  
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Figure 2.11.. Age of dams at time of failure (Costa and Schuster, 1988) 
 
.	3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 
Case studies show examples of stable to limited overflow conditions, where flow confined to the 
Carapace facies does not erode internally to failure, but acts to lower the reservoir level behind the dam 
crest, promoting stability by maintaining equilibrium between inflow and outflow (Dunning et al.,2005; 
Hancox et al.,1999). In such cases the role of seepage becomes critical to dam stability, and thus 
exemplifies the importance of correctly modelling the morphology and internal sedimentology. 
 
Hydraulic conductivity and intrinsic permeability (Figure 2.12) can be calculated from the grain size 
distribution (Dunning, 2004). From sampling carried out at the Poerua landslide dam (Dunning, 2004) 
hydraulic conductivity was found to range between 1.24 x 10-1 m/s in the Carapace facies to 3.69 x 10-4 
for the Body facies. 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Intrinsic Permeability for rock avalanche deposits based upon a measure of weight  
percentage gravel (Dunning, 2005) 
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Dunning et al., (2005a) claimed the higher hydraulic conductivity of the carapace to be crucial in the 
rapid destabilisation of natural dams. Modelling of reservoir infilling behind a homogenous dam using 
SLOPE/W and SEEP/W, produced a time to failure of 18.75 days. A realistic sedimentology, 
characteristic of a rock avalanche dam, caused failure within 48 hours (Figure 2.13). Such variation in 
failure time has serious consequences for hazard assessment and consequent evacuation procedure. 
Furthermore, Dunning et al., (2005a) suggested visual observation of phreatic migration on the 
downstream dam face could be a key indicator to confirm internal sedimentology of the dam and lead to 
subsequent predictions of its stability. 
 
 
Figure 2.13. Geoslope simulations of seepage through heterogeneous rock avalanche deposit at 2-hourly (48hr) and 
6 hourly (60 hr) simulations (Dunning, 2005) 
 
Slope failure on the downstream face has been found to be prevalent in deposits that do not overtop – i.e.  
those that are stable to low overflow conditions. Many researchers attribute the stability of prehistoric 
damming to events to ‘effective boulder armour’ and no apparent seepage, combined with the sheer 
dimensions of the blockage (Hewitt, 1999; Costa and Schuster, 1988). However predictions on formation 
and stability of a landslide dam are likely to be only applicable for dataset from which they were derived. 
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Natural dams differ from artificial dams in composition, construction and geometry. They are typically 
composed of unconsolidated and poorly sorted material with no engineered features designed to prevent 
piping, seepage or saturation, or channelised spillways or other outlets to control overflows. The time to 
failure of landslide dams can therefore range from minutes to thousands of years, depending on factors 
including lithology and hydrologic conditions within the catchment. However four factors appear to 
primarily control failure; 
 
1. Rates of sediment and water inflow into the impounded reservoir 
2. Dam and valley geometries 
3. Dam sedimentology and surface morphology 
4. Geotechnical properties of the dam materials 
 
Dam height and valley geometry determine the maximum impoundment volume at lake full level, but 
ultimately it is the local hydrologic characteristics and the catchment area that control the inflow/outflow 
which in turn determine the actual rate of filling and ultimate stability. If the river inflow exceeds seepage 
outflow the lake can fill to crest level, resulting in overtopping, breach formation and potential dam 
failure.  
 
Breach processes operating within artificial structures provide a useful analogue for quantifying the 
response of similar processes in the heterogeneous materials characteristic of rock avalanche dams. 
Documented earth dam disasters indicate gradual and progressive modes of failure. Loukola et al., (1993) 
noted that 98% of all dam failures in China (87,000 failed dams) are associated with earth dams. The 
main cause of failure was overtopping due to heavy rainfall and floods exceeding spillway design 
parameters. Middlebrooks (1953), in an investigation into rockfill dam failures, related failure to the age 
of the structure. Similarly in earth dam structures, susceptibility to failure by sliding, seepage or conduit 
leakage is greatest within the first five years of operation (Singh, 1996).   
 
Assigning a classification of ‘stability’ to landslide dams has to be treated with caution, since it is not 
time-invariant (Korup, 2004). Seemingly stable landslide barriers were reported to fail years or even 
decades after their formation without any obvious relationship to their dam or reservoir dimensions 
(Figure 2.14). Even a barrier that may satisfy basic geomechanical requirements such as internal cohesion 
or resistance to shear stress by the volume of the impounded water body, may be subject to failure by 
excess stress from earthquake-induced ground acceleration or landslide induced displacement wave. 
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Figure 2.14..Estimated volumes of landslide dams and related lakes versus the time  
to dam failure, based on the NZ dataset (Korup, 2004) 
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Rockfill embankments with impermeable cores have been the subject of investigations by Skoglund and 
Solvik (1995) in Norway, where approximately 170 large rockfill dams exist. It was found that the degree 
of overtopping of the core had little influence on the extent of damage to the core by internal erosion 
processes. Pugh (1985) studied zoned and rockfill embankments as fuse plugs for the controlled release of 
high return period floods over auxiliary spillways. His findings identified material gradation in the sand 
filter and embankments to be a key element contributing to the control of erosion rates, including lateral 
erosion.  
 
Observations from the pre-construction failure of the Hell Hole rockfill Dam (US) demonstrated the high 
permeability of the lower zone of dumped rockfill and its lack of stability under high throughflow 
(Kollgaard et al.,1988). 
 
A naturally formed spillway may resist erosion during normal overflow conditions; higher discharges 
during periods of intense rainfall, may overcome the channel materials erosional resistance initiating the 
erosion process leading to failure (Hancox, 1999). Slow migration of a phreatic front through the dam, to 
daylight at the downstream face some time after formation, may also cause long-delayed failure. 
Similarly if reservoir inflow and outflow are in equilibrium due to evaporation, or seepage through the 
dam material, the lake level can stabilise below the crest level without overtopping.  
 
Dodge (1988), reporting on embankment tests assessing crest and face protection schemes that would 
permit overtopping flow without causing dam breach, concluded that material placement controlled the 
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erosion process (Wahl, 1998). Overtopping flow was described to evolve from planar sheet flow to chute-
pool flow, characterized by reduced erosion rates.  
 
08 $
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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
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Non-Darcy flow conditions can develop for flow through a rockfill dam with a wide profile (Li, 1998). 
Such conditions are due to seepage flow with a high Reynolds number in rockfill and the interaction 
between normal pressure seepage flow and overtopping flow. The stability of the rockfill then decreases 
with increasing slope caused by the increasing flow velocity and therefore increasing destabilising forces. 
Rathgeb (2000) suggests that rock sliding occurs at low discharges due to hydrodynamic uplift forces 
reducing the normal force on the sublayer and therefore the activated friction force (Figure 2.15). 
Movement of multiple rocks promotes the expansion of an upstream gap, causing higher dynamic forces 
on the rock behind the gap and, therefore the reduction of the erosion stability of the stone. 
 
 
Figure 2.15.. Incipient Motion in Rockfill layering (Rathgeb, 2000) 
 
Several investigators have attempted to apply the Shields parameter to the design of riprap and the 
prediction of riprap failure thresholds. The Shields parameter is the dimensionless ratio of inertial forces 
(due to bed shear) and gravitational forces on a riprap particle, expressed by Wittler (1994) as: 
 
 
 Equation 2.1 
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For large boundary Reynolds numbers (>103), most investigators have found the critical value of Shields 
parameter at incipient motion to be a constant. Wittler (1994) hypothesised that the correct critical value 
of Shields parameter is 0.047, even for shallow, highly aerated flows down rough, steep slopes. Wittler 
(1994) and Abt et al., (1987) also studied the influence of riprap gradation uniformity, reporting that well 
graded mixtures (less uniform) had significantly lower failure thresholds.  
 
Coleman et al., (2002) suggest that the critical velocity for incipient motion at the breach crest can be 
related to breach slope S by;  
 
S
c eV
11.37334.0 −=  Equation 2.2 
 
Hartung and Scheuerlein (1970) proposed a relation for fully-developed flow velocity over the 
downstream face of a rockfill dam as a function of the flow depth, slope, rock size, a particle packing 
factor, and an aeration factor. 
 
The aeration factor is given by; 
 Equation 2.3 
 
 
 
The critical velocity for incipient motion is then given as 
 
 Equation 2.4 
 
0(3
Seepage forces exist whenever there is a pressure gradient in permeable material that allows water 
movement. They induce many different types of geomorphic change described by several terms in the 
literature such as artesian sapping, tunnel scour, mass wasting, rilling and seepage induced transport.  
 
Seepage in a rock avalanche dam is usually free surface flow. While seepage flow is laminar in fine to 
medium grain size materials (clays and fine sands), subsurface flow may become very turbulent in rock 
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fill dams (or rock avalanche deposits). The analysis of flow through a rock avalanche deposit is thus 
complicated by the non-linear relationship between discharge velocity and the applied hydraulic gradient. 
Seepage flow through landslide dams will therefore depend mainly on the geometry of the rock particles 
and the voids within the deposit. 
43$!2"#1
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With increasing population growth and land use pressure encouraging development in steep, marginal 
alpine valleys, the temporal disruption of river channels by landslide dams can pose substantial hazards. 
Catastrophic outburst floods from naturally dammed reservoirs causing loss of lives, housing and 
infrastructure have occurred repeatedly in many upland regions of the world (Costa and Schuster, 1988; 
Casagli and Ermini, 2003). The seismogenic landslide dam that blocked the Dadu River, China in 1786, 
breached to produce a flood wave that travelled 1400km killing 100,000 people (Li, 1989). More recently, 
the 1967 Tanggudong landslide (68 x 106 m3), which dammed a major tributary of the Yangtze to an 
elevation 175m above its natural valley floor, produced a peak discharge of 53,000 m3/sec upon 
breaching,. The scale of such events can also lead to significant economic loss, exemplified in the 
backwater flooding of the Spanish Forks River (1983), inundating the town of Thistle, Utah to cause 
US$400 million damage (Costa and Schuster, 1988). 
 
The failure process is specific to each dam, dictated primarily by the volume, distribution and 
geotechnical properties of the displaced material and the rate of inflow behind the impoundment. While 
most outburst events are initiated by a combination of climatic and hydrologic variables, failures may also 
be initiated by landsliding or ice-fall into the reservoir. The severity of downstream flooding may depend 
on 1) dam material composition; 2) volume and rate of outburst flows; 3) volume of lacustrine sediment 
behind the impoundment; and 4) the character of the downstream valley, particularly the volume of loose, 
easily erodible material available for the bulking process (ie entrainment of loose materials) (Schuster, 
2000).  
 
Various researchers (e.g. Costa 1985; Evans, 1986; Froehlich, 1987) have attempted to establish empirical 
relationships among key parameters such as dam height, reservoir volume and breach. These relationships 
often result in the segregation of dams according to type (Figure 2.16, after Costa and Schuster, 1988) or 
inferred failure mechanism (Casagli and Ermini, 2003). Dam breach technologies will be treated in more 
detail in Chapter 6. 
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Rock avalanche dams have a bimodal overall grain size distribution resulting from material heterogeneity 
and therefore differ significantly from constructed dams. This difference is observed in the comparison of 
peak discharges from natural and artificial structures (Figure 2.16).  
 
 
Figure 2.16..Flood peak discharge versus dam factor for constructed, landslide, and glacial dams (Costa, 1985) 
 
 
Peak outflow rates from failed landslide dams appear to be a little smaller than those for constructed dams 
with the same dam height and reservoir volume. This can be attributed to the higher volumes of sediment 
present in the formation of a landslide dam, prolonging the breach-erosion process (more sediment and 
debris to be eroded before a full breach is developed). The emplacement of large sediment volumes also 
cause landslide dams to have a larger footprint than constructed dams (Figure 2.17), resulting in 
significant elongation of the breach channel.  
 
 
Figure 2.17..Comparative Geometries of Landslide Dams and Constructed Dams (Fread, 1988) 
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The geomorphic change in the downstream reach of a valley below the point of rock avalanche dam 
failure will vary with the amount of sediment transported, velocity of the peak discharge, duration of the 
flooding and river bed slope (Costa and Schuster, 1988). Channel degradation resulting from breach 
discharges may remove the support at the toe of a slope leading to collapse of the valley side. Similar 
valley side destabilisation processes have been observed to also occur through aggradation-induced lateral 
erosion (Davies, pers comm.).  
 
Significant geomorphic change may occur upstream also through rapid reservoir drawdown behind the 
impoundment, initiating valley wall instability (a secondary hazard), from removal of lateral support 
immediately following lake drainage (Hancox, 1999). 
 
Failure of a landslide dam generates large increases in sediment transport, promoting localised bed 
aggradation through gradient reduction and consequent avulsion in the downstream channel. Bathurst and 
Ashiq (1998) observed localised bed aggradation to seriously affect the medium and long term channel 
morphology and stability. Comparison of downstream, post breach channel profiles on the Poerua River 
reveal a maximum bed level increase of 4 m, (Hancox et al., 2005) with the most severe channel 
instability occurring proximal to the gorge exit (Figure 2.18). 
 
Generation of hyperconcentrated/debris flows as reported by King et al., (1989) and Cruden and Lu (1992) 
pose a significantly higher geomorphic impact potential than mere water floods given sufficient 
entrainment and concentration of reservoir sediment, dam material or downstream channel alluvium by 
bulking Schuster (2000). 
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Figure 2.18. Aerial photos of the Poerua River fan showing the post failure geomorphic features. A, October 1999, 
2 days after the dam B, August 2001, after 22 months of sediment aggradation and erosion. (Hancox et al., 2005) 
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Failure of the dam structure most commonly results from erosion of embankment material by the flow of 
water either over or through the dam. The former results from overtopping of the dam crest and 
subsequent erosion. The latter gives rise to internal erosion or piping. Overtopping it is the most common 
cause of failure in natural dams (Figure 2.19).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.19.  Most common modes of failure 
(Costa and Schuster, 1988) 
  

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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
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Overtopping failure is caused by water spilling over the dam crest subsequently eroding a channel along 
the downstream face of the dam (Manville, 2001). Growth of the breach generally involves erosion of the 
channel base via sediment entrainment and knick-point retreat in conjunction with mass failure of the 
channel sidewalls and downstream dam face.  
 
Armouring of the breach channel (Figure 2.20) (particularly in dams with d50 > 1mm), and sediment 
accumulation immediately downstream of the dam, will restrict the depth to which the breach erodes. 
Costa and Schuster (1988) in a study of 73 landslide dams from around the world, found 50% failed due 
to overtopping. In a later study of 202 landslide dams by Schuster (1993), 97% failed by overtopping. 
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Figure 2.20 Overtopping Breach Incision of the Poerua Landslide dam (Hancox et al., 2005) 
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
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Piping is a significant mechanism of initiating dam failure, often leading to a similar breach erosion 
process as overtopping. Singh (1996) defines piping as subsurface erosion initiated by percolating which 
removes solid particles and produces tubular underground conduits that appear initially as springs or 
seepage on the downstream face. Piping is usually initiated low on the dam, due to the higher hydrostatic 
pressure gradient there. Once sufficient particles have been removed to form a conduit for water, the flow 
regime is changed from seepage to pressure flow in a closed conduit. As the pipe grows laterally and 
vertically, support for the dam crest is removed initiating collapse and the development of an open breach 
(Manville, 2001). Although multiple pipes may be active early in the breach, they are ultimately 
superseded by the conduit with the highest discharge and without intervention, erosion continues at an 
increasing rate as the cavity widens.   
 
Landslide dams are particularly susceptible to piping due to their heterogeneous nature - unlike man made 
structures such as embankment dams, which have undergone systematic design and compaction to reduce 
permeability which minimises the potential for piping (Meyer et al.,1994). In artificial dams, piping can 
be initiated by; intrinsic soil properties, hydraulic fracturing from internal stresses in specific layers 
becoming lower than hydrostatic pressures, impacts of bioturbation, and differential settlement. Piping 
can also result from leaking caused by inadequately compacted or pervious layers in an embankment, 
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inferior compaction adjacent to concrete outlet pipes, or poor compaction and bond between the 
embankment and the foundation or abutments. 
 
The formation of conduits from internal erosion in landslide dams is a function of the material 
composition of the dam. Because of their composition, landslide dams are not particularly subject to 
failure by internal erosion (Costa and Schuster, 1988). Within their inventory Costa and Schuster only 
accredit 2 failures to piping related processes. Davies and McSaveney (2004) attribute the low frequency 
of seepage, slumping or piping related landslide dam failures to a wide grain-size distribution and the 
minimal average void size of dam materials which act as an impermeable barrier when saturated. 
Following emplacement of the dam, seepage rates will be low and therefore slumping on the downstream 
dam face due to daylighting of the phreatic surface is likely to require a long time to occur, and is 
therefore relatively unlikely prior to overtopping. It can however reduce the ability of a spillway channel 
to resist erosion by surface flow. 
 
537!	1
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If the downstream face of the dam becomes saturated, sloughing (or raveling) may occur, whereby 
erosion at the downstream toe may cause a slide in the material just upslope, thinning the embankment.  
 
5(3$

Slope failure is commonly associated with both piping and overtopping when vertical erosion 
oversteepens the breach sidewalls leading to gravitational collapse (Manville, 2001). Dam failure is 
initiated when the hydraulic pressure exerted by the impounded water overcomes the dam materials’ 
frictional resistance to shear. Dunning et al., (2005a) suggest that slope failure, particularly on the 
downstream face, may be prevalent in dams that appear stable due to the ability of the carapace to allow 
overflow without internal erosion (equilibrium inflow/ outflow). 
 
5
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When a landslide blocks a tributary, leading to the formation of a large lake upstream of populated areas 
or major infrastructure, there is a need to minimise the impact of an outburst flood. This is often best 
achieved by reducing the capacity of a dam to store water by lowering the dam crest through construction 
of a spillway over the dam. Other methods include blasting of the dam using explosives; however this 
technique is not as controlled as spillway construction. Alternately stabilisation of the reservoir to a 
maximum freeboard can be achieved through tunnelling into abutment rocks below the minimum crest 
height allowing drainage of lake water. The requirements of good access, high cost and plentiful time 
precludes the use of this approach for many rock avalanche dams.  
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Overtopping erosion of a rock avalanche dam is a multivariable, multidisciplinary problem. Poweledge et 
al., (1989) provided clear descriptions of the initial hydraulic and erosion zones relating to the three flow 
regimes set up across a typical embankment during the initiation of overtopping. These zones indicate 
approximate positions for the transition of flow across the embankment from subcritical to the critical and 
supercritical flow regimes (Figure 2.21).  
 
 
Figure 2.21. Flow and erosion regimes in embankment overtopping (Powledge et al.,1989) 
 
In the subcritical flow region on the dam crest, energy slopes, velocities, and tractive stresses are 
relatively low. A transition to supercritical flow occurs on the downstream side of the crest. Energy slopes 
and tractive stresses are higher in this region, and erosion is sometimes observed as formation of a 
knickpoint at the downstream edge of the crest. The third flow regime involves supercritical flow and 
erosion on the downstream face of the dam. The energy slope is steep causing higher velocities. Shear 
stress also varies through horizontal and vertical flow convergence (Figure 2.22). 
;1:!(3
When slope exceeds critical slope - that is when the Froude number exceeds unity - much higher 
velocities result (Jarrett, 1984). Most analysts model large discharges through high gradient reaches as 
supercritical flow (Trieste, 1992). While this assumption may be valid for man-made channels of smooth, 
non erosive materials and uniform bedrock natural channels, it is questionable for most natural channels 
modelled. However, Grant (1997) suggests that high-gradient streams with beds ranging from sand to 
boulders typically achieve an equilibrium adjustment between the flow, sediment transport, and channel 
morphology at or near critical flow. 
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Figure 2.22.. Flow Convergence (Davies pers comm.) 
 
 
Within high gradient channel reaches, supercritical flow may occur for very short distances, but it 
normally changes back to subcritical flow because of extreme energy dissipation such as hydraulic jumps, 
turbulence and obstructions. Therefore, both large and small flows in steep natural channel reaches may 
alternate between sub critical and supercritical. Studies by Jarrett (1984) and Grant (1997) have suggested 
that supercritical flow does not occur extensively in most natural high-gradient channels. This has 
important implications for the modelling of natural and artificial dam break events because, if applied 
over long channel reaches, assuming supercritical flow could cause error in predicted flood depths and 
widths, velocities and travel times. The assumption of critical flow in steep channel floods would simplify 
many existing unknown sediment transport relationships (particularly at high slopes) and would allow 
resistance equations such as Manning’s to be replaced with   = (gd)0.5 (Trieste, 1995). 
 
-% 
)#331:
The mechanism of erosion involved is described by Singh (1996, p.34) as “complex and governed by the 
structure of the material and the nature of the interaction between the pore and eroding fluids”. Erosion 
will occur when local shear stress exceeds a critical value, after which particles are set in motion (Singh, 
1996). The rate at which the erosion process occurs is dependent upon both the erodibility of the dam 
forming material and the intensity of the water flow. In non-cohesive materials, erodibility depends 
primarily on grain size distribution, density, grain shape and arrangement. The main resistance to erosion 
by water is offered by the submerged weight of sediment, ie. gravity and friction forces (Singh, 1996).  
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For embankment dams, Powledge et al., (1989) listed the following factors having a strong influence on 
the initiation and rate of erosion: 
1. Embankment configuration, types and densities of materials  
2. Maximum velocity attained by the flow 
3. Discontinuities, cracks or voids in the slope and anomalies at the toe 
4. Presence and height of tail water on the downstream slope 
5. Flow concentration at low points along the embankment  
 
During overtopping, seepage daylighting at the toe of the downstream face accelerates bed slope erosion 
due to uplift on bed grains. As overtopping flows accelerate down the downstream face, the highest 
kinetic energy is achieved towards the base; the point where the materials shear stress is most likely to be 
exceeded by the flow (Singh, 1996). Tractive stresses are very high, and changes in slope or surface 
discontinuities can concentrate stresses and initiate erosion causing head cutting and upstream migration 
of a widening scour hole.  
 
 
-+%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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Breaching in embankments may develop by tractive or headward erosion. Headcut erosion is the process 
of fluvial erosion extending in an upstream direction. A headcut may be defined as a steep drop in 
channel bed elevation. The headcut retreats progressively headward as the base of the headcut deepens 
and widens (Figure 2.23). Failure and breaching occurs when the headcut migrates through the upstream 
crest of the dam (Hanson et al., 2003).  
 
 
                                Figure 2.23. Headcut erosion of a cohesive embankment (Hanson et al.,2003)  
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Alternatively a breach may also develop by down cutting, a channel incision process caused by erosion of 
a channel, usually characteristic of non cohesive granular material. Down-cutting behaviour is commonly 
observed in the breaching of sand dikes (Visser, 1998) where it requires preferential flow in a zone of 
weakness to initiate vertical and lateral incision of the embankment.   
 
-  	$% 
Observations of earth-dam failures such as those reported by Ralston, (1987) and laboratory experiments 
(AlQaser, 1991) indicate that the process of breach formation involves both tractive erosion of sediment 
and collapse of large masses of sediment from the breach walls, which are subsequently entrained and 
removed by the flowing water.  
 
There are several physically-based embankment dam breach models that simulate the erosion processes 
with time, based on the fundamental assumption that the primary erosion mechanism is sediment 
transport (Lou, 1981; Singh and Scarlatos, 1985). In such models both tractive and mass-wasting erosion 
processes are assumed to operate simultaneously.  
 
Recent research has continued to emphasise sediment transport and breach channel incision (rather than 
headcut advance) as the critical erosion process in breaching of non-cohesive sediments. From studies of 
breach growth in sand dikes, Visser (1998) provides a detailed description of the erosion processes 
occurring during non-cohesive embankment failures, relating the rate of retrograde slope erosion and 
widening to sediment transport concepts. Coleman et al., (2002) in a study of overtopping failure in 
homogeneous embankments reported erosion to evolve from vertical to lateral in nature, with the breach 
channel initially eroding the downstream face with an invert slope parallel to the face, before flattening to 
a terminal value by rotating about a fixed pivot point along the base of the embankment  
 
-+
Predicting the size, shape and exact location of the initial breach is very difficult.  Overtopping is often 
induced by settlement within the dam sediment. If the largest settlement occurs at the centre of the dam, 
the greatest depths occur during overtopping at this point leading to a central failure. The heterogeneity of 
landslide material is likely to exert a variable resistance to shear on top of the dam. Therefore due to local 
weakness, erosion may be initiated under less than maximum stress (Singh, 1996).  
 
-.+(3
Previous researchers have typically approximated breach cross-sectional shapes as simplified trapezoids 
or triangles (MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis 1984). To a lesser extent, rectangular, parabolic, 
semicircular, cosine, and curved regime channel cross sections have also been used in breach 
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development analyses (Singh 1996). The predominant presumption of trapezoidal and rectangular breach 
shapes is based on observation of final breach shapes, given the difficulty of establishing dimensions 
during breaching. In a review of recent work, Manville (2001) states that values for the ratio of breach 
width to breach depth vary between 1-5 (Johnson and Iles, 1976), (Walder and O’Connor 1997). Andrews 
(1998) argues that these final shapes have been influenced by falling reservoir levels reflecting limited 
reservoir volumes as the breach has developed and do not represent the true shape below the water 
surface of the developing breach.  
 
Various researchers have derived empirical relationships and numerical models (e.g. BossBREACH, 
OUTFLOW3) to link lake and dam characteristics to total breach development time and breach geometry 
(presented in Section 7.2) for a variety of natural and constructed dam types, including landslides (Costa 
1985; Costa and Schuster 1988; Walder and O’Connor 1997). 
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Most dam breaches are trapezoidal in final form (MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis 1984); they may 
possibly also have this geometry during their development. MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis (1984) 
in their analysis of the failure of 42 US dams, concluded that breach geometry evolved from a triangular 
shape (2V:1H), to a trapezoid (2V:1H) assuming the breach had reached the base of the embankment and 
discharge was sufficient to continue eroding the breach laterally. Houston (1985), using the same dataset, 
also favoured generation of a trapezoidal geometry with 1V:1H side slopes and base width equal to the 
depth of the breach. The extent of lateral erosion was given as a function of reservoir size and volume of 
stored water. 
 
-.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While a triangular final breach profile is rarely documented in current literature, this geometry represents 
an important stage in breach development and may reflect the restriction of lateral erosion by a small 
reservoir volume (Johnson and Iles 1976), or the failure to reach a non-erodible foundation. 
 
-.!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Rectangular breach shapes have not been reported for observed dam failures. Fread (1988), however, used 
rectangular cross sections to represent various stages of a developing breach. Singh and Scarletos (1988) 
also successfully used a rectangular geometry to model the 1976 Teton failure.  
 
-..
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Several options for the assumption of curved breach shapes have been developed by various researchers. 
A parabolic breach shape was assumed by Harris and Wagner (1967) and Andrews (1998). 
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Singh (1996) considers flow over a dam as being comprised of three elements; 
 
• Flow over the crest 
• Flow through the breach; and 
• Flow through the breach channel on the downstream face. 
 
Assuming low tailwater conditions at the downstream face, the hydraulics associated with flow in the 
developing breach can be simplified. Flow at the upstream end of the breach will become critical, causing 
it to behave hydraulically as a broad-crested weir, where the breach discharge is given by (Henderson, 
1966): 
Qb= g0.5 H 2.5 f (shape)            Equation 2.5 
 
Fread (1987) incorporated this assumption into calculation of flow over the breach crest and into the 
breach channel. Singh and Scarlatos (1988), Pugh (1985) and Cristifano (1965) use the broad-crested weir 
equation to describe flow through the breach which enables breach flow to be expressed as a function of 
reservoir and crest level.  
 
Singh (1996) outlined the governing equations for flow over a dam which incorporates the continuity, 
broad-crested weir, breach shape geometric relation, resistance to flow equations. While the dam-break 
problem involves unsteady non-uniform flow, the steep gradients and short channel lengths involved 
justify the assumption of quasi-steady flow, allowing the methods of flow approximation described above.  
 
Flow through a breach channel was calculated by Fread (1988) using the Manning Formula, where the 
Manning friction factor n was derived from the Strickler equation. Alternately, the Chezy formula was 
used for breach channel flow by Guiseppetti and Molinaro (1989). The Strickler equation was also used to 
determine the Chezy C parameter in the Chezy formula. 
 
Analyses based on the full development of unidirectional free surface flow (de Saint Venant equations) 
have been used by Ponce and Tsivoglou (1981) and Macchione and Sirangelo (1988). 
 
The breach development process is highly dynamic so breach flow analysis is extremely difficult. 
Unsteady flow conditions combined with uneven bed geometry invalidate the use of the Manning 
equation. Similarly the de Saint Venant equations are invalidated by the fact that streamline curvature is 
not small, hence vertical accelerations may not be negligible, and the slope of the downstream face of the 
embankment is considered steep in hydraulic terms. Although the broad-crested weir equation represents 
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an approximate measure, it provides reasonable results and can be incorporated into an approximate 
relationship for breach width as a function of breach depth (Jack, 1996).  
(	3
Sediment transport by breach flows reflects the flow rate, material composition and channel gradient. The 
amount of channel erosion may be directly related to the channel gradient, roughness and the flow regime, 
which will determine the size of the material being transported and resultant breach size. Because 
sediment supply is unlimited, sediment transport capacity equations can be used. 
 
The problem of defining critical flow conditions associated with the inception of sediment transport is of 
fundamental importance to understanding mechanisms associated with fluid erosion in channels of 
variable gradient. Tractive shear theory remains the basis for sediment discharge in low gradient alluvial 
streams. For coarse bed materials, the critical unit tractive force necessary to initiate bedload movement is 
a function of bed-sediment size. Tractive shear theory is therefore also applied in sediment discharge 
calculations for dam breaching (Singh, 1996). The sediment transport relationships proposed by 
Schoklitsch (1962) and Smart and Jaeggi (1983), are particularly relevant to breach development in rock 
avalanche dams because they were derived for steep slopes from laboratory and field studies. 
 
(	<,;9/
The Smart and Jaeggi (1983) relationship, an extension of the Meyer-Peter and Müller formula; (Equation 
2.6) is applicable to steep bed slopes in the range of 0.04-20% and sediment sizes of d50>0.04mm and 
therefore useful in the study of sediment transport in a dam breaching event. 
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In which φ  = dimensionless sediment transport rate ( )[ ][ 5.031 −− gdsqsb  
 
r
s
K
K
= a correction factor for bed roughness; and  
 θ  = dimensionless bed shear stress ( )[ ]dsHS 1/ −  
 
 Where sbq  = volumetric sediment discharge per unit channel width; 
 sK  = Srickler coefficient for no wall drag  
 rK  = the bed grain roughness  
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For bed plane conditions Equation 2.6 has the form (Smart, 1984); 
 
( ) 5.18 crθθφ −=    Equation 2.7 
 
Where 
crθ  = the critical dimensionless shear stress introduced by Shields (1936) 
 
The resulting relationship, unlike the Meyer-Peter - Müller formula, accounts for the effect of non-
uniformity in sediment grain size using the ratio d90/d30, therefore giving it specific application to the 
modelling of a breaching rock avalanche deposit with extreme material heterogeneity. Smart and Jaeggi 
(1983) also replace the bed roughness correction factor Ks/Kr with a resistance factor (C), defined as the 
ratio of mean velocity to shear velocity, to give;  
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Modelling the transport of large sediment inputs down steep channel systems using equations established 
by Meyer-Peter and Muller (1948) and redefined by Smart and Jaeggi (1983) are useful for understanding 
fluid erosion in steep channels but are often hampered by unreliable sediment discharge functions and 
linkages with the geometry, friction, and armouring of erodible channels. 
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Corrado et al., (2006) consider that bed-load transport rate within the breach channel can be adequately 
simulated using the Schoklitsch (1962) tractive force formula. This equation furnishes the best results 
under conditions of unlimited supply and for mountain rivers (coarse grain-size and steep slopes; Bathurst 
et al., 1996).  
 
Bed load transport is calculated as follows; 
 
)(2500 5.1 cs qqSm −=     Equation 2.9 
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Where ms = transport rate per unit width (kg/s);  
 S = channel slope; 
 q = volumetric water discharge per unit width (m3/s); 
 qc = critical volumetric water discharge per unit width (m3/s); 
 	s = specific mass of sediments (kg/m3),  
 	 = specific mass of water (kg/m3) 
 d40 = diameter for which 40% of sediments are finer (m). 
 
 ( 	
The relationships between fluvial process and form are often extremely difficult to quantify using 
conventional field and analytical techniques. Physical modelling provides a complementary technique to 
these methods and may be used to simulate complex processes and feedbacks in many geomorphic 
phenomena (Peakall et al.,1996).  
 
Through this technique, the formative processes can be observed, usually in a reduced time-frame, within 
a controlled and manageable laboratory environment to produce valuable quantitative information. 
Physical models may allow incorporation of variables which have markedly non-linear effects on the 
resultant dynamics or morphology.  
 
Chapter 2 Literature Review of Rock Avalanche Dams 
50 
 
Historically, small-scale embankment failure research was considered to be qualitative due to the 
difficulty of adequately reproducing the complex processes of erosion and sediment transport in steep, 
shallow flows at small scales; research in large-scale facilities was considered more quantitative (Singh, 
1996). Random influences can be substantial, and thus repetition of model tests is critical. 
 
Physical scale modelling to verify the role of the carapace facies in overtopping induced breach 
development appears to be a potentially useful approach, owing to the scale and cost of the structures 
under investigation. Several researchers have previously used this approach to identify and examine the 
factors affecting the temporal evolution of overtopping breaching phenomena. 
 
(
	
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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Donadini and Kunz (2001) and Davies et al.,(2006 in press) successfully used physical scale modelling to 
verify the failure sequence of the Poerua rock avalanche dam, in Westland, New Zealand, and collect data 
on the hydrograph shape generated by overtopping failure of a homogeneous dam of this type. After 
testing various dam geometries in a tilting v-shape flume, they concluded that higher peak discharges 
were characteristic of smaller dam volumes and larger water volumes. Although the highest peak 
discharges were generated by the steepest dam geometries, the gradient of the upstream valley bed slope 
appeared to exert the greatest control on peak discharge, due to its critical influence dam volume
. 
Furthermore channel gradient was found to exert significant control on peak discharge, with recorded Qp 
rates from a valley bed slope of 5° appearing 20-30% lower than those recorded on a bedslope of 3.5° (a 
smaller peak discharge for steeper valley bed slopes).  
 
A constant inflow rate of 3 L/s was used in the model to fill and overtop the dam, corresponding to 800 
m
3/s in the prototype (equivalent to a 2-year flood in the Poerua River). Using a linear scale ratio of 1:150 
( 150=λ ), the recorded breach outflow from the model achieved a high degree of similarity to outflow 
and temporal rates inferred during the prototype event. Application of regression-based peak discharge 
estimations (Costa, 1988) were also in agreement with the modelled rates. 
 
Investigation of breach development in overtopping non-cohesive embankments by Coleman et al., (2002) 
reveals that erosion primarily evolves from vertical to lateral, involving the processes of tractive shear 
and turbulence. The breach channel initially erodes the downstream face of the embankment with an 
invert slope parallel to the face; the breach invert slope then progressively flattens to a final value by 
rotating about a fixed pivot point along the base of the embankment, the location of this pivot point being 
a function of the size of the embankment material.  
 
In terms of hydraulic performance, Coleman et al., (2002) also concluded that breach development was 
consistent with the principle of minimum rate of energy dissipation for streams, whereby a stream is 
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assumed to change its channel geometry in a manner that tends towards producing a minimum rate of 
energy dissipation (Chanson, 1999). Such channel geometry has been observed to correspond to 
maximum sediment transport conditions (Davies and McSaveney, in press 2007). 
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	
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Scaled reproduction of processes and forms resulting from the overtopping of heterogeneous non-
cohesive rock avalanche deposits requires adherence to correct geometric, kinematic and dynamic scale 
ratios between the model and prototype. Often, all relations cannot be satisfied simultaneously and 
therefore a systematic procedure for selecting the similitude requirements that minimise the scale effects 
is required. Using dimensional analysis, similarity relations can be derived and relationships between 
geomorphic forms and processes established and interpreted in the context of the assumptions used. Scale 
models are based on similarity theory, which produces a series of dimensionless parameters that fully 
characterise the phenomena.  
 
Scale models have two advantages over mathematical models (Peakall et al.,1996); 
 
1. The formative processes can be observed, usually in a reduced time frame, within a controlled 
and manageable laboratory environment.  
2. They allow incorporation of variables which are not known a priori and may have markedly non-
linear effects on the resultant dynamics or morphology 
 
 	
( 
The success of any physical scale model depends on the proper choice of similitude requirements and the 
extent to which they are satisfied. For any set of similar phenomena, all the corresponding dimensionless 
characteristics (dimensionless combinations of dimensional quantities) have the same numerical values. 
As the hydraulics are principally concerned with the forces that affect fluid and sediment motion, 
hydraulic similarity requires dynamic similarity between a model and its prototype. 
 
Three degrees of similarity are required between a model and its prototype. 
 
Geometric Similarity requires a constant ratio of length dimensions. 
Kinematic Similarity requires constant ratios for both length and time dimensions to give a similar 
velocity. 
Dynamic Similarity requires constant ratios for length, time and mass to ensure similarity of forces; note 
that this incorporates geometric and kinematic similarity.  
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Overtopping failure is a free surface, gravity dominated phenomenon, and therefore Froudian model 
scaling laws apply, requiring that the ratios of gravity to inertia forces correspond between model and 
prototype (Andrews et al., 1999). In an idealised situation, every variable should be perfectly scaled in the 
model, requiring unity between Reynolds, Euler, Froude and Weber numbers in both the model and 
prototype; however due to experimental limitations, fulfilment of this requirement is never possible. 
 

Using dimensional analysis, the several parameters which describe a given system can be combined into a 
smaller number of dimensionless groups (Young and Warburton, 1996). Assuming a non-cohesive, 
homogenous material, two phase flow over a mobile bed can be completely described by; 
 
• properties of the fluid; the dynamic viscosity () and density ( ) 
• properties of the sediment; grain size (D), density ( s) grading coefficient (Ø) 
• the nature of the flow; bed slope (S), flow depth (d) and gravity (g) 
 
)( ρργ −= ss g
   Equation 3.1 
 
SgdV =*
   Equation 3.2 
 
Substitution of independent parameters such as gravity into Equation 1 to give the specific weight of the 
granular material (Eq. 3.1) and flow characteristics into Equation 2 to calculate the shear velocity (Eq. 
3.2) produces the four dimensional groups (Equations 3.3-3.6) after Young and Warburton (1986).  
 
v
DV *
*Re =
   Equation 3.3 
  
      
D
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s
V
γ
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*
*
=
   Equation 3.4   
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D
ddrelative =
    Equation 3.5 
 
ρ
ρρ srelative =
    Equation 3.6 
 
If the linear scale ratio between prototype and model is kept constant for all four of these terms, the model 
can only satisfy full dynamic similarity with a length scale of unity, thus requiring a full scale model 
(scale ratio 1:1).  
 
When modelling dam breaching, the model grain size must be large enough to ensure rough turbulent 
flow (Re* >70; Young and Warburton, 1996) necessitating the use of gravel and sand sized particles. As 
flow in the prototype is entirely turbulent, so must flow in the model. The criterion for turbulent flow in 
open channels is the Reynolds Number (Equation 3.7).  
 
500Re ≥=
v
Vd
     Equation 3.7 
 
.= !>
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Warburton and Young (1996) specify five requirements to be met in order for dynamic similarity to be 
achieved; 
 
• sediment density is equal in both model and prototype 
• grain sizes are scaled directly by length scale 
• water is used as the model fluid 
• flow is rough-turbulent in the model 
• bed slopes are equal in model and prototype  
 
In the present case the grain-size Reynolds number criterion is relaxed, while ensuring that flow remains 
in the fully turbulent regime, but the Froude number is scaled correctly. Relaxation of the grain-size 
Reynolds number allows more flexibility in the model scaling than variation in the Froude number which 
must be more tightly constrained. This technique is known as Froude scale modelling (FSM) and is 
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commonly used successfully in moveable–bed modelling. In free-surface flows, most laboratory studies 
are based upon a Froude similitude (Henderson, 1966; Chanson, 1999). 
 
Flow through a developing breach in a landslide dam can be simplified by the assumption that there is no 
back-water effect at its downstream end. In such a case the flow at the upstream end of the breach will 
become critical (Fr = 1), causing it to behave hydraulically as an undrowned broad-crested weir (Walder 
and O’Connor, 1997).  
 
Froude scaling using a length scaling ratio of  = 400 was chosen. The principal criterion for choosing the 
optimal length scale for an FSM study is a function of the ratio between the prototype Re* and the 
minimum Re* for turbulent conditions in the modelled flow. The practical limitations are usually size of 
the available flume facility, or the limits of space, time and money available when constructing a new 
flume. A length scale of  = 400 also allows the average geometry of prototype landslide dams to be 
matched from linear scaling of model geometries. Mention that prototype dams have height ~ 100 m, 
models usually <1 m; is shows where the 400 comes from. 
 
All model dimensions and hydraulic data outlined in Table 3.2 (kinematic and dynamic similitude) can be 
scaled to prototype values using the relationships derived from Froude Scaling outlined in Table 3.1. The 
geometric, kinematic and dynamic scaling ratios for the Froude model are shown in the following 
equations, where  equals the model to prototype scaling ratio for the property x. 
 
                             Table 3.1. Froude Scaling Ratios 
Parameter Ratio Scaling  Xp.Xm 
Length Xp/Xm =  400.1 
Time tp/tm =  =1/2 20.1 
Volume Vp/Vm = 3 64x106.1 
Flow Qp/Qm = 5/2 32x105.1 
Force Fp/Fm = = 3 64x106.1 
Cohesion Cp/Cm =  400.1 
 
A key factor in similitude is the model roughness. Turbulent flow in the model can be assured by 
specifying a minimum Reynolds number for the model flow. Therefore, the Reynolds number similarity 
is relaxed, with the proviso, Re remains within a fully turbulent flow regime (Re>500). Turbulent flow 
implies that the friction factor is independent of the Reynolds number.  
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              Table 3.2. Summary Table of scaled model design parameters and conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ł Assumed flow depth 
§ Usual requirement is for both model and prototype values to be >70 (rough turbulent flow). 
¶ Usual requirement is for model and prototype vales to be identical (free surface flow) 
jj Usual requirement is for model value to be >10–100. 
ŁŁ Usual requirement is for model and prototype vales to be identical 

0(%$$(3
Scale effects (discrepancies between model and prototype) generally arise from imperfect modelling of 
geometric and kinematic conditions rather than a flaw in basic theory of dynamic similitude (Young and 
Warburton, 1996).  
 
0 	$:	
Model dissimilarity occurs when parameter values become inconsistent between model and prototype 
(usually caused by use of a small scale). Correct modelling of shear stresses is a vital component of the 
successful modelling of the transport rate of non-cohesive sediments. Owing to turbulence, the tractive 
stress, and consequently the drag force on the particle, is subject to fluctuations. The choice of scale for 
modelling erosion process, is restricted by a requirement for rough turbulent flow. Yalin (1971) suggests 
this critical value for Re* lies between 70-150. The scatter of incipient motion values derived from 
different studies however suggests that transitional and rough turbulent flow conditions may prevail at 
lower Re* (Young and Warburton, 1996).  
 
Pugh (1985) also suggests that models operated solely according to Froude scaling do not accurately 
simulate the tractive forces (sediment erosion) and therefore should maintain a Re* >70. In this case, the 
relative magnitudes of viscous forces will be approximately correctly simulated in the model. 
 
Parameter Prototype Value Model Value  Scale 
Flow depth ( m) ~8 ~0.02 400.1 Ł 
Mean flow rate ( m3/s-1)  ~3400 ~1.08 x10-3 3200000.1 
Sediment d50 ( m) 0.1-1.0 6x10-3 - 6x10-4 400.1 
Reynolds number  ~17x106 ~2000 400.1 
grainsize Reynolds  2 x 105 ~ 107 400.1§ 
Assumed Froude  1 1 1.1¶ 
Weber number 43 0.1 400.1 jj 
Relative Density (kg/m3) 2.6 2.6 1.1 ŁŁ 
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In rough-turbulent flow, grain detachment and motion are independent of fluid viscosity and therefore Re* 
itself. Flow with Re between 500 and 2000 is transitional and has some characteristics of laminar flow, 
but some turbulence as well. Laminar flow also occurs locally in turbulent flows right at the contact 
between the fluid and a smooth surface it is flowing over as velocity decreases. This has important 
implications for transport of fine sediments. 
 
 Several problems arise in attempting to quantify bed load transport, especially in highly dynamic erosion 
environments, non-representative of the conditions used to derive many sediment transport relations. 
Yalin (1971) demonstrated that if Re* is below the critical threshold for a fully turbulent boundary while 
fluid and temperature characteristics are maintained for both model and prototype, dynamic similarity of 
sediment transport can never be achieved. Studies from river modelling also indicate that the inclusion of 
a high proportion of fine sediment in grain size distribution or local sorting in the model can vary and 
often increase bedload transfer, causing overestimation of bedload transport rates.  
 
4(
$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The forces caused by surface tension are very important in hydraulic models with lower flow velocities or 
small dimensions where the surface area to volume ratio is large, and the radii of curvature of the liquid 
surface, and the distances from the solid boundaries, are very small. Surface tension forces are negligible 
in field-scale rivers and should be kept negligible in hydraulic models also. 
 
σ
ρ 2
*
.. VdWe =
   Equation 3.8 
 
Defining a critical Weber number (Equation 3.8) for small hydraulic models has to date been largely 
based on operator experience. The calculated model Weber number of 43 for the present study is within 
the suggested range of critical values (10-120) which suggests that surface tension induced distortion may 
be minimal. Henderson (1966) advises that, as long as channel depths and widths are greater than 0.025-
0.05m capillarity and surface tension can be ignored. Novak and Cabelka (1981) suggest three minimum 
operating conditions to reduce surface tension effects: 
 
• The length of a surface wave on the model is > 0.017m 
• The velocity at the water surface of the model is >0.23ms-1 so that gravity waves are free to 
develop 
• The depth of flow in the model is > 0.015m 
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As the current model adheres to the recommendations of both Henderson (1966) and Novak and Cabelka 
(1981), surface affects are assumed to be negligible and no adjustment using additives or rescaling is 
required. 
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The objectives for modelling the role of the carapace facies in breach development within rock avalanche 
deposits were as follows: 
 
1. To obtain data on the overtopping of a rock avalanche dam constructed of non-cohesive 
heterogeneous materials for the purpose of investigating the influence of the carapace in the 
stability of rock avalanche dams. This includes determination of the following parameters: 
 
• Breach outflow hydrograph 
• Evolution of breach geometry with time  
• Migration of the phreatic front during lake filling and overtopping 
 
2. To observe peak discharges and the rates of breach development for rock avalanche dam failure 
so as to assess the ability of contemporary engineering applications to represent the phenomena 
processes of catastrophic failure of rock avalanche dams.  
 
3. To quantify the uncertainty associated with peak discharge prediction from overtopping 
breaching of rock avalanche dams using four different modelling techniques. 
 
 
. 	"
3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In modelling events such as landslide dam formation and failure, a conservative approach or worst case 
scenario is the most appropriate for hazard management and emergency planning. 
 
• The presence of a carapace has been documented to act as a permeable spillway (as designed in 
various rockfill dams) promoting equilibrium conditions between inflow and outflow. A key 
assumption in modelling such phenomena would require a threshold condition (such as inflow 
rate, or lake level) to be exceeded to produce overtopping failure. 
 
• As landslide dam failure is most likely to be induced by excessive precipitation (Section 2.2.2); a 
storm hydrograph entering the impounded reservoir would cause inflow to increase to a definable 
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peak before subsiding. For this investigation the reservoir inflow rate was assumed to be constant. 
This approach accounts for the following conditions: 
 
1. The peak discharge of the inflow storm hydrograph occurs before emplacement of the 
rock avalanche impoundment. 
 
2. The storm event volume is insufficient to completely fill the impounded reservoir.  
 
3. Flow through a developing breach is simplified in assuming minimal back-water effects 
at the breach outlet, in turn causing flow at the breach inlet to become critical (Fr = 1), 
and behave hydraulically as a broad-crested weir (Chow, 1959; Henderson, 1956). 
Walder and O’Connor (1997) claim this simplification strictly valid only if the breach 
length is sufficient to promote the development of a critical flow regime. Frictional 
resistance to flow may be more prevalent in breach channels of natural dams which 
incorporate a broad geometry, resulting in an overestimate of outflow discharge. 
 
4. Given the inherent difficulty in modelling the dynamic and rapidly varied hydraulic 
processes observed in landslide dam failure, breach development is oversimplified using 
uniform steady-flow hydraulics. Such hydraulic regimes are a convenient “best guess” 
and therefore severely limit the applicability of various sediment transport models to dam 
breaching. 
 
.3
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The influence of inflow conditions on rock avalanche dam stability was a key objective of this research. 
From extensive preliminary studies (outlined in Figure 4.2), failure was assessed for both a high and low 
reservoir inflow condition. From these studies it was noted that a reservoir inflow of 0.001m3/s 
represented the minimum critical inflow capable of initiating failure in carapace dams (under laboratory 
conditions). Therefore a low inflow condition of 0.001m3/s was sufficient to reliably initiate failure, 
without overwhelming the intrinsic behaviour of the failing dam. Due to the nature of the scaling factor, 
the low inflow condition of 0.001m3/s in the laboratory is represented by an inflow of 3200 m3/s in the 
prototype. This is extremely conservative and of low probability, representing a 10 year flood or 
alternately a 100 year rainfall event within a 100 km2 catchment, produced by inundation of the catchment 
with >100 mm falling in 24 hours. The high inflow condition of 0.0035 m3/s (10,000 m3/s at the prototype 
scale) was only representative of a condition whereby multiple landslide dams had formed in a river 
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valley and a cascading outburst flow had been generated from an upstream collapse. All simulations used 
a constant inflow throughout the duration of breaching. Flow rates were measured with a Dall™ tube 
flowmeter. 
 
.(

A second objective was to assess the influence of dam material saturation on dam stability. Saturated 
conditions could result from slow rates of reservoir filling leading to complete saturation of the dam base 
before the reservoir level reaches the dam crest. Saturation may significantly influence dam stability.  
.%3$1
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Physical scale modelling of breach development processes in the overtopping failure of rock avalanche 
dams was carried out in the Fluid Mechanics Laboratory of the Civil Engineering Department at the 
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.  
 
The experimental procedure used for the Physical Scale Model (PSM) dataset (Figure 4.1) was refined 
from an extensive background study program (summarised in Figure 4.2). Over 100 dams were tested in 
this study, 60% of which constitute those used in background studies to refine the both the materials 
being tested and the research methodology used to generate appropriate relationships between breach 
geometry and the outflow hydrograph. 
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Figure 4.1..Experimental Procedure for Physical Scale Model dataset 
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Figure 4.2..Background Study Program 
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A purpose-built flume (Figure 4.3 and 4.4) was constructed for this research, to allow complete visibility 
of the breach development in longitudinal profile, in addition to accessibility for sediment retrieval. Water 
was sourced and collected from the laboratory constant head supply system.  
 
The flume incorporated a rectangular storage reservoir (simulating an impounded lake or water body), 
channelised flow through a flume to discharge into a sediment retrieval structure. The 0.5m deep, 0.5m 
wide and 4m long flume also had a 0.02m thick glass panel on one side to allow complete recording of 
the breaching process. The reservoir was 1.5 x 2.2m in plan, with a maximum storage volume of ~ 0.82 
m
3  (behind a 0.25m high dam). A 1m long sheet metal extension to the timber flume fed the discharged 
sediment and water to temporary storage; this was pumped to an external drain (Figure 4.4).  
 
The volume of the reservoir was selected to give a relatively long-duration outbreak event, so that the 
erosive processes occurring in the breach channel could be adequately monitored. This resulted in some 
dissimilarity with field situations in steep mountain terrain, where the lake volume is likely to be smaller 
relative to dam volume due to the steep valley slope and narrow valley width. Thus the peak discharges 
from the model are likely to be much higher than would be expected from a similarly-sized dam in a more 
realistic reservoir setting such as that observed for the Poerua event. 
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!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The flume was specifically designed for visualisation of the breach process. Video captured the failures of 
dams of variable composition for measurement of breach development and seepage rates. Three digital 
cameras recorded the breach development process for overhead, longitudinal and frontal profiles (Figure 
4.4). 
• The overhead profile was filmed using a Canon™ MV30i (speed: 25 frames/sec, shutter: 1/4 to 
1/10,000 sec: sand mode, lens F/4.1-4.9 zoom: 1:12) located 3m above the dam crest. 
 
• The longitudinal profile was filmed using a digital video-camcorder Canon™ XM2 (speed: 25 
frames/sec, shutter: 1/4 to 1/16,000 sec., lens F/1.6-2.9, zoom: 1:20; 1488x 1128 pixels) 
positioned perpendicular to the dam crest at a distance of 1.3m. 
 
• The frontal profile was filmed with a Sony™ Digital Handycam DCRTRV740E (speed: 25 
frames/sec, shutter: 1/4 to 1/10,000 sec: sand mode, lens F/4.1-4.9 zoom: 1:12). Positioned 2.5m 
from the dam crest. 
  
 
Figure 4.3.. Experimental Flume Set up 
 
  
 
Figure 4.4.. Laboratory Setup 
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When dam failure starts, the reservoir surface level starts decreasing and at the same time the outflow 
increases. By measuring the decrease of the water surface level, change in volume can be calculated, and 
thus the outflow discharge.  
 
During this experiment a rotcount meter (Figure 4.5) was used to measure the variations of the water 
surface level with a count rate of 5 seconds in “pulses”. The pulses were then converted into millimetres. 
One pulse was the 4000th part of one complete turn of the rotcount-wheel, which has a perimeter of 0.37m. 
This measuring apparatus had a very high precision (1 pulse = 0.0925 mm) and was able to record the 
transition from a rising to falling water level in the critical period following overtopping and breach 
incision. 
 
Figure 4.5.Rotcount meter 
 
The water level was recorded by a float, housed in a permeable chamber constructed from 0.15m 
diameter PVC piping within the reservoir itself. This chamber was designed to reduce the influence of 
wave action on the water surface being measured and increase the accuracy of the readout. The float 
resting on this water surface was attached to a steel tape which rested on the pulley wheel of the rotcount 
meter. Upon breaching at the dam crest, the float would fall with the falling reservoir level, with the 
rotcount meter recording the pulse count as the pulley wheel rotated. The pulse count was then 
electrically transmitted from the rotcount meter to a digital display output mounted on the flume wall. The 
breach discharge Qout(m3/s), was calculated by subtracting the reservoir inflow Qin (m3/s) from the total 
breach outflow  Q(m3/s). 
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This study incorporated a half-width simulation of overtopping failure. Preliminary studies outlined in 
Figure 4.2 indicated that due to settlement, overtopping would be concentrated at the central part of the 
dam crest to produce a breach which remained pseudo-symmetrical throughout development. Half breach 
simulations were found to accurately reproduce breach widths generated in full breach simulations for 
similar sediment and inflow conditions. Therefore half breach measurements can be extended to represent 
the full breach condition.  
  
Dam geometry and volume were held constant. Each dam was constructed to a predefined geometry 
marked on the exterior of the flume walls. The construction method varied depending on the dam type 
being modelled. Table 4.1 outlines the 6 types of dams constructed. 
 
                                    Table 4.1 Structures Tested 
Trial Abbreviation Definition Repetitions 
 1 Litre/sec 3 Litre/sec 
Heterogeneous 
    
Carapace DC Dry Carapace 2 4  
 SC Saturated Carapace 5 7 
 STC 
Saturated  Thickened 
Carapace 
 
2 5 
Homogeneous     
Carapace C Carapace 2 3 
Non-Carapace DB Dry Body 2 3 
 SB Saturated Body 3 6 

.0* 
The model dams were constructed to represent the average geometry and sedimentology of rock 
avalanche dams recorded in several inventories (Costa and Schuster 1988; Walder et al., 1997) . The dam 
was constructed with a downstream face slope of 25° and an upstream face slope of 15°, to produce a dam 
volume of 7.2 x 10-3 m3. This longitudinal section resembles that of the landslide dam which blocked the 
Poerua River valley in 1999 (Figure 4.6). The dam crest was maintained at a height of 0.25m above the 
flume base, with the breach pilot channel incised to a depth and width of 0.02m adjacent to the glass 
flume wall prior to reservoir filling. 
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Figure 4.6. Dam Geometry 
 
 
.0 
Field observations of rock avalanche deposits (Dunning et al.,2005) have led identified distinct zonations 
or facies, notably the carapace facies which is highly angular, boulder-sized and porous with a high 
hydraulic conductivity. The underlying body facies consists primarily of finely crushed material matrix 
containing larger clasts of all sizes, with a higher susceptibility to erosion. 
 
The construction materials were selected to accurately simulate the influence of material heterogeneity on 
breach development during overtopping failure of a rock avalanche dam. The selected material needed to 
be relatively impermeable and also non-cohesive. Cohesion in actual rock avalanche deposits is usually 
very low (Davies pers. comm.) and therefore in the model the cohesion of the dam material, which has to 
be reduced by the scaling factor () is likely to have a negligible influence on the breaching process. 
 
Overtopping and down cutting, promoting breach enlargement through sidewall failure are the most 
prominent failure mechanisms at the prototype scale. The representation of these processes requires 
approppriate model material. 
 
In preliminary studies materials including crusher dust and cyclone sand were tested to simulate body 
facies; however all had too much cohesion, particularly under saturated conditions. Silica sand was 
selected as the simulation material because of its low permeability, zero cohesion (when dry) and 
availability. Simulation of the carapace was achieved using crushed roading aggregate (10mm metal chip) 
derived from greywacke river gravels. The body facies was simulated using a mixture of four parts silica 
sand to one part aggregate. Standard sieve analysis tests were carried out for both the silica sand mixture 
and the aggregate to determine grain size distribution (Figures 4.7 to 4.8). The properties of the test 
material are listed in Table 4.2. 
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Figure 4.7.Grading curve for silica sand mixture used to simulate the body facies 
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Figure 4.8.Grading curve for aggregate used to simulate the carapace facies 
 
 
                               Table 4.2. Material Properties 
 



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The dam was constructed within the flume, with body sediment mixed to a standard ratio of 4:1 (silica 
sand mixture: aggregate) externally before emplacement. Construction of the dry dams incorporated a 
multiple stage system, to ensure a maximum degree of uniformity throughout the deposit. Each dam 
building stage involved placement of an equal material volume using the homogenised mixed sediment. A 
Sediment d50 (mm) 
Bulk dry density 
(kg/m3) 
Silica Sand Mixture 0.043 1505 
Aggregate 5 1353 
Chapter 4 Experimental Study 
71 
 
spade was then used for compaction and surface smoothing. Material compaction was assessed by hand 
and considered adequate when a firm response to applied pressure was felt without shear of the material.  
 
Construction of dry carapace (DC type) dams incorporated the emplacement of a carapace over the body 
material (Figure 4.9). The aggregate was deposited by shovel over the dam in a mantled morphology of 
uniform thickness. The thickness of the carapace layer required for saturated thick carapace (STC) dams, 
made uniformity difficult to maintain. No attempt was made to simulate the lobate morphologies of real 
rock avalanche deposits on the carapace structure. Apart from ensuring adherence to geometrical and 
volumetric constraints, the aggregate was not compacted or smoothed after placement. 
 
 
Figure 4.9..Dry Carapace (DC) and Dry Body (DB) dams after construction 
 
Saturated dams were built differently due to the change in geotechnical properties of the model material. 
Such tests were conducted following the completion of a non-saturated trial and involved collection and 
recycling of the sediment used in the previous trial. Consequently sediment/aggregate ratios in the model 
material for SC and STC trials were higher (3:1) due to the incorporation of the carapace aggregate into 
the body material on dam failure.  
 
Saturated dams were of standard geometry and volume. Compaction and smoothing were restricted to the 
downstream face. On contact with water, silica sands tended to bond to the aggregate and make visual 
distinction of carapace thickness and uniformity difficult. 
 
Homogeneous dams; Dry body (DB), Saturated Body (SB), and body composed of carapace (C) were 
constructed/ emplaced with adherence only to dam geometry and volume constraints.  
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Prior to the commencement of any trial, the following steps were required. 
 
• Removal of surface water in flume with wet/dry vacuum. 
• Longitudinal Camera, focused with display to audiovisual unit (aid for construction). 
• Dam construction. 
• Pilot channel cut. 
• Positioning and clamping of dam crest scale. 
• Timer turned on and reset to zero. 
• Remove foreign objects and obstructions to downstream flow. 
• Raise and secure the reservoir drainage pipe (inhibit reservoir drainage). 
• Sieve and basket positioned under flume extension for sediment retrieval. 
• Electronic readout for rotcount switched on and in view of camera. 
• Lighting (spot and focused) switched on and positioned (reflection management). 
• Longitudinal Camera, focused and in standby mode with feed to video capture on computer 
initiated. 
• Overhead Camera, focused and in standby mode. 
• Frontal Camera, focused and in standby mode. 
• Hazard barrier in place to redirect lab foot traffic. 
• Positioning of light restriction screen using lab crane.  
• Main laboratory pump switched on(feed from header tank). 
• Flow meter on, clear air from reservoir inflow valve. 
• Addition of premixed red food colouring (flow visualisation). 
• Lower polystyrene wave baffle sheet to water surface height. 
 
.5%3
During the background studies, 2 people were required to operate the experimental setup modelling the 
breach process, due to the initial study requirement of zero inflow upon dam overtopping. A technician 
was required to activate the main laboratory pump, and then control the reservoir inflow to a constant rate. 
The second person monitored the change in water surface elevation adjacent to the upstream dam crest. 
When the reservoir had reached the maximum crest height and overflow had initiated erosion on the 
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downstream face, the second person signalled the technician to terminate the inflow. The second person 
then took still-frame photos of the changing water surface elevation. 
 
To run the constant inflow experiments only 1 person was required after the technician had activated the 
main laboratory pump. The individual could monitor the inflow until the constant rate was achieved.  
 
.9!#1
The filling of the reservoir required particular care to minimise the influence of wave development and 
the potential for overtopping from a displaced or turbulent water profile. Wave reduction was achieved by 
the positioning of the inflow pipe behind a baffle plate, the use of a polystyrene wave sheet in the 
reservoir and the permeable housing for the rotcount float. 
 
.;	$ +
For the purposes of this study, the term breach parameters will include the parameters needed to 
physically describe the breach (breach depth, breach width, and side slope angles) as well as parameters 
that define the time required for breach initiation and development. These parameters are summarised 
below. 
 
Breach depth (dB) is defined for this study as the vertical extent of the breach, measured from a datum, 
usually the dam crest down to the invert of the breach (breach channel).  
 
Breach width is defined for this study as the breach width at the top (WT) and bottom (WB) of the breach 
opening. As outlined in Section 4.10, this study adopted the use of two cross sectional profiles for breach 
development analysis. 
 
Breach side slope factor is defined for this study as the angle of repose of the landslide material 
(approximately 45°). Accurately predicting the breach side slope angles is generally of secondary 
importance to predicting the breach width and depth. 
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Figure 4.10.. Temporal Breach Parameters 
 
 
The only other key physical parameter is that already identified as; 
 
Peak discharge (Qp) represents the highest recorded outflow to pass through the breach channel, 
signified by a point of inflection on the hydrograph and the transition from a rising to falling limb. 
 
Time related parameters are also required in modelling breach development. These are; 
 
Time to Peak Discharge (tp) for this study is defined as the time required for the outflow to reach its 
peak discharge (Figure 4.10). 
 
Breach Initiation Time for this study is defined as the time from when initial flow over or through a dam 
is identified to the first breaching of the upstream face. The use of a pilot channel is this study makes the 
duration of this stage significantly shorter than that observed for prototype events and therefore is not 
considered. 
 
Breach Development Time (tb) for this study is defined as the duration of time between the first 
breaching of the dam upstream face and the time at which; 
 
1. sidewall collapse into the breach channel ceased or 
 
2. flow velocity through the breach was insufficient to erode the breach bed or readily transport 
sediment through the breach channel (evaluated from flow depth). 
Chapter 4 Experimental Study 
75 
 
 
Identifying two distinct time parameters recognises that there are two phases in which the mechanics and 
rate of erosion can be dramatically different. This is discussed further in Section 5.7.2. 
 
.- 
$+
All breach parameter data was collected using digital video in x, y and z axes and analysed at the 
completion of each simulation. From each axis, 2 dimensions of the breach event were captured. The x 
axis (longitudinal profile) provided breach length and height, while the z axis (plan profile) provided 
breach width. Although the frontal profile in the y axis was captured, it was used specifically for 
verification of both x and y axes and identification of key failure mechanisms.  
 
From observation during testing, the breach evolved differently at the breach inlet (head) and outlet (toe). 
To describe the different breach behaviours, two key cross sections through the breach channel were 
identified. A primary cross section called Cmax was used to represent the breach inlet or crest maximum 
width position. This cross section was not fixed, but migrated upstream during breach development. A 
second, fixed cross section called Wm representing a minimum breach width position was used to 
characterise the outlet zone of the breach. All width measurements were made at these two cross sections 
(Figure 4.11). 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Specific cross sectional profiles established for collection of parametric data 
 
 
Breach width (WT and WB), breach water surface elevation (h), elevation of the breach bed (Hb), carapace 
thickness and crest migration were measured at both Cmax and Wm profiles, at 5 second intervals using a 
transparent overlay during the digital playback of longitudinal and overhead profiles. The complete 
datasets are given in Appendix F.  
Chapter 4 Experimental Study 
76 
 
 
The collection of depth data from both the Cmax and Wm cross sections in the longitudinal profile provided 
a high level of accuracy for verifying breach depth at the breach channel inlet and outlet positions. Cross 
sectional depths from Cmax and Wm profiles however, could not be integrated to produce an average breach 
depth. As dB  is critical to the development of breach geometry, its estimation became an integral part of 
this investigation. 
 
.+
In the real-life event of overtopping failure of a landslide dam, only a few parameters may be available. 
Dam height can usually be estimated accurately and is therefore a known parameter from which other 
variables such as breach depth, length and width (parameters with significant uncertainties) may be 
derived or presented. Contemporary empirical analysis techniques used in dam breach modelling 
(outlined in Chapter 6) also adopt the method of presenting unknown parameters as a function of known 
parameters. 
 
The method used to characterise the depth of the breach relates the final surface elevation of the breach 
channel (dB) below a predefined datum (usually the dam crest) to the original dam height (H).  
 
 In terms of the unknown parameter dB, the base level for the breach erosion process is usually 
represented by the former riverbed, or the original valley topography can be inferred from field 
observation. This level, outlined in Figure 4.12, is important in the consideration of a maximum dB , as 
peak discharge from large lakes is very sensitive to breach geometry (Walder et al., 1997). While peak 
discharge from small lakes displays higher sensitivity to breach development time (tb), breach depth is 
still a relevant parameter given the observation that breach development initially proceeds from vertical to 
lateral erosion. Partial failure in landslide dams has also been reported (Hancox et al.,2005; Costa and 
Schuster, 1988) to produce a higher elevation of the final breach channel (smaller dB) and therefore 
presentation of breach depth (dB) as a function of dam height (H) enables full consideration of the above 
mentioned scenarios.  
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Figure 4.12. Defining the uncertain parameter breach depth (dB) as a function of the known parameter dam height 
(H), which is measured from the dam crest to the base level for breach erosion (indicated by the red line) 
 
 
Although the results obtained from this study were generated specifically for testing numerical models for 
predicting peak discharge and breach development time, some of these preliminary results indicated 
potential new research directions. 
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Chapter 5 Results and Observations 
 
0	

The output data from the Physical Scale Model (PSM) study are initially presented at laboratory scale. 
For the scaling up peak discharges, the following equation was used: 
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Q
 Equation 5.1 
 
QP. flow in the prototype (m3/s) 
QM. flow in the model (m3/s) 
 
  
      Table 5.1. Key Results from Physical Scale Modelling of natural dam internal sedimentology at high inflows 
Dam 
type 
 
Average 
Outflow Qp tp 
Dam 
Height 
Breach 
Depth 
Breach 
Depth/ 
dam 
height 
Top 
Breach  
Full 
Width* 
Bottom 
Full 
Width 
Rectangular 
Area 
Trapezoidal 
Area 
    (m3/s) (m3/s) (hr) (m) (m) (%) (m) (m) (m2) (m2) 
Model 0.006 0.011 0.01 0.25 0.2 80 0.91 0.50 0.18 0.14 DC 
Prototype 19200 35200 0.25 100 80 80 364 204 29120 22720 
Model 0.006 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.18 75 0.88 0.50 0.16 0.12 SC 
Prototype 19200 32000 0.22 100 75 75 352 202 26400 20775 
Model 0.005 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.17 70 0.93 0.60 0.16 0.13 STC 
Prototype 16000 32000 0.25 100 70 70 372 232 26040 21140 
Model 0.005 0.007 0.01 0.25 0.17 70 0.82 0.50 0.14 0.11 C 
Prototype 16000 22400 0.22 100 70 70 328 188 22960 18060 
Model 0.004 0.008 0.02 0.25 0.212 85 0.96 0.61 0.20 0.16 DB 
Prototype 12800 25600 0.32 100 85 85 386 245 32844 26825 
Model 0.006 0.012 0.01 0.25 0.21 85 0.95 0.70 0.20 0.17 SB 
Prototype 19200 38400 0.28 100 85 85 380 282 32300 28131 
            *Width dimensions doubled to simulate full breach failure  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Table 5.2 Key Results from Physical Scale Modelling of natural dam internal sedimentology at low inflows 
     Dam  
    Type 
  
Average  
Outflow Qp tp 
Dam 
Height 
Breach 
Depth 
Breach 
Depth/ dam 
height 
Top 
Breach  
Full 
Width* 
Bottom 
Full 
Width* 
Rectangular 
Area 
Trapezoidal 
Area 
    (m3/s) (m3/s) (hr) (m) (m) (%) (m) (m) (m2) (m2) 
Model 0.003 0.007 0.03 0.25 0.20 80 0.92 0.50 0.20 0.10 
DC 
Prototype 9600 22400 0.62 100 80 80 366 206 29312 22912 
Model 0.003 0.006 0.03 0.25 0.19 75 0.84 0.50 0.20 0.10 
SC 
Prototype 9600 19200 0.66 100 75 75 335 185 25140 19515 
Model 0.003 0.007 0.03 0.25 0.18 70 0.86 0.50 0.20 0.10 
STC 
Prototype 9600 22400 0.5 100 70 70 345 205 24136 19236 
Model 0.004 0.008 0.01 0.25 0.21 85 0.79 0.40 0.20 0.10 
DB 
Prototype 12800 25600 0.25 100 85 85 315 174 26792 20774 
Model 0.004 0.008 0.02 0.25 0.21 85 0.76 0.50 0.20 0.10 
SB 
Prototype 12800 25600 0.36 100 85 85 305 207 25908 21739 
       *Width dimensions doubled to simulate full breach failure  
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outflow discharge was calculated as a function of time from the changing surface elevation of the 
reservoir and the reservoir surface elevation and the constant inflow.  
 
Simple variation of base parameters (inflow, saturation) cause the physical scale models of a breaching 
natural dam to produce significant variability in outflow. Trials were first carried out using a constant 
inflow of 3.5 L/s (Figure 5.1), but the output parameters were relative insensitive due to the 
overwhelming influence of inflow rate, and a further set of trials was carried out at an inflow rate of 1 L/s 
(Figure 5.2), to better reveal some inherent differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous dams. 
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Figure 5.1. Outflows from 3.5 litre/sec inflow models.  
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Figure 5.2. Outflows from 1 litre/sec models. The higher sensitivity of the outflow due to reduction of the constant 
inflow, reveals the effects of the carapace  
 
0* 	 	 $+#3
In order to characterise the evolution of the breach, its incision and geometric enlargement were analysed 
using width and depth measurements, from which a cross sectional area was derived (Section 4.9). Breach 
length is only relevant to the maintenance of critical flow in the breach (significance of backwater effects) 
so it was not considered in this study.  
 
Superposition of the outflow hydrograph onto the cross-section development rate for each dam type links 
the hydraulic processes observed during failure to the physical enlargement of the breach area through 
erosion. The Cmax and Wm profiles are shown in each hydrograph to represent breach development at the 
breach inlet and outlet respectively. Data are presented for each dam type, at both high and low inflows.  
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Figure 5.3.. Dry Carapace High Inflow  
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Figure 5.4.. Dry Carapace Low Inflow 
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Figure 5.5.Saturated Carapace High Inflow 
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Figure 5.6. Saturated Carapace Low Inflow 
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Figure 5.7..Saturated Thick Carapace High Inflow 
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Figure 5.8 Saturated Thick Carapace Low Inflow 
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Figure 5.9. Dry Body High Inflow 
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Figure 5.10. Dry Body Low Inflow 
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Figure 5.11..Saturated Body High Inflow 
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 Figure 5.12..Saturated Body Low Inflow 
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Figure 5.13. Carapace Homogeneous Body High Inflow 
 
0.2
A key objective of this research was to understand the influence of the internal structure of a rock 
avalanche dam not only on the breach development rate, but ultimately on the outflow hydrograph and 
peak discharge. To extrapolate the laboratory model results to a prototype condition, inflow and outflow 
discharges recorded in model were scaled up by 400(2..5) to produce discharges representative of the 
prototype condition. The prototype inflows of 3200 m3/s (low) and 10,000 m3/s (high) were subtracted 
from the total discharge to give the true outflow discharge (equivalent to that with zero inflow) through 
the breach. Outflow discharge is often presented against a variable known as the dam factor which 
incorporates both dam height and impounded lake volume. Using the dam factor (HVo), Figure 5.14 
indicates that the peak discharge for the prototype condition of the PSM study lies within the range of 
observed peak discharges from both landslide and constructed dam failures.  
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Figure 5.14..Comparison of the PSM dataset to prototype conditions recorded from natural and constructed dam 
failures (dataset obtained from Manville, 2001) 
 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the influence of variable internal structure and sedimentology on the potential 
peak outflow at a prototype scale of 400:1. As Qp is a function of breach geometry and dam/lake volume, 
it provides a useful indicator of the magnitude of an overtopping failure of a rock avalanche deposit 
impounding a lake of uniform depth with an approximate volume of 50 x 106 m3 and vertical walls. While 
Table 5.3 indicates that the highest outflows are generally recorded from saturated homogeneous 
impoundments, the inclusion of a carapace reduces the outflow by 10-15%. Table 5.3 indicates that the 
carapace (comparative to a dam of homogeneous nature) does not have a large effect on the peak 
discharge.  
 
                                       Table 5.3. Summary of Prototype Peak Discharges 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under high inflow conditions however, when the emplaced material is dry prior to reservoir infilling, the 
inclusion of the carapace produces a 28% increase in peak outflow. The physical properties of the 
carapace differ from those of the body, with larger, more angular grain sizes and a higher hydraulic 
High Inflow Low Inflow 
Type Qp (m3/s) Type Qp (m3/s) 
SB 38400 SB 25600 
DC 35200 DC 22400 
SC 32000 SC 19200 
STC 32000 STC 22400 
DB 25600 DB 25600 
C 22400 
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conductivity, leading to enhanced failure, through accelerated propagation of the phreatic front. A 
homogenous dam constructed using only the carapace material produced a peak discharge 36% lower 
than in the carapace model. Such a result is indicative of the high intrinsic permeability of the carapace 
facies and its ability to transmit a large amount of the outflow through seepage. Saturation is a parameter 
which may reduce time to failure of a rock avalanche dam. At high inflows, saturation of dam materials 
prior to infilling produced outflows 36% higher in homogeneous dams, but only 10% higher in 
heterogeneous dams.  
 
At lower inflow rates, the influence of specific material properties became more pronounced; carapace-
type structures slowed breach development by armouring the dam crest and breach channel to produce an 
outflow 13% lower than that observed from non-carapace dams. The influence of material saturation on 
the reduction of peak discharge appears to be independent of inflow conditions. 
 
0.2
The development of the outflow hydrograph rising limb requires the active development of the breach 
channel and therefore also provides significant insight into the potential rate of breach enlargement.  
 
Under conditions of high inflow, tp is between 0.22 and 0.32 hours. All carapace (heterogeneous) dams 
reached peak discharge 20-30% faster than the non carapace (homogeneous) dams of the same material 
properties. Under high inflows, the carapace facies appears to reduce the time to peak outflow. These 
results also suggest that no correlation exists between Qp and tp under high inflow. 
 
Under low inflow conditions, tp varies much more, ranging between 0.25 and 0.66 hours. Under low 
inflows, the carapace facies appears to increase the time to peak outflow by up to 60% when the dam is 
unsaturated. Even under conditions of pre-saturation, the presence of a carapace increases tp by 54%, 
strongly supporting the proposition that the carapace acts as armouring mechanism resisting erosion under 
low inflow conditions. Dam saturation prior to infilling at lower inflows appears to increase tp by up to 
30% in homogeneous dams compared to 7% in heterogeneous dams. At low inflows a correlation exists 
between high Qp and low tp.  
 
00"

Armouring refers to the process of resistance to erosion usually due to selective erosion of fine particles, 
leaving large grain sizes which require higher critical velocities for entrainment. Armouring inhibits 
breach bed incision leading to a smaller final breach section area therefore reducing peak discharge. 
Simulation of the carapace facies using angular aggregate in the PSM allowed the armouring properties of 
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the carapace to be observed. Figure 5.15 indicates the influence of the carapace armouring of the dam 
crest in the DC trial to increase tp by 54% when compared to the homogeneous DB trial. The armouring 
phenomenon was observed to only operate under low inflow conditions.  
 
 
Figure 5.15..The armouring phenomena visible in the comparison of DC and DB dam hydrographs for low inflow 
conditions 
 
04+* 
From the methods outlined in Chapter 4, dimensional data were compiled to produce a mean dataset for 
each dam structure modelled. The data were all derived from physical scale modelling of a half breach 
and therefore all width dimensions are doubled to make the data applicable to a full breach scenario. All 
dimensions presented in Table 5.1 and 5.2 were generated from the crest maximum profile (Figure 4.11), 
a position representative of the breach head or inlet. The breach outlet geometry is characterised 
separately by the minimum width cross section.  
 
04+3
The rate at which vertical erosion takes place in the breach has been identified by many researchers as a 
key factor influencing tp, tb and Qp. Breach depth was found to be insensitive to inflow conditions (see 
Appendix F). Armouring within the breach channel was frequently observed in the carapace dams 
modelled, tending to reduce bed erosion and depth development. Non-carapace dams produced breach 
depths greater than 85% the original dam height, whereas carapace dam breach depths ranged from 70-
80%.  
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Breach width is a key constraint on Qout and therefore both tp and Qp. Breach width is calculated from the 
top and bottom widths of the channel measured at the crest (or breach inlet position). The breach top 
width (WT) was the only visible dimension in overhead video view. The base width of the breach (WB) 
was calculated using observed breach sidewall slope angles. For all carapace dams, a sidewall angle of 
45° was assumed; in non-carapace dams the sidewall angle was observed to increase to 60° under 
saturated conditions and 50° under non saturated conditions. 
 
Under high inflow conditions, the DB model recorded the largest WT yet produced a minimum peak 
discharge. WT   was generally observed to be largest in non-carapace dams, approximately 5% larger than 
in carapace dams. Saturation appears to increase breach width. Although WB   was synthetically generated, 
the largest dimensions were recorded in non-carapace dams. WB   reduces as the ratio of carapace to body 
increases, recording the smallest width in the C model. Reduced WB in carapace models were also 
observed in final breach configurations in the physical model. 
 
At low inflows WT was generally observed to be largest in carapace dams. This result contrasts with the 
behaviour observed for carapace dams under high inflow conditions, suggesting parameter insensitivity 
may be a function of an unrealistic inflow condition. The DC model recorded a WT   15% larger than the 
DB model. The largest WB   is observed in the SB model, 15% higher than the DB model, again indicating 
that saturation increases breach width. 
 
04+@ 
The ratio of carapace to body material used in the model strongly influenced the slope angle of the breach 
walls. The lowest sidewall angle (30°) was observed in the homogeneous dam composed purely of the 
carapace material. With the inclusion of body material, carapace type dams (Figure 5.16) produced side 
walls with an angle close to the material angle of repose (45°). On saturation of dam materials prior to 
infilling, the steepest side walls were recorded (50-60°), in non carapace type dams (Figure 5.16), due to 
apparent cohesion where pore pressure is <0  
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Figure 5.16.. Breach Enlargement at 10 sec time intervals for SB (top) and DC (bottom) dam types under 
 low inflow conditions as observed from downstream. Note the DC dam has a 45° sidewall and the SB  
dam has a 60° sidewall 
 
04.+("
Breach area was calculated as a trapezoid, with assumed sidewall angles of 45° for carapace dams and 
60° for non carapace dams as observed from Figure 5.16. At high inflows, non carapace models generated 
the largest trapezoidal breach area, approximately 20% larger than carapace models. Saturation-enhanced 
enlargement of the breach area appears to be characteristic only of homogeneous models, whereas 
saturation appears to restrict breach area growth in carapace type models. With the exception of the DB 
model, there is direct correlation between the trapezoidal breach area and Qp. At low inflows the largest 
breach area was generated by the DC model. Despite this, the trend of non carapace dams developing 
larger breach areas was also observed at low inflows.  
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Where dam volume is small relative to lake volume, peak outflow occurs at about the time breach 
development is complete (Wahl, 1998). Many researchers define breach development time tb in terms of 
the outflow hydrograph, usually as the sum of time to peak (tp) and time to fall (tf), however breach 
development during testing was frequently observed to terminate either prior to, or shortly after the 
occurrence of tp. Therefore the relevance of tf is questioned, when the breach profile may have already 
reached its maximum dimensions before or at tp.  
 
Breach development time (tb) in this study was obtained from video analysis of breach enlargement, using 
plan and longitudinal views (Table 5.4). The parameter tb represents maximum breach geometry and 
defines the time at which; 
 
1. sidewall collapse into the breach channel ceased or 
 
2. flow velocity through the breach was insufficient to erode the breach bed or readily transport 
sediment through the breach channel (evaluated from flow depth). 
 
The time at which the “dam failure” occurs is therefore considered synonymous with the parameter tb (the 
time required for the maximum breach cross sectional area to develop).  
 
 
 
Table 5.4. Comparison of model (m) and prototype (p) breach development time (in hours) for each dam type 
 
   Time to Peak outflow (tp) is also displayed to allow consideration of the influence of lake volume on tb 
 
 
Low Inflow High Inflow 
 
tb(m) tb(p) tp(p) tb(m) tb(p) tp(p) 
 
hrs hrs hrs hrs hrs hrs 
DC 0.03 0.66 0.62 0.02 0.39 0.25 
DB 0.01 0.28 0.25 0.02 0.44 0.32 
SC 0.03 0.61 0.66 0.02 0.31 0.22 
SB 0.02 0.39 0.36 0.02 0.31 0.28 
STC 0.03 0.56 0.50 0.02 0.33 0.25 
C - - - 0.01 0.28 0.22 
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Comparison of temporal breach parameters in Table 5.4 reveals that under low inflow conditions, tp will 
occur on average at 0.94tb while under high inflow conditions tp was observed to reduce to to 0.75tb. The 
generation of maximum breach geometry prior to tp was only observed in SC dams under low inflow 
conditions, however in all other dams the breach appeared to continue developing after Qp. Table 5.4 also 
indicates that the time required for maximum breach geometry to develop (complete failure) under low 
inflow conditions, in rock avalanche dams, is approximately twice that observed for homogeneous dams 
due to the armouring properties of the carapace. 
 
Increased inflow conditions caused tb values to reduce by 55% in carapace dams, but only 25% in non 
carapace dams, suggesting that tb may be a function of material geotechnical properties such as average 
grainsize (d50) and friction angle of the dam.  
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Breach geometry and development time (tb) are important parameters that influence Qp. Although breach 
depth was not generated from the Cmax and Wm cross sectional data, such information allows both the 
enlargement rate and geometry of the developing breach to be calculated for both the inlet and outlet of 
the breach. 
 
Due to the observed disparity in the breach development rates at the Cmax and Wm cross sections, 
trapezoidal breach area development for each cross section was plotted to compare the breach geometry at 
both the breach inlet and outlet. A characteristic frequently observed in the comparison of the breach 
trapezoidal area growth at both cross sections was the point at which uniformity in the rate of breach 
development at both Cmax and Wm ceases (Figure 5.17). At this point, called the branch point, the 
development of Cmax increases exponentially, deviating from Wm. The branch point has also been 
identified as a threshold condition for the onset of a higher rate of breach erosion apparent in both Cmax 
and Wm profiles. This point may also represent a transition from dominantly vertical erosion to 
dominantly lateral erosion. From comparison of the breach area development at both profiles, three stages 
of breach erosion were identified, corresponding to two erosion regimes occurring before and after the 
onset of the branch point respectively (Table 5.5). Breach geometric evolution was also used to verify 
three erosional regimes (Table 5.6). 
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Figure 5.17. Idealised Erosional Regimes. The prototype cross sectional breach enlargement is presented with the 
breach morphology observed during testing of physical scale models. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.5 Erosional Regimes Identified for the Prototype Scale 


Stage Erosion Description Duration (hrs) 
1 Vertical Overtopping surface flow, headcut development. Uniform 
rates of development at breach inlet and outlet. 0.1 
2 Lateral Increased development of breach inlet geometry Carapace 0.12 Non          0.06 
 
3 
 
Lateral Enhanced development of breach inlet by side wall collapse 0.5 
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Under high inflow rates, dams which displayed early occurrence of the branch point (transition to Stage 2 
Erosion), recorded the highest outflow discharges. Under non saturated conditions, WT   develops at five 
times the observed rate of dB, suggesting that lateral erosion controls breach development. Under 
saturated conditions, this rate of breach widening appears to halve. While the high inflow trials tended to 
produce parameter insensitivity due to the overpowering effect of the inflow condition, they do provide 
some verification of erosion trends identified specific to dam type. 
 
                 Table 5.6. Use of breach geometry to identify stages of breach erosion at a prototype scale 
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Failure of rock avalanche dams under low inflow conditions have been identified by various researchers 
including Dunning et al.,, (2005a) and Hancox et al.,, (2005). Such inflow conditions are therefore 
considered appropriate for assessing parameter sensitivity in breach development. As indicated by Figures 
5.18 and 5.19, the onset of Stage II erosion in the prototype appears to occur when the breach area 
exceeds 500m2 under non saturated conditions and 1000 m2 under saturated conditions. The slower rate of 
erosion in saturated materials, may be due to the apparent cohesion  in the model (see section The second 
stage of erosion in carapace dams requires duration twice that of non-carapace dams, indicating the onset 
of channel armouring in resistance to vertical erosion of the breach channel bed. Comparison of DC and 
DB dam types in Figure 5.18 indicates that during Stage II erosion, the breach inlet cross section develops 
rapidly, promoting lateral erosion and successive sidewall collapse. Carapace material is then entrained 
and ejected from the breach under higher outflows resulting from the widened breach profile.  
 
Comparison of breach development in C, STC and SC types (Figure 5.19) indicates that the second stage 
of erosion is characterised by several large side wall collapse events, temporarily blocking the breach 
outlet (represented by the Wm profile).  
 
The occurrence of Stage II erosion was also found to correlate well with the formation of the steepest 
breach bed slope in non-carapace dams. As outlined in Table 5.6, the onset of Stage III erosion is less 
 
Erosion Stage I Erosion Stage II Erosion Stage III 
Parameter Area Time Area Time Area (Cmax) Time 
 (m2) (hours) (m2) (hours) (m2) (hours) 
       
DC - 0.45 500 0.54 2500 0.66 
DB - 0.1 500 0.19 1800 0.23 
SC - 0.4 500 0.51 1500 0.58 
SB - 0.1 1000 0.23 3000 0.31 
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well-defined but appears to occur when breach area at the Cmax profile exceeds 1500 m2 for carapace dams 
and 1800 m2 for non carapace dams. 
 
Figure 5.18.. Breach Erosion stages identified for DC and DB dam types under low (left) and high (right) inflow 
conditions 
 
 
 
Figure 5.19. Breach Erosion stages identified for C, STC, SC and SB dam types under low inflow conditions 
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The longitudinal profile of the breach slope was recorded to provide information on the protective 
influence the carapace may have in reducing breach incision and therefore the bed slope of the breach 
channel. Using video analysis each profile represents bed slope development at 5 second time intervals 
for the various dam structures under high and low inflow conditions (Figure 5.20-29).   
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Figure 5.20.Homogeneous Carapace  
 
 
 
Figure 5.21.Unsaturated Carapace 
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Figure 5.22.Unsaturated Body (Homogeneous) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.23.Saturated Thick Carapace 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.24.Saturated Carapace 
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Figure 5.25.Saturated Body (Homogeneous) 
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Figure 5.26.Unsaturated Carapace 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.27.Unsaturated Body (Homogeneous) 
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Figure 5.28. Saturated Carapace 
 
 
   
Figure 5.29.Saturated Body (homogeneous) 
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From Section 5.7.2 breach geometric evolution was identified to occur in three stages of erosion (Table 
5.7). The evolution of the breach bed slope during breach enlargement was analysed relative to the three 
identified erosional regimes.  
 
                                                      
                                                  Table 5.7 Average Breach Bedslope (degrees) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Erosion Stage 
Dam Inflow I II III 
low 15 14 12.8 SC 
high 15 15 10 
low 20 16.5 14.5 SB 
high 20 17 11 
low 20 16 12 DB 
high 23 19 16 
low 20 15 13 DC 
high 20 15 15 
C high 15 13 10 
STC high 15 13 10 
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Using the longitudinal profiles, the average bed slope angle at each erosional stage was calculated as 
outlined in Table 5.7. The larger, coarser carapace material reduces the gradient of the breach channel. 
Dams incorporating carapace material were observed to have average bed slopes ranging from 13-20° 
during Stage I-II from the armouring of the breach bed, through raveling of carapace towards the 
downstream toe. Comparatively, non carapace dams produced the steepest breach bed slopes ranging 
from 17-23° during stage I and II. The steepest bed gradients were recorded in homogeneous dams 
(excluding model C). In trials where a high volume of carapace material existed (STC and C), armouring 
of the channel reduced the breach bedslope erosion, maintaining a gradient between 10-15°. Saturation of 
dam structures appeared to lower gradients during stage I-II by approximately 3-4°. Bed slope was largely 
insensitive to inflow conditions, with low inflows producing bed slopes of marginally smaller gradient, 
than that of higher inflows.  
 
One might expect the coarser material to give steeper bed slope, however as suggested from the results in 
Table 5.7, the body material (simulated using silica sand) offers little resistance to erosion and becomes 
deeply incised producing a very steep breach channel. The coarser carapace material provides resistance 
to erosion and inhibits incision until raveling takes place, thus maintaining a lower overall channel 
gradient. 
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The migration of the phreatic front through both heterogeneous and homogeneous dams is a function of 
both inflow rate and the material properties of the dam. Phreatic contours are presented at 10 second 
intervals for the low inflow profiles (Figure 5.30-31) and 5 second intervals for high inflow profiles 
(Figure 5.32-33).  
 
Under low inflow conditions the phreatic front propagates parallel to the downstream face. This condition 
was observed in both homogeneous and heterogeneous dam models, suggesting that the influence of the 
carapace is negligible in terms of velocity of migration of the phreatic front under conditions of slow 
reservoir filling. The phreatic profile (Figure 5.31) for carapace dams indicates that the carapace facies 
may in fact maintain inflow and outflow conditions below the critical flow velocity that initiates raveling 
on the downstream face. This characteristic of the carapace would allow it to act as a permeable spillway 
and resist overtopping, until a critical discharge was exceeded. 
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Figure 5.30. Phreatic migration through a homogeneous dam under Low Inflow 
 
 
Figure 5.31. Phreatic Migration through heterogeneous dam under low inflows 
 
At high inflows, the phreatic front propagates perpendicular to the dam base rather than parallel to the 
downstream face as observed at lower inflows. This difference must be related to the rate of reservoir 
filling, the only varied parameter. Under high inflows, seepage in the homogeneous dam increases when 
the reservoir level reaches the dam crest and overtopping commences (Figure 5.32). Once concentrated 
overflow has commenced on the surface of the downstream face, the phreatic front migrates downward 
from there toward the dam base. 
 
The influence of the carapace is significant at high inflows. The phreatic front propagates perpendicular 
to the dam base, as observed in the homogeneous tests, but with more concavity as shown in Figure 5.33. 
The inclusion of the carapace results in an acceleration of the phreatic front at the interface between the 
body and carapace facies. The hydraulic conductivity of the carapace is approximately double that of the 
underlying body for the materials modelled. When the water surface reaches the dam crest, the phreatic 
front is driven beyond the facies interface, day-lighting in the lower third of the downstream face. 
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Figure  5.32. Phreatic migration through a homogeneous dam under High Inflow. 
 
 
Figure 5.33. Phreatic migration through a heterogeneous dam under High Inflow 
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From analysis of the digital video data and outflow hydrographs, five stages of breach development were 
identified as characteristic of a rock avalanche dam failure. Because recent embankment dam research has 
addressed overtopping failure of homogeneous dams, only the failure sequence for carapace dams is 
presented herein. The failure sequences for carapace dams under saturated (Figure 5.34) and non 
saturated conditions (Figure 5.35) are presented to emphasise of the influence of higher hydrostatic 
pressures.  
 
While breach geometry has been identified to evolve in three erosional stages (Section 5.7.2), the failure 
sequence is identified to occur toward the end of Stage I and terminate at the onset of Stage II. 
 
Prior to breach initiation, seepage daylighting at the toe of the downstream face accelerates erosion. As 
overtopping flows accelerate down the downstream face, the highest flow velocity occurs at the base; the 
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point where the critical shear stress for external material is most likely to be exceeded by the flow. The 
seepage outflow induces regressive slope movements with a two-dimensional character, similar to a 
rotational slump. 
  
The head scarp generated by slumping causes surface discontinuities on the downstream face, which act 
to concentrate flows and initiate erosion causing head cutting and upstream migration of a widening scour 
hole. The main breach forming event is the final slump which lowers the dam crest below the reservoir 
level and initiates the concentration of outflow on the scoured head cut section on the downstream face.  
 
The failure of the carapace incorporates a process described in literature as raveling whereby the surficial 
coarse material is removed by rolling downslope due to the influence of gravity and the velocity of the 
overtopping flow.  
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Structural collapse of the dam due to the overtopping was identified to occur at four specific discharges, 
presented at the model scale in Table 5.8 below. 
 
     * time from the lake level reaching dam crest 
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At any point on the Cm (crest max) profile, the forces causing motion of a sediment particle are the 
tractive shear stresses from the flow, and the down slope gravity force components. The initiation of 
particle motion may be caused by shear stress developed by the breach flow; and the structural failure of 
destabilised bank material resulting in the collapse and deposition of sediment into the breach channel, to 
be rapidly entrained by breach flow. 
 
Using coupling of PSM breach development and hydrograph data for carapace dams, the discharge at the 
time of carapace raveling was recorded (Table 5.9) and can be considered the critical discharge required 
for failure of the carapace armouring. Such results are only applicable to the dams constructed of the 
upscaled materials tested in this study.  
Table 5.8 Critical discharges for initiation of structural failure for a rock avalanche dam under low inflow 
Time* (secs) Event Q (L/s) SE ± % 
0 Weakening of rock armour  0.63 0.00 
10 Partial saturation of the carapace 0.69 0.01 
15  Seepage induced erosion of downstream toe 0.96 0.01 
20 Main slope failure/ rotational slump 1.22 0.03 
25 Breach Initiation (Carapace removed) 2.00 0.08 
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                 Table 5.9. Critical discharge for failure of the carapace at model and prototype scales 
  
 
 
 
 
* critical discharge presented as a percentage of peak discharge 
   N.B. The Poerua Rock Avalanche Dam failed under an overflow < 1000 m3/s 
 
Critical velocity for incipient motion was calculated for carapace dams using Hartung and Scheulerin 
(1970) and Coleman and Andrews (2000) to give mean values ranging from 0.15 m/s to 0.38 m/s for an 
average bed slope of 0.21. Critical velocities in non carapace dams for an average bed slope of 0.26 were 
found to be 15% lower than that observed for carapace dams. Flow velocities at the time of breach 
enlargement for the prototype condition of the tested models vary from 0.15 m/s to 0.6 m/s. Therefore 
estimates of the critical velocity for incipient motion are considered reasonably accurate.   
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Two photographic failure sequences are presented in Figure 5.34 and 5.35 detailing the average 
morphology observed on the downstream face for both DC and SC dam types under low inflow 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 tm (secs) Qm(10-3m3/s) tp (hrs) Qp (m3/s) qc (%Qp)* 
DC 70 0.63 0.38 2038 8 
SC 45 0.17 0.25 544 3 
STC 30 0.17 0.16 544 3 
Chapter 5 Results and Observations 
105 
 
 
Figure 5.34..Failure Sequence for a saturated carapace dam 
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Figure 5.35..Failure Sequence for an unsaturated Carapace Dam 
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Each step refers to the corresponding photo in both Figure 5.34 and 5.35. 
 
• The main failure mechanism required to initiate breach development commenced at a time 
equivalent to t=15 seconds (0.2tb) and terminates at approximately t=25 seconds (0.37tb). 
 
• Upon the water level reaching the dam crest, the phreatic front propagates through the carapace, 
primarily concentrating seepage flow at the interface between the two materials, before day-
lighting at the downstream toe (Figure 5.35A).  
 
• At t=10 seconds (0.14 tb) the phreatic front moves up through the carapace, as the reservoir level 
rises until most pore spaces in the carapace are fully occupied by the inflow. The carapace 
becomes partially saturated, and surface flow becomes established within it. 
 
• At t=15 seconds (0.2 tb) discharge from daylighting of the phreatic front on the lower toe 
increases to erode and destabilise the downstream base of the dam promoting a sudden major 
regressive slope movement (Figure 5.35B) along the longitudinal axis of the dam similar to a 
rotational slump/slide failure. The slumping/sliding of the downstream face reduces the dam crest 
level below the water surface level, increasing the flow overtopping the crest. Increasing the flow 
rate causes the breach to initiate.  
 
• At 20 seconds (0.28 tb) the head scarp generated by slumping causes surface discontinuities on 
the downstream face, which act to concentrate flow and initiate erosion causing head cutting and 
upstream migration of a widening scour hole.  
 
• A critical flow velocity (vc) resulting from the free surface profile drives the erosion of the 
carapace through raveling (Figure 5.35C). With the breach discharge exceeding vc the eroded 
crest carapace material is transported downstream and deposited as a fan of debris in the 
enlarging breach channel. This deposition obstructs the flow and stabilizes the dam toe, 
armouring the channel and reducing the bed slope gradient by 2-5°. 
 
• At t=25 seconds (0.35 tb) both the breach inlet and outlet develop at a uniform rate (Stage 1 
erosion). Vertical erosion is dominant due to the removal of the carapace and exposure of the 
more erodible underlying body facies (Figure 5.34A, B; 5.35C).  
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• Exposure of the toe at higher rates of vertical erosion enables the breach outlet to establish a 
trapezoidal geometry. Stabilisation at the dams toe (breach outlet), causes concentration of flow 
at the breach inlet causing extreme lateral erosion of breach inlet on the upstream face (Figure 
5.34C, D).  
 
• The enlarged breach geometry at the inlet enables a higher volume of escaping water to flow 
through the breach, and entrain and transport larger sized clasts. 
 
• The deposit of carapace material at the breach outlet is removed, restoring the steep downstream 
face profile allowing rapid removal of the highly erodible body material (Figure 5.34E; 5.35D). 
The breach geometry now becomes defined by lateral and not vertical erosion, which proceeds 
downstream from the breach inlet. 
 
• Breach development proceeds through enhanced lateral erosion causing undercutting, over-
steepening and collapse of breach sidewalls initially at the breach inlet (Figure 5.34D,E; 5.35E). 
If the material is non saturated (DC), sidewall collapse will occur as a slide or flow, however due 
to the presence of surface tension forces, unsaturated materials (SC) are observed to slump 
(Figure 5.34D) or “topple” producing large tension cracks and head scarps visible in plan view. 
 
• Carapace and body materials are then delivered to the breach floor, entrained and removed by the 
breach flow  
 
• Sidewall destabilisation now appears to occur from lowering of the water surface, due to reservoir 
depletion, in addition to undercutting. Side wall failures become less frequent and sediment 
ejection from the breach channel slows (Figure 5.34E,F,G; 5.35F). 
 
• As the flow rate through the breach increases rapidly the breach channel initially develops a 
funnel shape in plan view due to the rapid upstream migration of the crest from carapace raveling, 
but may stabilise to an hourglass shape as the reservoir becomes depleted (Figure 5.36). 
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Figure 5.36..Typical Hourglass channel profile 
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The geometry of the final breach is of critical importance because; 
 
1. Peak discharge from large reservoirs is primarily a function of the breach final configuration 
(Walder and O’Connor, 1997). 
 
2. Numerical models assume the evolution of breach development from the incipient shape of the 
breach until its final configuration. 
 
The deposition of the carapace material immediately downstream of the dam has a stabilising effect, 
slowing the failure process – this is reflected mainly in the final breach depth which is about 80% of the 
dam height (in DC dam types). Using breach top width to depth ratios, the final breach geometry of 
carapace dams can clearly be distinguished from that of non-carapace dams (Table 5.10). 
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                                          Table 5.10. Breach top width/ depth ratio 





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A curved planform of the breach channel mirrors the shape of a minimum energy loss channel suggesting 
that, during breaching, the channel tends to an equilibrium that is associated with minimum energy 
conditions and maximum discharge per unit width for the available specific energy (Grant, 1997).  
 
Therefore the ‘hourglass’ profile is in fact a constant energy state, whereby flow in the breach is near-
critical (i.e. 0.5 < Fr < 1.8) and the total head remains constant throughout the breach inlet as far as the 
throat (Chanson, 2005). Head losses occur downstream of the throat when the flow expands and 
separation takes place at the lateral boundaries (Figure 5.37). 
 
 
Figure 5.37. Definition sketch of embankment breach for non-cohesive material. Cross-section through the breach 
centre line and view in elevation of breach flow (Chanson, 2005). 
 
Dam WT  / dB 
DC 4.6 
SC 4.5 
STC 4.6 
DB 3.5 
SB 3.4 
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The final breach planform for each dam type tested is presented in Figure 5.38. The final planform 
morphology and geometry for each dam type proved relatively insensitive to inflow conditions.  
 
 
Figure 5.38.. Planform Final breach profiles for carapace and non carapace dams 
 
While the hourglass profile was observed initially during breach development, the final breach planform 
for all dams was observed to have a funnel profile, with an enlarged breach inlet and restricted outlet.   
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Figure 5.39..Streamline Flow through a half breach 
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Despite significant undercutting of the breach wall by the flow, high vertical sidewalls and overhangs 
were observed in non-carapace dams, caused by the apparent cohesion of soil-moisture tension. For this 
reason, the behaviour of the silica sand was that of a cohesive material and therefore the use of such 
sediment may correspond to that of a very cohesive material at the prototype scale. The silica sand used in 
modelling (d50 = 0.045 mm) is cohesionless when dry, with a friction angle of 33° with a standard slope 
stability, which would not permit overhang formation (Figure 5.39). Therefore such phenomena are non 
representative of the prototype condition.  
 
A noticeable difference was observed in both the breach erosion mechanism and the shape of the resulting 
breach formation between carapace and non carapace dams. Non carapace dams produced breach 
channels with over-steepened sidewalls and dominantly vertical erosion, whereas carapace dams were 
observed to produce a breach with sidewall angles close to that of the material repose angle and evolving 
largely through lateral erosion. Therefore soil mechanical and geotechnical considerations must be 
included in the understanding of breaching processes. 
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Figure 5.39 shows the breach channel viewed from the breach inlet looking downstream after the 
depletion of the reservoir. Streamlines of the breach flow have been marked in Figure 5.39 to represent 
paths of equal flow transport. Yang (1996) defines a streamline as a line along which velocity vectors are 
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tangential. The following qualitative observations describe the hydraulic regime during breaching of 
carapace dams; 
 
• The longitudinal velocity component is greatest at the breach centreline (represented by the flume 
wall in a half breach simulation) 
• The flow spreads out leaving the breach, causing lateral erosion at the breach outlet and 
promoting the hourglass planform. 
• Flow depth and velocity are greatest at the breach centreline  
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The experimental post failure downstream channel morphology was observed to be consistent with that 
reported in prototype events. Significant channel aggradation resulting from proximal deposition of the 
carapace material caused ponding at the downstream toe (Figure 5.40). The breach channel was also 
unusually lacking in coarse material, with significant scouring at the breach outlet. Terraces (caused by 
waves) on the upstream face indicated a temporarily static reservoir surface level and extent of lateral 
erosion. The observed downstream morphology did not however provide evidence of the failure 
mechanism or breach geometric evolution, but rather represented processes operating toward the end of 
the failure. 
 
 
Figure 5.40.. Characteristic Morphology observed for carapace dams during the PSM study 
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As outlined in section 5.7, breach dimensional growth can be constrained relative to a known parameter. 
All dams were constructed to a height of 0.25m. As dam height was held constant in each trial and is a 
readily identifiable parameter within the field, it can be used to describe the final breach geometry. 
Therefore the results presented herein are specific to the conditions and materials utilised in this 
investigation. The experiments reveal the following: 
 
• The final breach cross section is best described as trapezoidal; 
• The final top width of the breach is approximately 4.5 times the dam height for carapace 
(heterogeneous) dams, and 3.5 in homogeneous dams; 
• The final average width of the breach is approximately 3.5 times the dam height; 
• The average final breach depth for dams containing a carapace is approximately 75% of the dam 
height; 
• The average final breach depth for dams without a carapace is approximately 90% of the dam 
height; 
• The average depth development rate is ~50% of the average lateral erosion rate for carapace dams 
and ~ 0-33% for non carapace dams; 
• The time to peak flow is between 36 -120s which corresponds to a time between 15 and 40 min in 
a prototype rock avalanche dam 100m in height. 
• The breach side slopes are consistently greater than the angle of repose depending on the 
geotechnical properties of the dam construction material. 
• The breach channel in final planform has a funnel shape (upstream, negative concavity; flow 
control section and inflection of positive concavity and downstream a negative concavity; 
deposition of carapace material)  
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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An important consideration in the use of physical scale modelling is the way in which the generated 
results can be interpreted. Any dataset should be analysed in the context of the methodology used in its 
compilation. During both experimental testing and parametric analysis stages of research, inaccuracies 
can affect the results, especially if used to explain prototype scale phenomena. As the measurement errors 
are probabilistic and non-correlated, they accumulate arithmetically as the square root of the sum of 
variances. The primary laboratory errors associated with the PSM dataset are outlined below and 
summarised in Table 5.11. 
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Dam Construction  
The dam height, the variations of the water surface level and the use of digital imaging to obtain 
dimensional parametric data were identified as factors that could generate error in the geometry reported 
in the previous section. Relative error in the adherence to dam height during construction varied by 2%, 
(0.005m). Therefore outflow rate and peak discharge may have been incorrectly estimated in dams 
constructed with a height less than 0.245m due to a loss of reservoir storage.  
 
Measurement of the change in water surface elevation 
Fluctuation of the water surface level influences the reading of the rotcount (section 4.4) and therefore 
generates variation in the recorded height. Possible variations of the water surface level were assumed to 
be in the order of 0.002m (5 pulses ~ approximately 0.6%). 
 
Hydraulic Conditions 
Restriction to lateral erosion of the widening breach due to the physical limitations of flume width and the 
effect of the glass wall in the channel centre potentially generating non-representative hydraulic and 
erosive conditions to ultimately influence the development rate of breach width. Therefore breach width 
may have been overestimated to the order of 0.01m (2 %).  
 
Image Recording 
The writer regards the highest uncertainty to derive from the recording of dimensional data using the 
digital media (Section 4.9). The error associated with time was less than ±1/250 second (0.4%) and 
therefore the cumulative error over the duration of each trial is significantly smaller. Error from the 
overhead position of the initial breach width was ±0.001m. This correlates to a 2% error in the 
measurement of breach dimension from parallax effects. In the longitudinal profile, the error in the 
measurement of breach depth was set at ±0.002m, from a combination of turbulence and meniscus effects 
which produced an error of 4%. As the frontal camera was primarily used for verification of the failure 
mechanism, no error value is assigned. 
 
Data Transfer 
Digital movies were analysed frame-by-frame, with dimensions marked at 5 second intervals on 
transparent overlays; however the data acquisition and transfer technique is assigned an inaccuracy of 
0.005m (1%).  
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                  Table 5.11. Laboratory Error associated with the PSM dataset 
 
Variable Lab Error (%) 
Dam construction 2 
Water level 
measurement 
0.6 
Flume hydraulic 
conditions 2 
Time  0.4 
Camera  6 
Measurement of Breach 
Dimensions 1 
Total Error 7% 
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Breach formation and the resultant geometry have a fundamental control on the outflow hydrograph and 
downstream migration of the flood wave. Rapid analysis of the potential magnitude of a dam break flood 
is essential in mitigating loss of human life and infrastructure due to the rapid failure of many natural 
dams (Manville, 2001). Therefore a high level of accuracy in the simulation of outflow from a dam 
breach is required for effective hazard management.  
 
Dam break research has focused on outburst flood magnitude prediction and the breach development time 
from initial overtopping to full breaching. A comprehensive understanding of the complex interaction 
between processes during overtopping- induced breaching of a rock avalanche dam requires an adequate 
database with information on key parameters before such dam breaks can be confidently simulated. The 
present study made use of physical scale modelling to develop a series of prototype events, from which 
new breach development data specific to landslide dams under representative inflow conditions could be 
obtained. Given the paucity of contemporary research in this field and a traditional reliance on 
embankment dam break technologies and inventories, these tests provide useful information on time 
dependent breach geometry in heterogeneous non-cohesive materials. 
 
The two primary tasks in the analysis of a dam breach are the prediction of the reservoir outflow 
hydrograph and the routing of that hydrograph through the downstream valley. Predicting the outflow 
hydrograph can be further subdivided into predicting the breach characteristics (e.g. shape, depth, width, 
rate of breach formation) and routing the reservoir storage and inflow through the breach (Wahl, 1998); 
routing through the breach and downstream valley are accurately simulated in the majority of industry 
one-dimensional routing methods. However, the programs differ widely in their treatment of the breach 
simulation process.  
 
4+%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Breach simulation and breach parameter prediction contain the greatest uncertainty of all aspects of dam-
break flood forecasting (Wurbs, 1987). Many models do not directly simulate the breach; rather, the user 
determines the breach characteristics independently and provides that information as input to the routing 
model. Methods for peak discharge determination vary from simple estimations based on empirical data 
from dam breach inventories, to complex numerical and mathematical techniques incorporating multiple 
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parameters (Fread, 1988; Manville, 2001). From the literature, models developed for simulating breach 
development in both constructed and natural dams can be classified into four categories: 
 
Empirical Relationships - Estimate peak discharge from an empirical equation based on case study data 
and assume a reasonable outflow hydrograph shape.  
 
Parametric models - Use case study information to estimate time to failure and ultimate breach geometry, 
then simulate breach growth as a time-dependent linear process and compute breach outflows using 
principles of hydraulics. 
 
Dimensionless Models – Predict the breach growth rate and lake volume relative to the peak discharge, 
assuming that the fundamental physical mechanisms involved are the same for all dam-break flood events.  
 
Physically based methods - Predict the development of a breach and the resulting breach outflows using 
an erosion model based on principles of hydraulics, sediment transport, and soil mechanics (ie. 
BossBREACH). 
 
While the first three methods allow rapid analysis and an order of magnitude estimate of peak discharge, 
each approach is highly dependent on case study data (Wahl, 1998). Currently there is only a small 
amount of landslide dam failure data available to researchers, with few records for very high dams or very 
large storage volumes (Korup, 2002). Therefore selection of an appropriate empirical relationship 
requires similarity of boundary conditions between case study data and the dam under consideration. 
 
4%3!3
42
The simplest approach to estimating the peak discharge from dam breach events is to use empirically 
derived correlations, relating observed values of peak discharge to some characteristic of the lake or dam, 
such as lake depth and excess lake volume.  
 
Empirically derived regression relationships have been widely used in the prediction of peak discharge, 
typically having the form of the power-law relationship; 
 
b
p aXQ =    Equation 6.1 
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where X is the lake or dam characteristic and a and b are empirical coefficients (Manville, 2001). The 
intrinsic variability in the source data reflects the disparity between data collection methods with 
discharge usually estimated well downstream of the actual breach, therefore requiring floodwave 
attenuation correction particularly in steep gradient or progressively widening river valleys. Similarly, 
extrapolation back to the dam site is complicated by bulking effects whereby sediment entrained into the 
flood may increase the volume (Pierson,1995, 1997). 
  
Although empirically derived equations provide a rapid method of determining peak discharge from 
dambreak floods, such regression relationships produce estimates that vary by an order of magnitude and 
therefore cannot be confidently used to estimate peak discharge (Manville, 2001). A severe limitation of 
such an approach is that peak discharge is never a simple function of excess lake volume or breach depth 
(Manville, 2001). Walder and O’Connor (1997) conclude that such regression relations have limited 
predictive value because factors other than lake volume and breach depth commonly exert substantial 
control on peak discharge at the breach. 
 
Empirical analysis has been widely used in estimating dam breach parameters from constructed dams 
(Table 6.1). A simple approach to estimating probable peak discharge Qp at a dam breach is to develop 
regression relations between observed values of Qp and measures of lake characteristics, typically Hw, the 
total drop in lake level during the flood, and Va, the volume of water released as the water level falls by 
the amount Hw (e.g. Kirkpatrick, 1977; Hagen, 1982; MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis, 1984; 
Evans, 1986; Costa, 1988; Costa and Schuster, 1988).  
 
    Table 6.1. Empirical Relationships for estimation of Peak Discharge 
 
       Equation notations. Qp = peak discharge (m3/s); Vo = volume of water released (excess lake volume, m3);d = depth of  
      lake (m); D =total drop in lake level during breach; Ep = potential energy (dam factor). 
Regression Equation Dataset r2 S.E. (%) Reference   
Qp = 0.0184Ep0.42 26 0.75 91 Costa & Schuster 1988  
Qp = 961(V0/106)0.48 29 0.65 124 Costa 1985   
Qp = 10.5d1.87 31 0.8 82 Costa 1985   
Qp = 325(dVo/106)0.42 29 0.75 95 Costa 1985   
Qp = 13.4(d)1.89 28   Singh and Snorrason (1984)  
Qp = 1.776(Vo/106 )0.47 34   Singh and Snorrason (1984)  
Qp = 0.72V00.53 22 0.84  Evans (1986)   
Qp = 1.16V00.46 35 0.73  Walder & O'Connor 1997  
Qp = 2.5d2.34 35 0.53  Walder & O'Connor 1997  
Qp = 0.61dVo0.43 35 0.76  Walder & O'Connor 1997  
Qp = 2.297(d+1)2.5 21      Kirkpatrick (1977)   
Qp = 65d1.85 13   U.S. Soil Conservation service 1981 
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Although landslide dam failures are still frequently analysed as earthen dam failures, assuming similarity 
in breach development processes, empirical regression relationships specific to landslide dams have been 
formulated. As the accuracy of any empirical approach is a function of the number of historic events it 
draws upon to establish defining relationships, landslide dam inventories were created to provide better 
verification of defining parameters. Costa and Schuster (1988) and Walder and O’Connor (1997) 
developed several relationships for the prediction of peak discharge from landslide dam datasets (Table 
6.2). 
 
         Table 6.2 Empirical relationships for estimation of peak discharge in landslide dams 
 
              Equation notations. Qp = peak discharge (m3/s); Vo = volume of water released (excess lake volume, m3);  
              d = depth of lake (m); D =total drop in lake level during breach; ; Ep = potential energy (dam factor). 
 

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Although peak discharge and its time of occurrence may provide the best indicators of potential flood 
magnitude, breach development time and breach width are important secondary breach parameters. From 
large databases on embankment dam failures (particularly in the US), several empirical relationships have 
been developed by various researchers. MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis (1984) proposed a breach 
formation factor, defined as the product of the volume of breach outflow and the depth of water above the 
breach invert at the time of failure (Wahl, 1998). Froehlich (1987) developed nondimensional prediction 
equations for estimating average breach width, average side-slope factor, and breach development time. 
Von Thun and Gillette (1990) used the data from Froehlich (1987) and MacDonald and Langridge-
Monopolis (1984) to develop guidance for estimating breach side slopes, breach width and time to failure. 
US Bureau of Reclamation (1988) also provided guidance for selecting ultimate breach width and time of 
failure to produce conservative, upper bound values introducing a factor of safety into the hazard 
classification procedure. 
Regression Equation Dataset r2 S.E. (%) Reference 
  
Qp = 0.0158Ep0.41 12 0.81 185 Costa & Schuster 1988 
Qp = 672(V0/106)0.56 10 0.73 142 Costa 1985   
Qp = 6.3d1.59 10 0.74 147 Costa 1985   
Qp = 181(dVo/106)0.43 10 0.76 129 Costa 1985   
Qp = 1.6V00.46 19 0.6   Walder & O'Connor 1997 
Qp = 6.7d1.73 19 0.82   Walder & O'Connor 1997 
Qp = 0.99dVo0.40 19 0.7   Walder & O'Connor 1997 
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Four empirical relationships estimating tb (Table 6.3) were selected for application to the PSM dataset. 
Empirical equations developed by Froehlich (1987; 1995b) have been recently used in landslide dam 
breach analysis (Manville, 2001; Ollett, 2001). Von Thun and Gillette (1990) developed two equations 
specific to the erodibility of dam materials for tb based on average lateral erosion rates (the ratio of final 
breach width to tb) versus depth of water above the breach invert. Consideration of the sedimentology of 
the rock avalanche deposit required use of the equation developed for highly erosive materials as 
presented in Table 6.3. Application of USBR guidelines will also provide indication as to the relevance 
and accuracy of safety guidelines for embankment dams.  
 
 
 
                         Table 6.3. Empirical Equations for estimation of Breach Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time (tb computed in hours). 
*SE = ± 70% 
 
 
 
4	$+@ 	
Empirical relationships have also been developed to predict breach width development for embankment 
dam failure (Table 6.4). Froehlich (1987) and USBR (1988) were used for similar reasons to those 
presented in section 7.3.4. Suitable ranges for estimates of breach width were presented by Johnson and 
Illes (1976) and Singh and Snorrason (1982) and their applicability to rock avalanche dams is uncertain. 
Therefore testing such empirical approaches against the PSM dataset will enable methods with higher 
uncertainty to be disregarded in hazard analysis. 
Breach Development 
Time Equation Dataset Reference 
tb= 0.011B 40 USBR 1988 
tb= 0.8 (Vr/ Hw2)0.5  43 Froehlich (1987)* 
tb= 3.84(Vo)0.364d-0.9 34 Froehlich (1995b) 
tb= B/(4Hw +61) 36 Von Thun & Gillette (1990) 
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                      Table 6.4. Empirical estimates for average breach width (Wahl, 1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*SE = ± 54% 
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Parametric approaches represent a complex method of dam break flood hydrograph forecasting, usually 
modelling the discharge through the evolving breach through the application of weir flow equations. Such 
models generally account for hydraulic constraints not reflected by regression relations, but commonly 
require the input of final breach dimensions (width, depth and sidewall angle) and breach development 
time; information that may be unavailable, especially for natural dams. The operator specifies the rate of 
breach development.  
 
Most dam breaches are trapezoidal in final cross section (MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis, 1984), 
and presumably may have this geometry during much of their development (Manville, 2001). Breach 
development in landslide dams, modelled hydraulically as broad crested weirs, may over-estimate breach 
discharge due to the breach channel being wide and not long enough for critical flow to develop. 
 
Manville (2001) uses OUTFLOW3 (Appendix C; a numerical model of the growing breach) to calculate 
the discharge hydrograph. The model uses three alternate broad crested weir (Figure 6.1) equations to 
generate different values for the instantaneous peak discharge through a trapezoidal breach (ie the outflow 
that would occur if the breach attained its final size instantaneously when the reservoir was at the dam 
crest). Although this condition is unrealistic due to lake draw down, the technique constrains the potential 
upper maximum discharge likely during a dam break flood.  
Breach Width Equation Dataset Reference 
B
 
= 3(Hw) 80 USBR 1988  
B= 13.3(V0H) 0.25 43 Froehlich (1987)* 
 
0.5H < B >3H 
 
 Johnson & Illes (1976) 
2H<B>5H 20 Singh & Snorrason (1982) 
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Figure 6.1.. Definition sketch of a trapezoidal broad-crested weir (Manville,2001). 
 
Assuming trapezoidal breach geometry throughout the duration of breaching, the trapezoidal form of the 
broad-crested weir equation should be used, given by Price et al., (1977) as: 
 
)6.04.0(
27
8 5.15.0
TBbb WWHgQ +=    Equation 6.2 
 
Using Fread’s (1996) alternative derivation of the broad-crested weir flow equation for a trapezoidal 
breach, Manville (2001, p.16) solves for the case of critical flow through a trapezoidal breach using head 
over the weir as a function of the unit discharge. Conversion of unit discharge to discharge though a 
breach yields:  
 
5.25.1 )(35.1)(7.1 bbBb HzHWQ +=     Equation 6.3 
 
Manville (2001) presents a third equation for calculating the discharge through a trapezoidal breach as: 
 
)45(591.0 5.1 bBbdb zHWHCQ +=     Equation 6.4 
 
Where the drag coefficient (Cd) = 0.57 for a trapezoidal breach (Manville, 2001). Application of these 
three alternative broad-crested weir equations to the PSM study generates three different values for the 
instantaneous peak discharge (Manville, 2001). As such equations do not account for frictional and 
turbulent flow resistance in the outlet channel, actual peak discharges will be overestimated to produce a 
conservative prediction.  
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Dimensionless analysis is a technique for investigating the relative importance of breach growth rate, lake 
volume and lake shape on the peak discharge of a dambreak flood (Walder and O’Connor, 1997). The 
method is based on the assumption that the fundamental physical mechanisms involved in dam breaching 
and lake drainage are the same for all dambreak flood events. The study conducted by Walder and 
O’Connor (1997) is significant because it points out the importance of the failure rate and process in 
determining the peak discharge of a dam failure. This set of procedures offers the advantage of a 
thoeretical foundation that accounts for the differences and limitations imposed by the large- and small-
reservoir cases. 
 
In addition to the uncertainty issue, with the exception of Walder and O’Connor (1997), the breach 
parameter prediction equations that have been developed do not address the rate of failure. Without the 
influence of tailwater at the breach outlet, the flow at the breach inlet will become critical (Fr=1) 
assuming the breach channel has sufficient length, causing the flow to behave hydraulically as a broad 
crested weir, where discharge at the outlet Qo is given by  Equation 2.5 (Chapter 2). Peak Discharge Qp 
and lake volume Vo are then able to be recast as dimensionless variables according to 
 
 
   Equation 6.5 
 
 
    Equation 6.6 
 
 
The graphical representation of the relationship between these two dimensionless variables (Figure 6.2) 
yields a unique distinction between breach development processes for small and large reservoirs. Qp* 
from large lakes (V*o > 104) displays a higher sensitivity to physical breach dimensions, with the breach 
typically forming before substantial drawdown of a lake can occur. Significant reductions in lake level 
during breaching cause Qp* from small lakes to have a higher sensitivity to the breach development time.  
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Figure 6.2.. Plot of Qp* against Vo* (Walder and O’Connor, 1997) including the PSM study data 
 
From analysis of a simple, physically based model of dam breach formation Walder and O’Connor (1997) 
developed peak discharge parameter prediction equations based on the dimensionless parameter; 
 
   Equation 6.7 
 
k = mean vertical erosion rate of the breach,  
k* = dimensionless breach growth rate (k* =k/g0.5Hb 0.5 ). 
Vo = drained volume  
Vo* = dimensionless drained volume 
Hb = head  
g = acceleration due to gravity.  
 
They were thus able to make a distinction in types of reservoirs depending on whether  < 1 (slow breach 
formation relative to lake volume) or  > 1 (fast breach formation relative to lake volume). Physically, for 
values of  < 1, the peak outflow occurs before the breach reaches maximum depth of erosion, leading to 
significant draw down prior to full depth erosion of the breach. For values of  >> 1, the peak outflow 
occurs after the breach reaches maximum erosion depth but prior to any significant draw down of the 
reservoir.  
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Walder and O’Connor (1997) identified that physical characteristics of the lake in particular exert a 
significant control on the breach development and assumed that the hypsometric lake shape factor lies in 
the range m= 1-3 (Figure 6.3). 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Hyposometric classification of potential lake shape  
 
 
Due to the laboratory constraints of this research, only a hypsometric lake factor equivalent to m=1 could 
be simulated in the physical scale models, although the author the unrealistic nature of this condition is 
acknowledged, particularly in the context of rock avalanche dam formation  
 
Calculation Steps 
 
Stage 1 
 
For the prediction of an approximate outflow hydrograph from a dam-breach, dimensionless analysis 
requires determination of  from realistic values of three parameters:  
 
• The drop in lake level or breach depth d  (typically 50-100% of the dam height H for rock 
avalanche dams) 
• The water volume released Vo (constrained by d and some assessment of how the surface area of 
the lake varies with d), and  
• The vertical breach erosion rate k (typically 10-100 m/hr). 
 
Stage 2 
When  < ~ 0.6   
95.0
006.05.25.0 )(51.1 

	




=
d
kVdgQ p
   Equation 6.8 
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Stage 3 
When  >> 1     
75.0
5.25.094.1 
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=
d
HdgQ p
   Equation 6.9 
 
Stage 4 
 
Figure 6.4. Dimensionless Peak Discharge with consideration of Lake hyposymetry  
 
When 0.6 <  << 1, the dimensionless peak discharge must be derived from the m=1 (lake hypsometry) 
curve from Figure 6.4 Qp is then determined using: 
 
*)94.1( 5.25.0 QpdgQp =
    Equation 6.10 
 
This dimensionless technique is limited because there is no consideration of the role of breach width and 
it only assesses the sensitivity of the relationship between breach growth rate (as a proxy for breach 
development time) and lake volume (Manville, 2001). Consideration of breach width is best achieved 
using parametric methods such as OUTFLOW3.  
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Numerical modelling of dambreak flood outflows, usually relating breach development to the erosive 
capacity of the water flowing through the breach, has received much attention in the past four decades.  
 
Most numerical models involve a computation process incorporating the development of a core algorithm 
such as that for the BREACH model. Key parameters describing the impoundment geometry (dam height, 
crest length and width, upstream and downstream face inclinations) and material properties (average grain 
size, cohesion, friction angle and unit weight) are initially required.  
 
Computation of reservoir characteristics is often the next required input, typically describing the reservoir 
level and subsequent depletion as a series of 2D surface areas or layers. This enables lake volume to be 
calculated from the change in lake surface elevation. Inflow conditions and simulation duration are 
usually specified (particularly if a design storm, or variable inflow is being modelled).  
 
The next step is specification of the initial breach geometry (pilot channel), with most models assuming a 
central crest breach position. Water flow through the breach is then simulated as a broad crested weir 
(Henderson, 1966) with conversion of flow depth over the weir to a volumetric discharge using the broad 
crested weir formula. 
 
Computation of the erosion of the breach invert and sidewalls requires selection of an appropriate 
sediment transport formula. Such formulae usually require slope, average grainsize (d50), and flow 
velocity, which can be calculated from the breach shape, discharge and water depth. Erosion of the 
material from the breach is then calculated as a rate (m/s).  
 
A change in lake volume is calculated by multiplying the difference between the lake inflow and the 
breach outflow rates by a specific time increment. This volume change is used to calculate change in lake 
level through interpolation between the surface lake areas. As the breach erosion has been estimated, and 
the change in lake level determined, a new water depth can be calculated for the crest of the breach, 
giving a new breach outflow. From here, the process is iterated until some specified condition is reached, 
with data being recorded at each time increment.  
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Cristofano (1965) proposed the first physically based dam breach model, relating the shear stress of the 
water through the breach to the shear strength of the material forming the dam, enabling the rate of 
erosion of the breach channel to be expressed as a function of the discharge rate (Wahl, 1998). The model 
assumed a trapezoidal breach of constant bottom width; side slopes of the breach were determined by the 
angle of repose of the material, and the bottom slope of the breach channel was equal to the internal angle 
of friction of the material. An empirical coefficient was critical to the model’s performance (Fread, 1988). 
 
Harris and Wagner (1967) applied the Schoklitsch sediment transport equation to dam breach flows, 
assuming breach erosion to begin immediately upon overtopping, and to proceed until the breach reached 
the bottom of the dam. Brown and Rogers (1977) presented a breach model, BRDAM, based on Harris 
and Wagner’s work, which was applicable to overtopping and piping induced breaches. 
 
The BEED (Breach Erosion of Embankment Dams) model developed by Singh and Scarlatos (1985) is a 
physically-based model simulating breach evolution, flood routing, and sediment routing. Erosion and 
sediment transport are computed using the equations of Einstein-Brown and Bagnold.  
 
44 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Concerted Action on Dambreak Modelling (CADAM), Report SR 571 (2000) for the European 
Commission, presents a comparison and assessment of currently available physically based breach 
prediction models in Table 6.5. 
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   Table 6.5 Physically Based Models currently used in Industry (Source CADAM SR  571) 
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6.6.4.Selection of a Physical Model 
Despite the different geometric and material properties observed in rock avalanche dams, breaching from 
such impoundments is still frequently studied using embankment failure technology. Therefore any 
numerical model used for the simulation of breach development from a landslide dam should be applied 
with caution. Based on the available models outlined in Table 6.5, selection of an appropriate physically 
based model to simulate the failure of a landslide dam must consider the following; 
 
Breach Geometry- The breach enlargement should be simulated using a trapezoidal geometry in cross 
sectional profile. 
 
Sediment Transport- The average bedslope during breaching is steep, producing unsteady, critical to 
supercritical flow. Most existing sediment transport equations were derived for steady state, subcritical 
flow conditions, for specific types of sediment, and for a certain range of sediment diameters, making 
them inapplicable to a dam breach scenario. Therefore breach erosion can only be accurately simulated 
using the Meyer-Peter and Müller formula modified by Smart (1984) and the Schoklitsch formula 
(Schoklitsch, 1962) which both were calibrated against steep gradient beds with unlimited sediment 
supply.  
 
Heterogeneous Composition- The model should enable specification of two average grainsizes to 
account for material heterogeneity in the rock avalanche deposit.  
 
Most numerical dam breach models rely on bed-load erosion formulae that imply assumptions of 
gradually varied flow and relatively large flow depth in comparison to the size of roughness elements. 
Singh (1996) emphasises that little is known about the mechanics of heterogeneous sediment transport 
especially under highly dynamic conditions, and therefore researchers rely on experience from alluvial 
streams. The bed load formulae based on the tractive force theory assume that sediment transport is a 
function of excess bed shear stress. Most of these conditions are likely to be violated during the breaching 
process since conditions are typically unsteady, supercritical flow, and with a wide variety of grain sizes 
in landslide dams. 
 
The only numerical erosion model found to fully satisfy the above conditions was Boss BREACH™. 
BossBREACH™ is presently the only model identified which enables specification of two different 
materials. The following section outlines the background theory to this model. 
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To study the effects of the heterogeneity of the landslide material on the erosion of the breach, the 
BossBREACH code, the most widely used breach modelling software within the industry, was used to 
simulate the breaching of the scaled physical models tested in this study.  
 
Boss BREACH™ is a mathematical model developed by Fread (1987) at the US National Weather 
Service, used to simulate the failure of earthen dams. The model predicts breach characteristics 
(dimensions, geometry, and rate of development) from the physical properties of the dam material and the 
characteristics of the lake. The model couples the breach outflow with the sediment-transporting capacity 
of the unsteady uniform flow along the erosional channel cut through the dam (Manville, 2001).  
 
453

The BREACH model uses the principles of soil mechanics, hydraulics, and sediment transport to simulate 
the bed and side wall erosion processes that occur during breach enlargement (Fread, 1996). A range of 
input parameters is used in the computation of the outflow hydrograph (Figure 6.5). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Schematic representation of input parameters and components of Boss BREACH (Manville, 2001) 
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Calculation of breach parameters involves the following methods; 
 
1. The reservoir surface elevation is calculated using a specified reservoir inflow hydrograph and 
spillway overflow.  
 
2. Overtopping and breach flow are simulated using a broad crested weir flow equation.  
 
3. Breach width is simulated as a function of the optimal channel hydraulic efficiency*, evolving 
from rectangular to trapezoidal geometry through sidewall collapse when breach depth exceeds 
the stability limits for the dam material.  
 
4. Breach erosion is assumed to be uniform along both the channel bed and side, but is suspended 
upon sidewall collapse until the fallen material is ejected from the breach at the pre-collapse 
erosion rate (Manville, 2001).  
 
5. The rate of breach erosion is dependent on the transport capacity of breach outflow, calculated 
using the Meyer-Peter and Müller sediment transport relation, as modified by Smart (1984) for 
steep channels as outlined in section 2.10.  
 
6. Iteration of calculations is required as the flow into the breach is dependent on breach dimensions. 
Breach enlargement is therefore also dependent on erosion depth which is controlled by the 
sediment transport capacity of the breach flow, which is itself a function of the breach size and 
flow (Manville, 2001). An estimated incremental erosion depth is used at each time-step to start 
an iterative solution that accounts for the mutual interdependence of the flow, erosion, and breach 
properties (Manville, 2001). 
 
45"33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The dam-break may occur by overtopping, by piping, or by sudden structural collapse due to hydrostatic 
pressure. Manville (2001) outlines the following conditions that can be modelled using Boss BREACHTM; 
 
• An inner core of different composition and properties to the outer parts of the dam (useful for 
rock-fill cored earthen dams). 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
* The ability of a hydraulic structure or element to conduct water with minimum energy loss 
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• The development of an initial erosion gully on the downstream face of the dam prior to the 
formation of a through-going breach that penetrates the full thickness of the dam crest. 
 
• Armouring of the downstream face of the dam by grass or coarse rip-rap. 
 
• Breach enlargement by sudden structural collapses through the hydrostatic pressure exerted by 
the reservoir exceeding the shear and cohesive strength of the dam. 
 
• Breach enlargement by failure of over-steepened breach walls, calculated from slope stability 
rules. 
 
• Initiation of the breach by piping flow followed by development of free-surface breach flow. 
 
49+!%" 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A key objective of this research was to assess the ability of breaching models to predict breach 
development and peak outflows in rock avalanche dams. A series of physical models representing rock 
avalanche sedimentology was tested to investigate peak discharge and breach development time under 
overtopping flow. Using Froude scale modelling, the laboratory tests were scaled up to prototype size 
using a linear scaling factor of 400=λ  (see Section 3.4). The scaled prototype parameters were used as 
inputs to simulate the breaching of a 100m high, 416m wide dam with a heterogeneous structure in 
BossBREACH (Figure 6.6). 
 
A low inflow condition of 0.001m3/s was sufficient to reliably initiate failure, without overwhelming the 
intrinsic behaviour of the failing dam. Due to the nature of the scaling factor, the low inflow condition of 
0.001m3/s in the laboratory is represented by an inflow of 3200 m3/s in the prototype. This is extremely 
conservative and of low probability, representing a 10 year flood or alternately a 100 year rainfall event 
within a 100 km2 catchment, produced by inundation of the catchment with >100 mm falling in 24 hours. 
The scaled high inflow condition of 10,000 m3/s was only representative of a condition whereby multiple 
landslide dams had formed in a river valley and a cascading outburst flow had been generated from an 
upstream collapse. Therefore only the low flow condition was simulated using Boss BREACH™. 
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 Figure 6.6.Input Parameters for the BREACH simulation of the DC dam. 
 
Six dam types, both homogenous and heterogeneous in composition, were simulated using the model 
input parameters listed in Figure 6.6. The dam materials were modelled as a poorly sorted and 
unconsolidated mass of rock fragments, with d50 ranging from 0.045 mm to 1mm within the inner core 
(modelled to represent the body), to 100-1000 mm in the outer core (modelled to represent the carapace). 
For the simulation of unsaturated sediments ( DB, DC, C models), materials were considered cohesionless, 
however due to surface tension a small degree of cohesion was observed in saturated materials. Therefore 
the prototype condition of SC, SB and STC models were simulated using cohesion = 30N/m2. Saturation 
of materials in the prototype condition was simulated through a 25% reduction in porosity and 15% 
increase in internal friction angle. The decision to use such values was influenced by reported prototype 
values in Kojan and Hutchinson, (1979); Dunning et al., (2005) and Hancox et al., (2005).  
 
The body material was simulated with a friction angle ranging between 27-33 degrees, while the carapace 
material was simulated with a friction angle ranging from 40-45 degrees. Guidance as to the use of 
appropriate values was found in the geotechnical evaluations of the Montaro landslide dam (Kojan and 
Hutchinson, 1979). The upstream and downstream dam faces were defined with a slope of 1 in 5 to 
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maintain numerical stability in the model (a serious limitation); true values were closer to 1 in 3.0 
downstream and 1 in 4.8 upstream (25 and 15 degrees respectively). A Manning roughness coefficient of 
0.04 (characteristic of steep gradient hydraulics as observed in mountain streams, floored with gravels, 
cobbles and boulders) was used, with the tail water gradient assumed to be approximately 0.1m/m. The 
simulation duration was set to 3 hours, to allow full development of the falling limb in the outflow 
hydrograph.   
 
4;(# 
All models selected (empirical, parametric, dimensional and physical) have a degree of sensitivity to the 
geometric and material properties of a dam. Sensitivity analysis was conducted for each modelling 
technique.  
 
4;(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#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Simulations of the DC physical model were used to test the sensitivity of peak discharge and the time to 
peak outflow to the material properties of the dam (Figure 6.7). 
 
 
Figure 6.7.. Sensitivity analysis for peak discharge using BossBREACH 
 
Peak discharge was sensitive to the internal friction angle of the dam material. Variation of the friction 
angle in the body is unlikely to exceed ±10° causing a ± 2% change in Qp. Variation in the carapace 
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friction angle, although also unlikely to exceed ± 10° alters Qp by ± 8%. The time to peak outflow 
appeared to be insensitive to friction angles. 
 
Qp and tp are also sensitive to dam material porosity. Porosity is a critical parameter controlling the 
migration of the phreatic front through the upstream face on filling of the lake behind the impoundment. 
Porosity of the body was simulated with a void ratio of 45%, while the carapace was modelled as having 
void spacing of >50%, indicative of the larger spacing between larger angular clasts. Estimates of 
porosity could vary by 15%, yielding an uncertainty of ±25% in Qp. 
 
The average grain size (d50) varied between 0.045mm in the body to 1000mm in the carapace. Sensitivity 
analysis of peak discharge to average grain size (d50) revealed that a critical threshold exists for outflow 
conditions conducive to breach formation and entrainment of clasts (Figure 6.8). Qp was found to reduce 
by 84%, when d50 exceeded 250mm. tp was also sensitive to variance in d50 ;  tp increased by an order of 
magnitude as d50 increased from 100mm to 200mm.  
 
 
Figure 6.8.. Sensitivity analysis for peak discharge to average grainsize for a carapace dam  
reveals the grain size at which a dam remains stable in the BREACH simulation. 
 
Conversely, both peak discharge and time to peak are insensitive to variation in the crest width and 
cohesion over 2 orders of magnitude.  
 
4;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Empirical Models (Costa 1985; Walder and O’Connor, 1997) only require dam height/lake depth and or 
volume of water released (lake volume). As these parameters are usually well constrained no uncertainty 
is assigned.  
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The main uncertainty associated with parametric model OUTFLOW3 (Manville, 2001) surrounds the 
assumption of breach dimension and development time. Conservative estimates of the peak outflow 
should be based on maximum probable breach dimensions and minimum breach development times. As 
both temporal and dimensional data inputs were sourced from the PSM, the main uncertainties relate to 
the method of data acquisition as outlined in section 4.10.  
 
Sensitivity analysis of OUTFLOW3 suggests that the greatest uncertainty is associated with the constraint 
of the breach development time. Alteration in tb from 10 to 20 minutes can generate a 50% reduction in 
Qp. Breach depth and lake surface area have linear relationships with outflow discharge and are better 
constrained than other parameters.   
 
4;.(# " $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Dimensionless analysis has a limited amount of uncertainty, but places a high reliance on the reservoir 
volume and water depth at the dam face. The model is also highly sensitive to the breach width/ breach 
depth ratio.  
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A primary objective of this investigation was to estimate the uncertainty associated with the four types of 
models used (empirical, parametric, dimensional and physical). As outlined in Section 5.11, the limits of 
accuracy in the dataset acquired from physical scale modelling can be related to parameter and 
component uncertainty, or the uncertainty associated with assumptions made regarding the physical 
process of breach development. Component uncertainty compared the performance of the empirical, 
parametric and numerical models to the observed results from the physical scale model (PSM) of variable 
dam sedimentologies. This method also enabled the identification of parameters used in the modelling 
process that cannot be estimated accurately, to provide indication of the overall uncertainty. The 
sensitivity of various parameters to peak discharge is represented within the error assigned to model 
performance for each model. The combined error associated with each dam breach modelling technique is 
presented as the sum of both model performance and laboratory uncertainty errors.  
 
5 	$
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While prediction of peak discharge is the most critical parameter for dam breach prediction, various 
researchers have derived empirical relationships and parametric models (BREACH, OUTFLOW3) to link 
lake/dam characteristics with time to peak breach discharge, total breach development time and breach 
geometry (presented in Section 6.2) for a variety of natural and constructed dam types, including 
landslide dams (Fread, 1988; Costa 1985; Costa and Schuster 1988; Walder and O’Connor 1997). 
 
Based on the dataset obtained from physical scale modelling and the use of identical parametric inputs, 
the four models (empirical, parametric, dimensional and physical) were assessed on their ability to 
simulate the breach development process observed in the PSM. Specific empirical methods, while 
simplistic, were found to predict critical breach parameters to a higher accuracy than other methods and 
are therefore recommended as an appropriate first order assessment. 
 
52
Peak discharge provides the best indicator of potential flood magnitude (impact) and is therefore the 
principal parameter required for dam break analysis. While all four models demonstrated the ability to 
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constrain peak discharge to the same order of magnitude as PSM data, the empirical method using Walder 
and O’Connor’s Equation 7.1 (Table 7.1), which is derived from a landslide dam dataset, predicted Qp to 
an accuracy of ± 7% in carapace dams and ± 25% in non carapace dams. Parametric modelling techniques 
are also considered suitable for application to landslide dams, predicting peak discharge to an accuracy of 
± 37% in carapace dams and ± 34% in non carapace dams. The results from simulation of PSM data for 
each dam type are presented in Table 7.2. The combined uncertainty associated with estimation of peak 
discharge is presented for both carapace dams (Table 7.3) and non carapace dams (Table 7.4). 
 
 
 
Table 7.1. Empirical Relationships for Qp estimation ( PSM 19200 m3/s < Qp> 25600 m3/s) 
* Equation 7.1 
 
 
 
Table 7.2 Simulation Results for estimation of Qp 
a
 Empirical method using Equation 1 
b Dimensional method uses Equation 6.2 (Fread,1996) 
 
 
 
 
Regression Equation Dataset r2 S.E. (%) Qp (m3/s) Reference 
Qp = 0.0158Ep0.41 12 0.81 185 6605 Costa & Schuster 1988 
Qp = 672(V0/106)0.56 10 0.73 142 6163 Costa 1985 
  
Qp = 6.3d1.59 10 0.74 147 9535 Costa 1985 
  
Qp = 181(dVo/106)0.43 10 0.76 129 7189 Costa 1985 
  
Qp = 1.6V00.46 19 0.6  5684 Walder & O'Connor 1997 
Qp = 6.7d1.73 * 19 0.82  19323 Walder & O'Connor 1997 
Qp = 0.99dVo0.40 19 0.7  7640 Walder & O'Connor 1997 
  landslide - average 8877 +/- 4772 
  
Model PSM Empirical Parametric BREACH Dimensional b 
 Qout   Qout a  Error   Qout   Error   Qout   Error   Qout   Error  
 
(m3/s) (m3/s) (%) (m3/s) (%) (m3/s) (%) (m3/s) (%) 
DC 22400 19323 14 15605 30 21301 5 35858 60 
SC 19200 19323 1 15360 20 9433 51 35093 83 
DB 25600 19323 25 35344 38 13302 48 58417 128 
SB 25600 19323 25 26880 5 12800 50 41726 63 
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            Table 7.3 Combined Uncertainty associated with the estimation of Qp from Carapace Dams.  
            Value is the arithmetic mean, with error bars at one standard deviation. 
 
 
            Table 7.4. Combined Uncertainty associated with the estimation of Qp from Non Carapace 
            Dams. Value is the arithmetic mean, with error bars at one standard deviation. 
 
52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Estimations of time to peak discharge provide indication of available response times from calculation of 
flood peak arrival times at downstream locations. BREACH predicted tp to an adequate degree of 
accuracy (Table 7.5). 
 
Table 7.5. Uncertainty in Time to Peak Outflow estimates 
*Includes lab uncertainty (±7%) 
 
Total Failure 
(m3/s) Model Lab Uncertainty 
Model 
Performance 
Combined 
Uncertainty 
Carapace 
    
 
Empirical ±7% ± 7% ± 14 % 19323 ± 2705 
     
Parametric ±7% ± 25% ± 32 % 15483 ± 4955 
     
BREACH ±7% ± 27% ± 34% 15367 ± 5225 
     
Dimensionless ±7% ± 71% ± 78% 35476 ± 27671 
     
Total Failure 
(m3/s) Model Lab Uncertainty 
Model 
Performance 
Combined 
Uncertainty 
Non Carapace 
    
 
Empirical ±7% ± 25% ± 32 % 19323 ± 6183 
     
Parametric ±7% ± 22% ± 29 % 31112 ± 9022 
     
BREACH ±7% ± 50% ± 57% 13051 ± 7439 
     
Dimensionless ±7% ± 95% ± 102% 50072 ± 51073 
     
  
Carapace Non-Carapace 
Model Performance tp *hrs) Performance* tp*(hrs) 
Parametric ±48% 0.21-0.61 ±40% 0.12-0.28 
BREACH ±26% 0.32-0.54 ±17% 0.18-0.25 
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Unlike time to peak discharge, breach development time reflects the physical controls on the development 
of breach geometry, such as lake volume, dam volume and inflow conditions. Rapid breach development 
times may indicate peak outflow occurs when the breach reaches maximum depth prior to any significant 
drawdown of the reservoir, which will initiate different geomorphic impacts to that observed from slow 
development. 
 
The empirical approach presented by Froehlich (1987) provided the most accurate prediction of breach 
development time in carapace dams, but proved to be inappropriate for use in non carapace dams (Table 
7.6). 
 
Table 7.6. Uncertainty in Breach Development Time estimates 
 
Carapace Non-Carapace 
Model Performance tb*(hrs) Performance tb *(hrs) 
Froehlich (1995b) ±63% 0.15-0.66 ±63% 0.07-0.32 
Von Thun & Gillette 
(1990) 
±9% 0.42-0.51 - - 
Froehlich (1987) ±5% 0.49 ±76% 0.06 - 0.33 
BREACH ±22% 0.24-0.37 ±20% 0.23-0.35 
*Includes lab uncertainty (±7%) 
 
50+@ 	
The ultimate breach width and the rate of breach width expansion can dramatically affect the peak 
discharge and resulting inundation levels downstream from the dam. Empirical approaches accurately 
predicted breach width (Tables 7.7-7.9) and should be used for rapid first order assessment of potential 
breach geometry. 
 
        Table 7.7. Uncertainty in estimation of Breach Top Width 
            *Includes lab uncertainty (±7%). a Assumption of 45° sidewalls 
 
 
 Carapace Non carapace  
 Performance WT  * Performance WT  * 
Froehlich (1987)
 
a
 ± 7% 242-278m -   - 
BREACH ± 38% 81-180m ± 37% 74-162m 
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        Table 7.8 Uncertainty in estimation of Breach Base Width 
            *Includes lab uncertainty (±7%) a Assumption of 45° sidewalls 
 
 
 
      Table 7.9. Uncertainty in estimation of Average Breach Width (B) 
          *Includes lab uncertainty (±7%) 
 
5.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Application of empirical relationships (Table 7.1) derived for landslide dams (Costa 1985; Costa and 
Schuster 1988; Walder and O’Connor, 1997) to the physical scale model (PSM) data yielded a wide range 
of estimates in peak discharge. Of seven equations presented, only Equation 7.1 predicted Qp for the 
given dataset within the correct order of magnitude. Total failure was modelled to characterise the 
observed final breach configuration as well as to represent the low dam:lake volume ratio.  
 
Application of Equation 7.1 to the both carapace and non carapace dam types under variable conditions of 
saturation produced mean values are in the range 12173–26472 m3/s for non carapace dams and 15652-
22994 m3/s for carapace dams. The higher accuracy in the prediction of Qp for carapace dams is expected 
given the dataset Equation 7.1 was derived from.  
 
A single empirical regression relationship was used to describe the known values of Qp from the 
extremely rapid failure condition observed in the PSM (representative of the worst case scenario). Other 
studies including Manville (2001) and Hancox et al., (2005) have also used single regression equations in 
 Carapace Non carapace  
 Performance WB * Performance WB* 
Froehlich (1987)
 
a
 ± 18% 86-123m - - 
BREACH ± 90% 1-19m - - 
 Carapace  Non carapace 
 Performance B  Performance B  
USBR (1988) ± 9% 155-186m* ± 5% 198m* 
Johnson & Illes (1976) - 40-240m - 45-270m 
Singh & Snorrason (1982) - 160-400m - 180-450m 
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retrospective analysis of the Poerua event. While such an approach has been used to assess the inherent 
uncertainty associated with such equations, the use of empirical methods as predictive tools for first order 
magnitude forecasting must consider the worst case scenario of extremely rapid failure.  
 
Use of multiple empirical relationships derived from landslide dam data sets may help constrain estimates 
of peak discharge to an upper and lower limit. Using the mean value from empirical methods presented 
by Manville (2001), the accuracy of peak discharge prediction falls within ±60%.  
 
The use of empirical relationships linking dam geometry and lake volume to breach development time for 
constructed dam types reveals a broad range of estimates, when applied to the PSM data (Table 7.2). The 
empirical relationships developed by Von Thun and Gillette (1990) and Froehlich (1987) estimate tb for 
carapace dams extremely accurately, but appear to be unsuitable for estimation in non carapace dams. 
Application of Froehlich (1987) to the PSM data produced mean values in the range of 0.49 hours in 
carapace dams (Table 7.6). Mean values in a similar range (0.42-0.51 hours) were found using Von Thun 
& Gillette (1990) for highly erosive conditions. Unlike Von Thun and Gillette (1990) which uses B and 
Hw to estimate tb, Froehlich (1987) is considered more appropriate because it incorporates input 
parameters which can be assessed prior to failure for the landslide dam, such as H and V. 
 
Breach top width
 
(Table 7.7) and base width
 
(Table 7.8) were calculated using the empirical relationship 
for average breach width for constructed dam types after Froehlich (1987) for two separate sidewall 
conditions, relative to the friction angle of the controlling material present. In non carapace dams, WT was 
accurately estimated using a trapezoid with high angle sidewalls, generating mean values in the range 
264-356m. As outlined in Table 7.8, WB is approximately constrained using Froehlich (1987) indicating 
that the angle that the breach wall makes with the breach bed should be modelled as steeper than the angle 
of repose. 
 
Empirical relationships for the estimation of average breach width for constructed dam types produced 
results in agreement with the PSM data (Table 7.9). The USBR equation estimated average breach width 
with less uncertainty for non carapace dams producing mean values for B
  
in the range 155-198m.  
 
Empirical relationships defining the dimensional limits to average breach width were also considered for 
the PSM dataset (Table 7.9). Comparison of three documented relationships revealed Johnson and Illes’ 
(1976) limits to average breach width are most applicable to the landslide dam breach geometry observed 
for the PSM dataset. 
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Empirical relationships, while useful for approximation of both breach outflow and resultant geometry, 
provide no information about downstream conditions, particularly in relation to the effects of bulking, 
sediment entrainment and attenuation.  
 
5.
Walder and O’Connor (1997) indicate that peak discharge is primarily a function of the lake volume and 
breach erosion rate, so that only three parameters; breach depth (dB),volume released (Vo) and rate of 
vertical breach erosion (k) are required to predict the full outflow hydrograph. Breach development times 
of 0.25 - 0.66 hours generated peak breach discharges of 6031- 64921m3/s for carapace dams and 0 - 
103649m3/s for non carapace dams (Table 7.4). Figure 7.1 displays the plot of dimensionless peak 
discharge against dimensionless volume drained, incorporating the PSM data into the dataset used by 
Walder and O’Connor (1997). 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Plot of Dimensionless Peak Discharge and Drained Volume including 
PSM data (Walder and O’Connor, 1997).  
 
The large excess lake volume used in the PSM made the peak discharge sensitive to breach geometry, 
particularly the ratio of breach width to breach depth. Dimensional modelling of the PSM dataset 
overestimated Qp in carapace and non carapace dams by 80% (excluding lab error), making it unreliable 
as a predictive tool to assess Qp for rock avalanche dams. Dimensional analysis did however correctly 
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predict the disparity between erosion rates for carapace and non carapace dams, due to channel armouring 
in carapace dams reducing erosion rates by 50%. 
 
5. 
The parametric approach forecasts dam-break flood hydrographs by modelling the discharge through an 
evolving breach using standard weir flow equations. These place physical constraints on the rate at which 
water can pass through a breach of defined geometry and size. The parametric approach is limited by 
reliance on uncertain input parameters (final configuration breach geometry, and tb), however realistic 
values for such parameters can be estimated from analogous case studies. The OUTFLOW3 parametric 
model was applied to the PSM dataset using a trapezoidal breach with a top width 3.5 times the depth for 
non carapace dams and 4.5 times the depth for carapace dams (i.e., sidewall slope is equal to friction 
angle of the body or carapace material c.33° – 45°). The parametric approach was found to underestimate 
peak breach discharges from carapace dams generating mean values ranging between 9755-21211 m3/s, 
but served as the most accurate method for estimation of peak discharge from non carapace dams, 
producing mean values within the range 20534-41690 m3/s. Although the parametric approach also has 
the capacity to estimate tp, results from application to the PSM dataset (Table 7.6) suggest that such an 
approach cannot constrain tp to the required accuracy to justify its use as a predictive tool. 
 
The parametric approach simulates peak discharge from the lake as occurring before tb and therefore 
before the breach has reached its maximum dimensions. Termination of breach development prior to peak 
outflow as modelled using the parametric approach is not consistent with observations made during the 
PSM study. It does however suggest that the duration of the observed rising limb of a hydrograph (at a 
downstream site) may under-estimate the actual breach development time for carapace type dams.  
 
5..+!%"" 
Choice of the BREACH model to simulate the PSM dataset was based on its ability to account for 
heterogeneous dam composition, steep slope sediment transport and non linear breach growth. 
Simulations using BREACH predicted peak discharge to ± 39% in carapace dams and ± 62% in non 
carapace dams.  
 
Unlike the empirical relationships presented, BREACH estimates tb relatively accurately for both dam 
types. BREACH constrains tb to 0.27-0.61 hours in carapace dams and 0.31-0.51 hours in non carapace 
dams, thereby correctly addressing the disparity in breach development rates due to breach armouring in 
carapace dam types. BREACH estimates may be used as an approximate value for prediction of tp in non 
carapace type dams. 
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Furthermore, BREACH struggles to simulate extremely rapid dam failures (tp <1 hour) such as those 
documented for the PSM dataset, given the large reservoir size. The simulation duration for the BREACH 
model had to be increased from 0.6 hours (as recorded in the PSM) to 3 hours to produce representative 
results. Increasing the simulation time was not observed to influence Qp, tp, or tb. 
 
Overall, the BREACH analysis of the PSM dataset showed a number of features observed during testing. 
BREACH correctly simulated the termination of breach development prior to the peak discharge in the 
SC dam type and the continuation of breach development after peak discharge in DC, DB and SB dam 
types. BREACH correctly simulated steeper side wall angles in the saturated non carapace dam types. 
 
BREACH estimates of breach geometry were inaccurate and problematic. BREACH frequently 
underestimated WT  by 43% for all dam types, making the BREACH approach significantly less reliable as 
a predictive tool than the empirical relationship presented by Froehlich (1987). The error associated with 
the BREACH estimation of WB in rock avalanche dams was unacceptable (Table 7.8). 
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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The BREACH code is widely used as a modelling tool, so comparison of the geometric enlargement of 
the breach between the BREACH model and the PSM dataset is useful for assessing the applicability of 
BREACH to model breach development in rock avalanche dams.  
 
The BossBREACH model allows consideration of multiple parameters, notably reservoir, geotechnical 
and outflow channel conditions. Despite the detail of input data, BREACH outputs were found to poorly 
represent the PSM dataset. As the BREACH output is presented at each specified time step, the disparity 
between breach geometric development in the BREACH simulation and the PSM study can be examined 
in detail. 
 
The PSM dataset reflects breach development until the occurrence of peak discharge and therefore does 
not address evolution to the final breach configuration. The following section presents results from the 
BREACH simulation of the PSM dataset, presenting the temporal development of the parameters 
describing breach enlargement; outflow discharge, trapezoidal cross sectional area, breach top width 
and breach depth. Breach enlargement rates from the PSM study and BREACH simulation are compared 
(Figures 7.2-7.5) using the development of the breach channel inlet (Cmax cross sectional profile) and 
breach channel outlet (Wm cross sectional profile). 
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Figure 7.2(a-d). Breach Development in DC type dams 
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Comparison of the BREACH and PSM hydrographs in Figure 7.2a clearly indicates that while BREACH 
accurately simulates Qp, failure is simulated without consideration of dam crest armouring by the 
carapace, resulting in significant underestimation of tp and tb. Therefore BREACH outflow hydrograph 
for DC type dams appears to poorly represent the observed physical behaviour in the PSM.  
 
Comparison of PSM data to the BREACH simulation of breach geometry development in DC dams 
indicates the following; 
 
• BREACH is unable to account for the carapace armouring at the dam crest, providing resistance 
to erosion, to act as a permeable spillway before a critical discharge initiates raveling, 
entrainment and detachment at 0.49 hours (Figure 7.2a-b) 
 
• Breach depth and width do not develop uniformly as simulated by BREACH, but rather breach 
growth initially proceeds through lateral erosion at the breach inlet and vertical erosion at the 
breach outlet (Figure 7.2c-d). 
 
• BREACH predicts WT at peak discharge reasonably accurately despite simulating the 
development at an incorrect rate by not accounting for armouring. (Figure 7.2c). 
 
• The failure of BREACH to simulate the progressive enlargement of Bw is a severe limitation of 
the model. BREACH overestimates the rate of breach development in the DC model, due to the 
sudden growth of the Bw from an overflow condition concentrated to 8 m on the downstream face, 
to erosion on the upstream face and the terminal dimension of 24 m at only 0.02 hours (Figure 
7.2b). Comparatively the same Bw dimension occurs at 0.19 hours at the inlet and 0.61 hours at 
the outlet in the PSM.  
 
• Although BREACH inaccurately simulates the breach development process, for estimations of 
potential breach geometry at peak outflow BREACH may be considered representative to ±38% 
(Figure 7.2b).  
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Figure 7.3(a-d).Breach Development in DB type dams 
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Non carapace dams incorporated carapace material in a matrix of fine sediment. Detailed input 
parameters are outlined in Appendix G. Comparison of the BREACH and PSM hydrographs in Figure 
7.3a demonstrates that BREACH significantly underestimates Qp by 60%, but accurately estimates tp.  
 
Despite being specifically designed for embankment dams, BREACH performed only moderately in the 
simulation of overtopping failure in non carapace dams composed of a homogeneous material. 
Comparison of PSM data with the BREACH simulation of breach development in DB dams indicates the 
following; 
 
• At the onset of stage 2 erosion, the outlet breach area (Wm profile) develops at the same rate as 
the BREACH simulation (Figure 7.3b).  
 
• BREACH correctly simulates the depth development in the breach outlet, but models breach 
width development at approximately 50% the observed rate for the breach outlet after the onset of 
stage 2 erosion at 0.17 hours (Figure 7.3c-d). 
 
• From Figures 7.3c and 7.3d, BREACH fails to account for the non uniform development of the 
breach inlet, which evolves displaying characteristics of the two initial erosion stages; breach 
formation (0.08-0.15 hours) and breach enlargement (0.16-0.25 hours).  
 
• BREACH significantly underestimates the depth development (vertical erosion) at the breach 
outlet after the onset of stage 2 erosion at 0.14 hours (Figure 7.3d).  
 
• BREACH predicts breach width and depth development at peak discharge reasonably accurately 
for the outlet position of non carapace dams, but fails to simulate the non uniform development of 
the inlet position (Figure 7.3c-d). 
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Figure 7.4(a-d). Breach Development in SC type dams 
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Carapace dams constructed with saturated materials were modelled in BREACH through reduction of the 
material porosity input value to 75% of that used for dry materials. Comparison of the BREACH and 
PSM hydrographs in Figure 7.4b indicates that BREACH approximates tp, but significantly 
underestimates Qp. This result contrasts with the behaviour of BREACH in the simulation of non 
saturated carapace dams.  
 
Comparison of PSM data to the BREACH simulation of breach development in SC dams indicates the 
following; 
 
• The BREACH simulation of breach trapezoidal area development for the PSM data indicates that 
BREACH correctly estimates breach area, inlet width and outlet depth at peak discharge, despite 
failing to simulate armouring, as observed in the DC dam types (Figure 7.4b).  
 
• As identified in DC type dams, BREACH inaccurately models Bw in SC dams as a static 
dimension throughout breach enlargement (Figure 7.4b). 
 
• Significant side wall collapses, which enhance lateral development of the breach at the inlet 
(visible at 0.43 hours in Figure 7.4c) also contribute to the onset of rapid vertical erosion at the 
outlet (Figure 7.4b). 
 
• Although BREACH fails to simulate the armouring of the carapace, for estimations of potential 
breach geometry at peak outflow BREACH may be considered representative to ±54%.  
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Figure 7.5(a-d). Breach Development in SB type dams 
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Non carapace dams used saturated materials in construction, incorporating carapace material in a matrix 
of fine sediment. Input parameters are outlined in Appendix G. Comparison of the BREACH and PSM 
hydrographs in Figure 7.5a demonstrates that while BREACH significantly underestimates Qp by 54%, it 
approximately matches tp. 
 
As in the simulation of DB structures, BREACH accurately models the observed breach development rate 
for the Wm profile, but appears to underestimate the development of the breach width in the Cmax profile 
after the onset of stage 2 erosion (0.23 hours). Comparison of PSM data to the BREACH simulation of 
breach development in SB dams indicates the following; 
 
• BREACH simulation of saturated materials reduces the resultant breach area by approximately 
20%, while enhancing the development of the breach inlet (Cmax) by approximately 50% and the 
outlet (Wm) by 13% (Figure 7.5b).  
 
• At the onset of stage 2 erosion (0.2hours), the inlet breach area (Cmax profile) deviates from the 
both the outlet development rate and the BREACH simulated rate (Figure 7.5b). 
 
• BREACH underestimates the growth of the breach outlet area by approximately 20% resulting 
from underestimation of breach width and depth development at the breach outlet by 
approximately 50% (Figure 7.5c-d).  
 
• Unlike the DB model, the BREACH simulation appears to closely resemble breach development 
at the inlet and not outlet position, as observed for the carapace models which indicate BREACH 
simulates breach growth by primarily lateral and not vertical erosion. 
 
• As observed in the DB model, BREACH fails to account for the non uniform development 
(enhanced lateral erosion) at the breach inlet at the onset of stage 2 erosion at 0.23 hours (Figure 
7.5b-c). 
 
• The SB structure was the only trial whereby initial uniformity was observed for breach area 
development rate in both the physical scale model and BREACH.  
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The breach models used in this study were based upon methods used in the retrospective analysis of the 
Poerua River event (Hancox et al., 2005), enabling comparison between uncertainty predictions. 
Modelling of the Poerua breach as a partial failure (representative of the prototype condition) indicated 
that uncertainty could be up to ±60% of the predicted peak discharge. Uncertainty quoted for the 
BREACH model was in agreement with the PSM value, while uncertainty for other models was within 
±20% of PSM values. As observed in the PSM study, empirical estimates recorded the lowest uncertainty, 
while dimensional methods, despite their derivation from natural dam studies, recorded the highest 
uncertainty. Therefore uncertainty estimates for the PSM study can be considered both representative and 
appropriate.  
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BREACH analyses of catastrophic and gradual landslide dam failures are sparse within literature. The 
BREACH software package presents two landslide dam case studies as template simulations; the 
overtopping failure of the Mantaro River landslide, Peru, 1974 and the potential piping failure of Spirit 
Lake, US, 1982. Manville (2001) applies BREACH to the retrospective analysis of the Poerua River 
landslide dam failure, New Zealand 1999, in addition to a variety of other dam breach technologies for 
process verification, including physical scale modelling. Corrado et al., (2006) used BREACH to model 
landslide dams of homogenous composition and variable boulder content, implementing new components 
to the software to improve its application to landslide dams. In addition to these studies, work by Almeida 
et al., (2005) comparing the performance of BREACH against the RoDaB model in the simulation of 
rockfill dam breaching is also considered important in the verification of BREACH as a suitable tool for 
breach analysis in rock avalanche dam failures. 
 
505 !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BREACH accurately modelled both Qp and tp from the Mantaro failure to within ±5% of observed 
conditions, with both parameters highly sensitive to cohesion, but insensitive to friction angle (Fread, 
1988). Furthermore, BREACH appears to simulate armouring of the dam crest during the Mantaro failure, 
permitting a stable discharge for 17 hours prior to rapid failure. PSM prototype (scaled) dams were 
simulated in BREACH using similar geotechnical properties and hydraulic conditions to those used in the 
Mantaro simulation, however the inability to correctly simulate the influence of armouring may result 
from the significant disparity between temporal scales and dam geometry. Comparatively, the duration of 
the Mantaro event was simulated as 200 hours, while PSM protoype events ranged from 0.28-0.66 hours. 
The low gradient of the Mantaro dam geometry enabled accurate BREACH simulation, without 
exceeding the zuzd=1 limitation of the model, as encountered in the PSM prototype dam simulations. The 
Mantaro dam was modelled using only an outer core, with no consideration of a carapace facies mantling 
Chapter 7 Testing of Models 
158 
 
a finer body material with significant disparity between the geotechnical properties of the modelled 
materials as simulated for the PSM prototype dams. BREACH also significantly underestimated the 
Mantaro breach geometry, modelling the breach as pseudo-triangular at peak discharge and in final 
configuration, with dimensions WT = 126m Bw = 1.9m, when in reality the Mantaro breach was observed 
be trapezoidal with WT = 243 Bw = 30m. This suggests that BREACH may be a representative tool for Qp 
and tp prediction, but not breach geometry. 
 
505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Hancox et al., (2005) utilised several dam-break technologies, including BREACH, in the retrospective 
analysis of the Poerua landslide dam. BREACH was documented as the only model to simulate the 
observed partial breach, producing estimates of Qp, tp and tb which ‘did not conflict with the available 
observations’ (Hancox et al.,2005). Physical laboratory modelling of the Poerua landslide dam indicated 
the occurrence of peak outflow before full breach development and a relatively short time-to-peak. 
Physical scale modelling of the Poerua event conducted by Donadini and Kunz, (2002), tested variable 
dam geometries, including the geometry used for the current PSM dataset (but with a much smaller lake 
volume). Comparison of the Poerua (1:150) physical scale model for a landslide dam with geometry of 
15us/25ds to the BREACH simulation of the Poerua event, yields similar results to the BREACH 
simulation of DB and SB dam types in the current PSM study. The Poerua physical scale model was 
modelled as a homogeneous dam, with different behaviour to that observed for carapace dams, primarily 
through the rapid onset of erosion without the armouring of the carapace facies.  
 
The disparity between Qp estimates for the Poerua event using the PSM presented by Davies et al., (2002) 
and BREACH is evident in Figure 7.6. While Hancox et al.,(2005) considers the BREACH model to 
accurately simulate the observed behaviour of the prototype event, Davies PSM (with similar geometry), 
over estimates both peak discharge by 32% and time to peak by 38%. This result highlights the individual 
strengths of both numerical and physical modelling techniques and validates their independent use at 
specific stages in the analysis. The inability of BREACH to simulate the observed Qp and tp to better than 
±50% in the current PSM study and ±35% the PSM presented by Davies et al.,(2002) indicates BREACH 
may simulate the breach initiation phase as a tractive-force erosion problem, which conflicts with the 
erosion mechanics observed in laboratory testing (Wahl, 1998).  
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Figure 7.6.Poerua Outflow hydrographs 
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RoDaB was developed by Almeida et al.,(2005) to address the issue of overtopping failure in rockfill 
dams with a homogeneous body and an impervious layer on the upstream slope. While such a model 
cannot be applied to landslide dams, comparison of the BREACH against RoDaB for simulation of 
overtopping failure of rockfill dams revealed that BREACH generates a time to peak 0.69 hours before 
the simulated tp in the RoDaB. The time to peak discharge in an earth dam of similar geometry is about 
15% of the time corresponding to the rockfill dam. Furthermore BREACH estimates peak discharge 65% 
higher than RoDaB for rockfill dam and 15% higher than the BREACH earth dam. Therefore BREACH 
appears to be restricted in its ability to accurately model the influence of large grain sizes on Qp.  
 
Almeida et al., (2005) concluded that BREACH significantly underestimates the influence of armouring 
due to the inadequacy of the Smart sediment transport formula and is therefore more appropriate for the 
simulation of an earth dam breach.  
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From retrospective modelling of the Valderchia landslide dam, Italy 1997, Corrado et al.,(2006) 
considered BREACH to inaccurately represent material transport over a poorly sorted landslide deposit 
given the use of the Smart-Jaeggi bed-load transport formula, derived from flume experiments where 
d90/d30 < 10. Corrado et al.,(2006) question the use of the Shields stress, to evaluate entrainment 
thresholds in Smart’s revision of the Meyer-Peter-Muller equation (Smart, 1984) claiming accurate 
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assessment of water depth under turbulent flow conditions to be problematic. Corrado et al.,(2006) 
overcome the requirement for depth assessment by using the Schoklitsch equation (Schoklitsch, 1964) 
which instead considers discharge per unit width and not depth as a critical parameter. Selection of the 
Schoklitsch equation is also attributed to its development and testing under field and not laboratory 
conditions (Corrado et al., 2006). 
 
Corrado et al.,(2006) also claim that the use of a single d50 for both the inner and outer core in the 
BREACH model is not representative of a real granulometric class and could result in overestimation of 
breach erosion and the outflow hydrograph. 
 
Corrado et al.,(2006) implemented BREACH with a new procedure that calculates two granulometric 
curves, one for each mode of the original distribution, and evaluates transport of the landslide material 
separately. Results of the analysis indicate that the model is very sensitive to the bed-load equation and 
that the procedure implemented to consider the eventual bimodal distribution of the dam material 
simulates the armouring phenomenon (frequently observed in carapace dams for this PSM study). 
 
Consideration of material bimodality in the Corrado et al.,(2006) modified BREACH model indicates the 
original BREACH model may overestimate peak outflow by ~60% for a homogeneous dam composed of 
10-20% boulders by volume. When the composition of the landslide deposit was simulated to have a 
boulder content >30% by volume, peak outflow was overestimated by 90% and the breach erosion 
observed to terminate after the time of peak discharge. The modified model also produces a significantly 
reduced breach channel depth both at the peak flow and in final configuration; armouring causes erosion 
at the breach base to cease, due to the increase in relative frequency of the boulders in the breach bed. 
 
The peak discharge values are constant for d50 ranging from 0.045 to 15 mm using either the Schoklitsch 
or the Smart equation Corrado et al.,(2006). Entrainment within the breach outflow of clasts with a 
median diameter of 47-256mm is also constant using either the Schoklitsch or the Smart equations. 
Corrado et al.,(2006) however claim that inflow conditions conducive to breach formation and 
entrainment of clasts >256 mm in the Schoklitsch or the Smart equations vary by 2 orders of magnitude 
(i.e. Schoklitsch formula, 15.4 m3/s compared to Smart formula 3,000 m3/s). Linear scaling of the critical 
discharge (presented in section 5.8.2) using  = 400 reveals a discharge of 2038 m3/s is required for 
entrainment of carapace materials in the prototype condition of the DC dam type. Linear scaling of flow 
velocities during initial breach enlargement produce values ranging from 0.15 m/s-0.6 m/s. Such values 
are within a similar range to the critical velocities obtained using formulae developed by Coleman et al., 
(2002) and Scheuerlein and Hartung (1970).   
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Rock avalanche deposits as documented by Dunning (2005) are classed as very poorly sorted with a mean 
grainsize of -2.63 Phi (10mm). Detailed sampling at five rock avalanche deposits by Dunning (2005) 
revealed the mean absolute range in grain size to lie between -0.82 - 3.69 Phi (1-200mm) and therefore 
well within the range for clast entrainment simulated by the original BREACH model. Given the scaling 
ratio of 1:400 used in this PSM study, the required inflow condition for clast entrainment using the Smart 
equation is also met. 
 
From detailed field investigation of the post formation development of landslide dams in the North-West 
Nelson region, Nash (2003) reported dam materials with block sizes > 250mm to correspond to relative 
dam stability. Therefore the BREACH model appears appropriate in its simulation of landslide dam 
stability when the d50 > 250mm (see Figure 6.8). Although individual blocks within the carapace facies 
have been observed in the field to range from 100 to > 1000mm in size (Davies pers comm.), BREACH 
should be able to accurately simulate breach erosion and development for approximately 85% deposit 
materials (< 256mm), but may underestimate breach outflow due to the use of tractive-force erosion 
modelling.  
 
Given the lack of geotechnical data available for sampling during their investigation, Corrado et al., 
(2006) model the Valderchia landslide as a homogenous deposit with variable boulder composition within 
a fine matrix. While such a condition may be representative of rock type mass movements with low 
volumes (< 106 m3) and runout distances or even the body facies as modelled in DB and SB dam types, 
rock avalanches have a distinctly different morphology with a heterogeneous fabric composed of unique 
facies with contrasting geotechnical properties (as outlined in section 2.2.6). 
 
The carapace facies, therefore cannot be correctly simulated by the bimodal distribution of the new 
BREACH procedure assuming a specific boulder content. The writer suggests that this is the main reason 
for the disparity between BREACH simulations from the PSM study and that presented by Corrado et 
al.,(2006). Furthermore, the modified BREACH model was not available for application to the PSM 
dataset in this study and therefore its performance relative to the original model cannot be assessed.  
 
The PSM study confirms a number of the physical assumptions made by Corrado et al.,(2006). The 
volume of boulders (within the carapace) and the spatial distribution significantly influence peak 
discharge by selective erosion of fine particles leading to the creation of an armour on the breach bed, 
which does not permit the incision of the breach. This leads to the formation of a smaller breach section 
area and to a consequent smaller peak outflow. 
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The PSM study (incorporating carapace and non carapace dams) also confirms that the increase in 
percentage of boulders determines (at the time of peak discharge) a substantial decrease in the section 
area and a decrease in the breach depth. 
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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Physically-based numerical models such as BREACH offer the potential to provide more detailed 
information regarding breach dynamics but are recognised as having limited accuracy. Several 
deficiencies have recently been identified in critical reviews of the model by Manville (2001) and 
Mohamed et al.,(2005). The implications for practical application are that flood hazard areas identified by 
hydrodynamic modelling of the dam breach wave may have large error margins particularly in proximal 
downstream regions where risk to life is greatest.  
 
As presented in the preceding sections, the BREACH model has been applied to a variety of dam breach 
case studies for both natural and artificial dams proving to have variable accuracy as a predictive tool. 
From BREACH analysis of the PSM dataset, limitations were observed in the model’s ability to 
accurately simulate overtopping failure, regardless of dam composition (homogeneous or heterogeneous) 
or type of emplacement (constructed or natural). The following principal limitations are identified for the 
model. 
 
1. Inability to simulate armouring induced by carapace material despite sensitivity analysis 
indicating that dam stability occurs when d50 exceeds 250mm 
 
2. Incorrectly simulates the rate of breach enlargement for the outer core condition modelled with 
the geotechnical properties of a carapace.  
 
3. The model requires unrealistic inflow conditions for the entrainment of carapace material with a 
median diameter of >250mm. 
 
4. The model was found to be particularly sensitive to the dam geometry, requiring slope angles to 
be restricted to z > 5 to maintain numerical stability(Manville, 2001) Dams with high angle 
slopes (z < 5) are simulated to be stable, while reducing the slope (z > 5) was found to trigger 
failure. Such conditions are obviously contrary to reality. The use of high Zu/Zd values also 
produces unrealistic estimates of Qp (Figure 7.7) 
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                                                     Figure 7.7. Qp sensitivity to variation in Zu/Zd angle 
 
5. BREACH inaccurately models Bw in carapace dams as a static dimension throughout breach 
enlargement  
 
6. Manville (2001) further identified that when simulating low dams impounding relatively large 
lakes, breach growth (both lateral and vertical) is terminated upon reaching the dam base, while 
the discharge increases. This restricts the model’s ability to accurately evaluate breach 
dimensions at Qp.  
 
7. d50 is the only granulometric parameter used by the base model to calculate the breach erosion.  
 
Further criticism of BREACH relates to its reliance on sediment transport relations that are untested in the 
regime of flow conditions applicable to a dam breach. Both Almeida et al., (2005) and Corrado et al., 
(2006) consider the use of the Smart bed-load transport equation, (which may not be appropriate for all 
stages of the breach process) to limit the application of BREACH to large unsorted sediments typical of 
those observed in rock avalanche deposits.  
 
The use of the Smart bed-load transport equation is therefore only valid if used specific to the conditions 
from which it was derived (ie. d90/d30 < 10). Comparatively the d90/d30 values used in the BREACH 
simulation of PSM prototype dams ranged from 100-1000, which may have contributed to the significant 
underestimation of peak discharge in most dam types. Graf and Altinakar (1998) claim 28.6 mm to be the 
maximum grain size diameter for which the original Meyer-Peter-Muller formula was established. 
 
The reliance of BREACH on tractive force erosion is also not consistent with the mechanics of the 
breaching process as observed in several laboratory and field studies (Wahl, 1998). While tractive stresses 
on the downstream face are very high, and changes in slope or surface discontinuities can concentrate 
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stresses and initiate erosion, analyses based on such mechanics apply only until initiation of erosion after 
which surface discontinuities and observed headcutting behaviour make tractive stress analyses 
questionable (Wahl, 1998). BREACH is also criticised by Hahn et al., (2000) for its inability to correctly 
model headcut-type erosion processes in cohesive embankments.  
 
Overall, however, the BREACH analysis of the PSM dataset, predicted a number of physical features 
observed during testing. BREACH correctly simulated the termination of breach development prior to the 
peak discharge in the SC dam type and the continuation of breach development after peak discharge in 
DC, DB and SB dam types. BREACH correctly simulated steeper side wall angles in the saturated non 
carapace dam types. 
 
Although the BREACH model is data intensive with an overall error margin of ±50%, the detail provided 
in the output file enables consideration of all principal breach parameters and physical characteristics 
associated with failure. The assumption of linear breach development, though shown to be incorrect by 
the PSM, still adequately represents the breach process without causing consistent error in predictions. 
The modified BREACH model developed by Corrado et al., (2006) may however be more applicable to 
modelling breach development in rock avalanche dams and therefore should be the focus of future 
research.  
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The use of a PSM also allowed observation of several features unaccounted for by the empirical and 
computer based models, including dam crest and breach channel armouring, the slumping failure 
mechanism, the formation of a debris fan at the toe of the breach outlet and the disparity between breach 
development at the inlet and the outlet. The PSM also indicated that downstream geomorphic features 
were produced by outflow conditions during the final stages of breach erosion and cannot be used to infer 
probable breach development rates or failure mechanisms. 
 
Application of PSM phenomena to prototype observations assists in understanding the accuracy 
associated with the use of this modelling technique. The role of carapace armouring in prolonging time to 
failure was identified as a key characteristic distinguishing between carapace and non carapace 
(homogeneous) dams. The results of the PSM study appear to contrast those of Dunning (2004) who used 
SLOPE/W and SEEP/W Geoslope™ software to model the influence of the carapace facies on time to 
dam failure (outlined in Section 2.4). Dunning et al., (2005a) reported time to failure in homogeneous 
dams to be 88% greater than carapace dams for the same geometry under normal inflow conditions. 
Results from the PSM however indicated that the time to failure in carapace dams was 57% greater than 
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homogeneous dams for the same geometry and inflow, probably due to armouring. The value of physical 
scale modelling to verify computer simulation is therefore realised in this study.  
 
Preliminary breach trials conducted prior to the PSM study found that non carapace dams would fail 
under a condition of zero inflow, whereas carapace dams require a minimum inflow of 1 litre/second. 
This suggests that the failure mechanism for both dam types is also different, however only the failure of 
carapace dams was investigated in this study. 
 
Reported carapace armouring for prototype conditions are in agreement with PSM behaviour. Both the 
Poerua (1999) and La Josefina (1993) landslide lakes were reported to overtop their respective barriers 
approximately 6 days before breach failure was initiated (Hancox et al., 2005; Plaza-Nieto, 1990). Both 
landslide dams were observed to contain coarse material up to 1-2 m diameter at the dam crest, 
representative of a carapace facies. Therefore the armouring properties and resistance to erosion offered 
by the carapace as observed in the PSM are qualitatively comparable to the short term stability observed 
in prototype scenarios under semi-static inflow conditions. Under such conditions the carapace may act as 
a permeable spillway, maintaining inflow and outflow in equilibrium, before a critical discharge induces 
instability on the downstream face. Equilibrium behaviour was documented for the Tsatichhu landslide 
dam failure in Bhutan (2004), with seepage outflow ranging between 0.53 - 5 m3 s−1 to reduce the lake 
level at dam crest by 3m (Dunning et al.,2005).  
 
Consideration of armouring as a characteristic of prototype scale failures requires verification using a 
wider dataset. The New Zealand landslide dam dataset plot for volume against time to failure (Figure 7.8) 
reveals a population of landslide dams which display stability for a period ranging from 1-100 days 
(marked band). While it must be emphasised that this dataset includes landslide dams derived from a 
broad spectrum of mass movements, rock avalanches and rockslide/fall derived landslide dams make up 
approximately 50% of the data. Furthermore, Korup (2004) reported 38% dams to be derived from an 
unknown blockage mechanism. Therefore, the high concentration of dams (volume > 106m3) with a time 
to failure between 10-100 days may be indicative of armouring related stability for impoundments 
incorporating large grainsizes comparable to a carapace facies.  
 
As documented for both the Poerua and Tsatichhu landslide dam failures (Hancox et al., 1999; Dunning 
et al., 2005), a critical change in conditions caused by rainfall was required to initiate failure. Reported 
observations of actual failure at a prototype scale are sparse in literature due to the tendency for such 
events to occurr during conditions of poor visibility. Observations of the failure of the Tsatichhu landslide 
dam, incorporating dam-face saturation, progressive seepage and slumping (Dunning et al.,2005) are 
consistent with failure mechanisms observed in the PSM.  
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Figure 7.8.. Identification of the armouring phenomena at a prototype scale using the New Zealand landslide dam 
dataset. The marked band represents a population of landslide dams with volumes > 106m3 for which time to failure 
ranges between 10- 100 days. (Source. Korup, 2004) 
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Chapter 8 Hazard Management 
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The formation and failure of rock avalanche dams are common geomorphic processes in mountain 
regions throughout the world, causing a series of geomorphic hazards such as catastrophic outburst floods, 
debris flows, backwater ponding, up-and downstream aggradation, and channel instability. The hazard 
posed by such failures is often much greater than that posed by the initial landslide event.  
 
While outburst floods or debris flows following rapid landslide dam failure are usually the focus of 
hazard management, the 1999 Poerua event demonstrated the profound geomorphic and social impact of 
sustained post-flood downstream aggradation of landslide-derived sediment. Therefore management of 
the hazard must also consider the longer term geomorphic impact such failures have for an extensive 
distance downstream of the dam breach. 
 
The use of a physical scale model in this study, to quantify the influence of representative rock avalanche 
sedimentology on the prediction of critical breach parameters, provides new insights into rapid response 
management of landslide dam hazards, primarily through; 
 
1. Identification of physical features and specific conditions which may be used as indicators of 
potential dam stability/instability and outburst flood magnitude. 
 
2. Identification of contemporary dam breach modelling technologies which can be applied to rock 
avalanche dams for the accurate assessment of the outburst flood hazard. 
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Risk management is decision making based on available data and precedent. The 1999 Poerua River 
event was a timely example of the hazard posed by landslide dams, providing evidence of the spatial and 
temporal nature of the associated geomorphic impacts from outburst flooding.  
 
Management of landslide dam hazards requires identification of catchments prone to landslide damming, 
primarily through geomorphic investigation. The response time for the implementation of effective 
management will depend on the availability of the following; 
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• precipitation and lake level data 
• dambreak modelling data for various scenarios in the affected catchment; peak discharge, breach 
development time, inundation plans etc. 
• information on potential inundation, land use, centres of population, infrastructure etc. (GIS/DEM) 
• geomorphic maps  
• response plans; evacuation routes 
 
Identification of catchments susceptible to dam-break flooding will enable effective management to 
reduce the hazard of future landslide dams. While the annual probability of a landslide dam-break flood in 
an identified catchment is usually very small (< 10-2), the risk to inhabited areas proximal to the exit of 
the downstream gorge is significantly greater than to inhabited areas further downstream due to short 
response time and minimal attenuation of the flood wave. Appropriate response planning requires 
integration of all emergency services. Increased public awareness through education and distribution of 
appropriate information to the public will also enable more efficient response to hazard warnings.  
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The economic impact of outburst flooding will be a function of (a) peak outflow discharge/ downstream 
attenuation and (b) the type of infrastructure located in the downstream valley (i.e. high value structures 
such as dams, or lifeline infrastructure such as transport, water supply, communication and electrical 
facilities). While peak discharge is a useful measure of outburst flood magnitude, it leaves the spatial and 
temporal range of geomorphic impact unspecified. Furthermore, at a critical distance downstream the 
flood wave peak discharge becomes independent of the magnitude of the discharge at the dam site. 
 
As at Poerua the long term downstream impact of channel avulsion and aggradation may also be greater 
than that of the initial flood. The geomorphic response depends on the size and nature of the dam, and the 
size of the river and its ability to breach the dam and redistribute the debris downstream (Korup, 2002). 
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Scenario based hazard assessments are beneficial for development of emergency response plans, but the 
complexity of such geomorphic phenomena (i.e. the Mt Adams landslide had no triggering mechanism) 
and their consequential impacts are difficult to assess prior to occurrence. Furthermore, given the scarcity 
of both historic and quantitative geomorphic data for a specific region, such hazards may also occur 
outside those catchments identified as “at risk”.  
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Formation of a large landslide dam near a gorge exit presents the greatest risk to downstream populations 
given the limited response time available before the arrival of the flood wave. A landslide dam could 
form and fail in only a few hours, before local authorities became aware of the hazard. Rapid hazard 
assessment and response primarily require quantification of the potential magnitude of the outburst flood. 
The critical breach parameter, peak discharge (Qp) provides the best indicator of magnitude (Hancox et al., 
2005). From estimation of Qp, tp may be calculated using flood routing methods to define the critical 
response time (arrival of the downstream flood wave), which will also be a function of proceeding 
meteorologic and/or seismic conditions. Threatening meteorologic and/or seismic conditions will also 
affect the surveillance of the dam condition prior to failure. Investigation and analysis should be focused 
toward consideration of a worst case scenario (rapid failure) and mitigation of potential impacts which 
will extend for a significant distance both up and downstream of the point of blockage. 
 
Aerial observation (of the upstream catchment, landslide scarp, landslide dam and resultant lake) is 
imperative to obtain a full understanding of the hazard and collect key parametric data. It also allows 
identification of variables which may compound to the existing hazard potential, such as multiple 
upstream blockages or activation of further slips on the existing scarp. 
 
Use of a high inflow condition in the PSM (comparable to cascading collapse of multiple dams upstream 
at the prototype scale) indicated that in such a scenario peak discharge at the subject dam would be 35-
50% higher than that observed from single failure. Due to the overwhelming inflow, the carapace would 
offer no resistance to failure (armouring) reducing the time to peak outflow by 60%. Future slope failures 
into the dammed lake might generate displacement waves, which could induce overtopping failure of the 
dam. 

9.		$	
( 
The PSM study suggests that rock avalanche dam stability will depend on (a) the geotechnical 
characteristics of the carapace and (b) the critical lake level on the upstream face (affected by inflow rate) 
at which seepage flow becomes concentrated at the interface between the carapace and body facies. 
Inspection of the downstream toe to monitor springs or seepage induced erosion is a critical indicator of 
dam stability under constant low or reducing lake inflow, and instability if inflow is likely to increase. 
The observation of tension cracks, headscarp development, slumping or headward migration of seepage 
on the downstream face are indicators of imminent failure (they will cause rotation of the downstream 
face, to lower the breach inlet below the reservoir level). Appearance of such features should imply 
immediate evacuation of the downstream areas at risk of inundation. 
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In order to rapidly estimate peak discharge to within ±30% of real values, the writer recommends the use 
of empirical analysis as a first order assessment for the worst case scenario. The empirical method is 
extremely efficient due to the reliance of most regressional relationships on parameters such as dam 
height and lake volume that are easily obtained from aerial and indirect observation (DEM methods). 
Furthermore, as outlined in section 7.4, empirical relationships verified against the PSM dataset 
(indicative of realistic sedimentology) were able to estimate Qp to ±19%, tb to ±17% and WT to ±24%. 
Given the accuracy of the empirical prediction of Qp as the principal parameter from which event 
magnitude can be assessed, this approach is considered the primary response. Such an approach is 
especially relevant to conditions conducive to rapid failure, but should always be utilised despite 
forecasting of conditions associated with minimal perceived risk as outlined in Figure 8.1. With provision 
of the probable event magnitude through the empirical method, downstream routing of the outburst flood 
enables indication as to the likely response time for required action.  
 
Previous studies (e.g.  Manville, 2001) have emphasised a consensus approach for the estimation of the 
potential flood magnitude, using parametric, dimensional and physical methods for refinement of initial 
regression analysis predictions. Results from this study indicate that the higher uncertainties associated 
with dimensional, parametric and physical predictions limit their ability to refine and increase the 
precision of empirical peak discharge estimates.  
 
While parametric and physical models may not be applicable to rapid first order assessment of potential 
magnitude, they produce an outflow hydrograph which can be used for downstream routing of the 
outburst flood, to provide a more accurate determination of more distal hazards. Physical models such as 
BREACH can provide useful information on sediment bulking and entrainment potential in the 
downstream channel. BREACH also was found to accurately predict physical features associated with the 
dam failure, including partial breach and maximum breach development prior to peak outflow.  
 
Due to the requirement for extensive data collection and operator familiarity, increasing processing time, 
parametric and physical models are a secondary response which may be used to qualify specific temporal 
and spatial characteristics of the outburst flood on the downstream valley. The secondary response is not 
however an alternative approach to the primary response, but rather a complementary analysis which 
relates specific impacts (both social and geomorphic) to a predicted magnitude.  
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Figure 8.1..Recommended Rapid Response methodology after the identification of a Landslide dam 
 
*Response time is generated from the primary response empirical analysis for first order assessment of magnitude. 
It is presented as a clarifying condition under which further use of the secondary response system might be 
considered feasible. 
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Where seismic and meteorlogic conditions are conducive to conducting a site investigation, a detailed 
assessment of geotechnical parameters should be undertaken. Specification as to the exact parametric data 
required for the use of secondary response models is presented in detail in Section 2.3.7. A brief summary 
of the principal data required from site investigation is presented below. 
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Lake Inflow 
The rate of inflow into the impounded lake enables constraint to be placed on dam stability in the 
estimation of lake infill time (or time to overtopping). Rapid changes in lake level are critical to both dam 
and valley wall stability. Installation of monitoring equipment such as a radio-linked water-level recorder, 
will allow remote assessment of critical lake conditions to provide sufficient alert to the affected 
population and precise inflow inputs in secondary response models.  
 
Carapace 
The size of the material occupying the dam crest and downstream face will provide some indication as to 
the potential resistance to overtopping offered by the carapace (armouring) or its ability to transmit flow 
and act as a permeable spillway. Investigation as to the assemblage of the deposit and whether the 
carapace is clast or matrix supported will significantly influence estimations of potential dam stability. 
The PSM study provided clear indication that rock avalanche dams, despite having a very different 
sedimentology, produce a peak discharge comparable to that observed for failure of homogeneous dams .  
 
Sediment Transport 
Consideration of the landslide dam volume will indicate the potential debris requiring delivery 
downstream, and may be used to forecast geomorphic impact. Estimation of dam volume may also assist 
in modelling the dambreak flood as a hyperconcentrated or debris flow. Evidence from the Poerua event 
suggests that the initial flood wave may be laden with vegetative debris, increasing the destructive 
potential of the flow. 
 
Attenuation 
Assessment of the downstream channel and valley characteristics will enable estimation of the likely 
downstream attenuation and bulking of the flood. If the downstream channel is steep, a significant 
increase in the peak discharge may occur without attenuation if a large volume of sediment is eroded and 
transported as bed load by the outburst flood. Significant sediment debulking due to attenuation of the 
floodwave on the alluvial fan will also cause the mouth of the gorge to become a locus for geomorphic 
impacts.  
 
Failure Mechanism 
Investigation of the potential failure mechanism (if not apparent), should consider the potential for 
overtopping from a landslide induced displacement wave or cascade collapse from multiple dam failures 
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upstream. Identification of bedrock abutments which may act as natural spillways and lead to instability 
of the downstream toe, due to flow concentration effects is also paramount. 
 
Breach Characteristic 
The PSM study indicates that the maximum breach cross sectional area will occur shortly after the time of 
peak discharge through the breach and be trapezoidal in form with sidewall angles slightly higher than the 
angle of repose for carapace material.  
 
Consideration of all parameters listed above is required to simulate representative failure conditions in 
both parametric and physical models.  
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The parametric model (OUTFLOW3) was verified against the PSM dataset providing estimates of Qp to 
±37% and tp to ±53% for carapace dams. Use of the parametric model will enable sensitivity analysis of 
the peak discharge to breach development time and breach dimensions to help quantify the rate of breach 
development (Manville, 2001).  
 
The physical model (BossBREACH) was verified against the PSM dataset (indicative of realistic 
sedimentology) but could only estimate Qp to ±50%, tb to ±27%, WT to ±43% and tp to ±32% for 
carapace dams. The assumption of linear breach development in BREACH, though shown to be incorrect 
from direct comparison to the PSM rates, may be applicable to model breach development in materials 
with a d50 < 250mm. The writer however recommends the use of a modified BREACH model (Corrado et 
al.,2006) to specifically model the armouring influence of a carapace under low inflow conditions.  
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The results of the primary and secondary (if required) response systems may then be presented (in the 
context of their limitations) along with field inspection evidence (if applicable) to allow the authorities to 
decide on appropriate action. The first order magnitude assessment used in the primary response may be 
coupled with the secondary response to identify potential downstream impacts and social/economic 
vulnerability. The appropriate action will depend on the response time available for either relocation of 
the downstream population or physical modification to the dam to reduce the risk of catastrophic failure.  
 
The value of conducting scenario based hazard analyses is evident in the immediate need for specific 
information from which hazard management decisions can be made. Inundation simulation and mapping 
to identify zones of highest susceptibility will assist in effective planning for evacuation of affected 
populations and future residential development.  
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Chapter 9 Summary and Conclusions  
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The formation and failure of landslide dams are common geomorphic processes in mountain regions 
throughout the world, generating a series of indirect hazards such as catastrophic outburst floods, debris 
flows, backwater ponding, up- and downstream aggradation, and channel instability. River blockages 
formed by rock avalanches often pose a higher hazard potential than other landslide dams, given the 
extreme runout distances and volumes of rock avalanche deposits. Recent research has identified rock 
avalanche deposits to have a unique internal sedimentology consisting of a surficial, coarse material 
(carapace) and a fragmented interior (body). As such dams are reported to fail rapidly by overtopping; the 
influence of the carapace material at the dam crest was proposed to be of critical importance to rock-
avalanche dam stability, potential breach development and the resultant peak discharge of the outburst 
flood. 
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(
	 
Physical scale modelling of overtopping failure and breach development in rock avalanche dams under 
variable inflow was used to quantify the influence of representative sedimentology on critical breach 
parameters and their prediction using existing embankment dam breach technologies. 
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Results from the PSM indicated that the carapace has minimal influence on Qp under a range of inflow 
conditions:  rock avalanche dams produce Qp values similar to homogeneous dams. Although carapace 
dams recorded Qp values 9-13% lower than homogeneous dams for the same geometry and inflow 
condition, such variation can be considered negligible in the context of the precision of embankment dam 
breach modelling technologies.  
 
;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2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The influence of the carapace on tp depends on inflow conditions. The carapace acts to reduce tp by ~30% 
under high inflow, but increases it by ~60% under low inflow (due to crest armouring) when compared to 
homogenous dams of the same geometry. The time to peak flow observed in the models was between 36 -
120 seconds corresponding to 15 - 40 minutes in a prototype rock avalanche dam 100m high.  
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Breach formation in carapace dams was identified to be initiated by concentration of subsurface flow at 
the interface between carapace and body facies, causing seepage to daylight at the toe of the downstream 
face. At a critical discharge defined as 40-60% of the low inflow condition used in this study, the 
carapace armouring properties were exceeded and carapace material becomes entrained in the outflow. 
The breach is then enlarged by regressive slope movement along the longitudinal axis of the dam, 
lowering the dam crest below the reservoir level and initialising complete removal of the carapace 
material to form a debris fan at the breach outlet. The time required for the maximum breach geometry to 
develop (complete failure) in rock avalanche dams (under low inflow) is approximately twice that 
observed for homogeneous dams due to the armouring properties of the carapace. 
 
Breach erosion and geometry was observed to evolve in three distinct stages identified through the 
comparison of breach development rates at the breach inlet and outlet. The initial stage is characterised by 
rapid vertical erosion (channel incision) after the removal of the carapace, while later stages were 
dominated by lateral erosion at the breach inlet through successive sidewall collapse. In comparison to 
homogeneous dams, presence of carapace materials appeared to reduce breach depth by 10-15% but 
enhance width development by 8-12% to produce a funnel shape in plan form, possibly indicative of 
maximum sediment transport efficiency. Armouring of the breach bed by carapace materials, prevented 
incision, and maintained a low angle bed slope in the breach channel, leading to the formation of a 
smaller breach section area and to a consequent smaller peak discharge. The maximum breach cross 
sectional area was observed to occur within ± 5% of tp and be trapezoidal in form with sidewall angles 
slightly higher than the angle of repose for the carapace material.  
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Based on the dataset obtained from physical scale modelling and the use of identical parametric inputs, 
four models (empirical, parametric, dimensional and physical) were assessed to estimate the uncertainty 
associated with their prediction of critical breach parameters. BossBREACH (a physically based model) 
was also tested to evaluate its relevance to breaching in rock avalanche dams, through comparison of 
simulated breach development rates with those observed in the PSM.  
 
Uncertainty analysis (which considered laboratory error, sensitivity analysis and model performance 
against the PSM dataset) indicated that typical modelling uncertainty could range from ±19% to ±107% 
of the predicted peak discharge. Despite the range of uncertainty observed, empirical, parametric and 
physical models performed consistently for carapace and non carapace dams, generating uncertainty 
values in agreement with reported value ranges from similar studies. Empirical estimations of peak 
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discharge, while simplistic, recorded the lowest uncertainty (±19%). Higher uncertainties were associated 
with parametric and physical model predictions, (± 35-50%) due to a dependence on multiple input 
parameters, however the uncertainty associated with estimates using dimensional models was considered 
unacceptable.  
 
The BREACH simulation of linear breach development is moderately consistent with the observed breach 
development in rock avalanche deposits with a carapace facies. BREACH was unable to simulate 
armouring using the Smart sediment transport equation, despite sensitivity analysis indicating breach 
discharges to be insufficient to entrain materials with a d50 > 250mm; a block size verified by field 
investigation to equate to landslide dam stability. Recent modification to the original BREACH model by 
Corrado et al., (2006) to incorporate a new procedure that considers the bimodal distribution of dam 
material and uses the Schoklitsch equation to model sediment transport, may be more appropriate to 
simulate the armouring properties of the carapace. Further research is required to test such a model.  
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Formation of a large landslide dam proximal to a gorge exit presents the greatest risk to downstream 
populations given the limited response time available before the arrival of the flood wave. Rapid hazard 
assessment and response primarily requires quantification of the peak discharge to indicate the potential 
magnitude of the outburst flood.  
 
Empirical methods are therefore recommended for first order assessment of magnitude due to their 
reliance on parameters that are easily obtainable from aerial and indirect observation. Higher uncertainties 
associated with parametric and physical model predictions were found to limit their ability to refine 
empirical estimates, as previous studies have recommended. Parametric and physical models could be 
incorporated into a secondary response as such methods produce an outflow hydrograph which can be 
used for downstream routing of the outburst flood, to provide a more accurate determination of more 
distal hazards. Such models are limited by the requirement for detailed parametric data, often only 
obtainable by geotechnical site investigation. The value of conducting scenario-based hazard analyses is 
evident in the immediate need for specific information from which hazard management decisions can be 
made. Recognition of the hazard posed by landslide dams in New Zealand and abroad, requires guidelines 
for acceptable societal risk to be incorporated into, and enforced by legislation to provide effective hazard 
management. 
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Due to the complexity of breach development research, this study was only able to address the influence 
of sedimentology on critical breach parameters. Therefore it is recommended that future research should 
address; 
 
• probability, magnitude and frequency analysis for catchments whereby the downstream risk of a 
landslide dam break proximal to a gorge mouth is deemed unacceptable.  
• the long term geomorphic influence of landslide dams on confined channel reaches; particularly 
those incised in deep valleys which evolve into unconfined semi braided systems at the mouth of 
a gorge. 
• steep channel sediment transport during and after landslide dam breaching 
• the hydraulics of the armouring process  
• the ability of the modified BREACH model developed by Corrado et al.,(2006) to simulate the 
process of armouring through application to an actual rock avalanche dam event 
• the influence of lake hyposymetry on breach development processes 
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Section 5    Purpose 
1. The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical 
resources. 
2. In this Act, “sustainable management” means managing the use, development, and protection of 
natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to 
provide for their social, economic, and cultural well being and for their health and safety while: 
 
(a) Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to meet 
the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems; and 
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the environment. 
 
Section 24 Functions of Minister for the Environment 
The Minister for the Environment shall have the following functions under this Act: 
(a) The recommendation of the issue of national policy statements under section 52: 
(b) The recommendation of the making of regulations under section 43: 
(c) The call-in of projects for decision under section 140: 
(d) The recommendation of the approval of an applicant as a requiring authority under 
section 167 or a heritage protection authority under section 188: 
(e) The recommendation of the issue of water conservation orders under section 214: 
(f) The monitoring of the effect and implementation of this Act (including any regulations in 
force under it), national policy statements, and water conservation orders: 
(g) The monitoring of the relationship between the functions, powers, and duties of central 
government and local government under this Part, and the functions, powers, and duties of the 
Hazards Control Commission under Part XIII: 
(h) The consideration and investigation of the use of economic instruments (including 
charges, levies, other fiscal measures, and incentives) to achieve the purpose of this Act: 
(i) Any other functions specified in this Act. 
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Section 30 Functions of regional councils under this Act  
(1) Every regional council shall have the following functions for the purpose of giving effect to this 
Act in its region: 
(a) The establishment, implementation, and review of objectives, policies, and methods to achieve 
integrated management of the natural and physical resources of the region: 
(b) The preparation of objectives and policies in relation to any actual or potential effects of the use, 
development, or protection of land, which are of regional significance: 
(c) The control of the use of land for the purpose of: 
(i) Soil conservation; 
(ii) The maintenance and enhancement of the quality of water in water bodies and coastal water; 
(iii) The maintenance of the quantity of water in water bodies and coastal water; 
(iv) The avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards; 
(v)  The prevention or mitigation of any adverse effects of the storage, use, disposal, or transportation 
of hazardous substances; 
(d) In respect of any coastal marine area in the region, the control (in conjunction with the Minister of 
Conservation) of: 
(i) Land and associated natural and physical resources; 
(ii) The occupation of space on lands of the Crown or lands vested in the regional council, that are 
foreshore or seabed and the extraction of sand, shingle, or other natural material from that land; 
(iii) The taking, use, damming, and diversion of water; 
(iv) Discharges of contaminants into or onto land, air, or water and discharges of water into water; 
(v) Any actual or potential effects of the use, development, or protection of land, including the 
avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards and the prevention or mitigation of any adverse effects of the 
storage, use, disposal, or transportation of hazardous substances; 
(vi) The emission of noise and the mitigation of the effects of noise; 
(vii) Activities in relation to the surface of water; 
(e) The control of the taking, use, damming, and diversion of water, and the control of the quantity, level, 
and flow of water in any water body, including: 
(i) The setting of any maximum or minimum levels or flows of water; 
(ii) The control of the range, or rate of change, of levels or flows of water; 
(iii) The control of the taking or use of geothermal energy; 
(f) The control of discharges of contaminants into or onto land, air, or water and discharges of water into 
water; 
(g) In relation to any bed of a water body, the control of the introduction or planting of any plant in, 
on, or under that land, for the purpose of: 
(i) Soil conservation; 
(ii) The maintenance and enhancement of the quality of water in that water body; 
(iii) The maintenance of the quantity of water in that water body; 
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(iv) The avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards; 
(h) Any other functions specified in this Act; 
(2) The functions of the regional council and the Minister of Conservation in subsection (1) (d) (i) do 
not apply to the control of the harvesting or enhancement of populations of aquatic organisms, where the 
purpose of that control is to conserve, enhance, protect, allocate, or manage any fishery controlled by the 
Fisheries Act 1983. 
 
Section 31 Functions of territorial authorities under this Act 
Every territorial authority shall have the following functions for the purpose of giving effect to this Act in 
its district: 
(a) The establishment, implementation, and review of objectives, policies, and methods to achieve 
integrated management of the effects of the use, development, or protection of land and associated natural 
and physical resources of the district; 
(b) The control of any actual or potential effects of the use, development, or protection of land, 
including the implementation of rules for the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards and the 
prevention and mitigation of any adverse effects of the storage, use, disposal, or transportation of 
hazardous  substances; 
(c) The control of subdivision of land; 
(d) The control of the emission of noise and the mitigation of the effects of noise; 
(e) The control of any actual or potential effects of activities in relation to the surface of water in 
rivers and lakes; 
(f) Any other functions specified in this Act. 
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Part 3  
Civil defence emergency management planning and civil defence emergency management duties 
(Section 31 to 65). 
   
Section 37  
• Groups and Director must not act inconsistently with national civil defence emergency 
management strategy   
 
• A Civil Defence Emergency Management Group must ensure that its actions in exercising or 
performing its functions, duties, and powers under this Act are not inconsistent with any national 
civil defence emergency management strategy that is for the time being in force. 
 
• The Director must ensure that his or her actions in exercising or performing his or her functions, 
duties, and powers under this Act are not inconsistent with any national civil defence emergency 
management strategy that is for the time being in force. 
 
 
Section 48  Civil defence emergency management group plans   
   
Every Civil Defence Emergency Management Group must prepare and approve a civil defence 
emergency management group plan. 
 
Section 53     
 
Civil defence emergency management group plan must not be inconsistent with national civil defence 
emergency management strategy and must take account of Director's guidelines, codes, or technical 
standards   
   
A civil defence emergency management group plan must not be inconsistent with the national civil 
defence emergency management strategy in force when the plan is approved. 
 
A civil defence emergency management group plan must take account of the guidelines, codes, or 
technical standards issued by the Director under this Act. 
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Part 2 Building (section 15 to 168) 
 
Section 153; Meaning of dangerous dam 
    
A dam is dangerous for the purposes of this Act if the dam— 
   
(a)  is a high potential impact dam or a medium potential impact dam; and   
(b)  is likely to collapse— 
   
(i)  in the ordinary course of events; or  
(ii) in a moderate earthquake (as defined in the regulations); or  
(iii) in a moderate flood (as defined in the regulations); or 
  
(c) is a leaky dam. 
 
Section 161;   Regional authority must adopt policy on dangerous dams   
   
(1)  A regional authority must, within 18 months after the commencement of this Part, adopt a policy on 
dangerous dams within its district. 
   
(2)The policy must state— 
 
a) the approach that the regional authority will take in performing its functions under this Part; and 
b) the regional authority's priorities in performing those functions; and 
c) how the policy will apply to heritage dams. 
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This Microsoft Excel 97TM spreadsheet incrementally calculates the breach outflow from a reservoir using 
user-specified parameters of final breach dimensions, breach development time, and the surface area of the 
reservoir at the start and end of the run. The model accounts for a reservoir whose surface area decreases with 
falling level, and declining hydraulic head and effective breach top width as the lake level falls during 
drainage. Three alternative broad-crested weir equations (discussed in section 3) are utilised on the different 
sheets, with their respective answers collated on the first sheet for comparison. 
Four key assumptions are made: 
1. The lake is shaped like a funnel, with a constant side-slope 
2. The rate of breach growth is linear, i.e. top width, basal width, and breach depth all increase 
simultaneously 
3. The lake is full to the top of the dam when failure occurs, failure is by overtopping. 
4. Mean discharge for each time-step is calculated from the average of the discharges at the end of 
the current and the previous time step. This is multiplied by the duration of the time-step to obtain the 
volume of outflow during that interval. 
This parametric method is a rapid means of testing the sensitivity of the peak discharge to variations in the 
breach size and development time. Experimenting with different values of breach size and development time 
is a way of constraining the peak discharge estimates generated by other methods in this report. 
Using the spreadsheet: 
1. Open OUTFLOW3.xls 
2. Enter user-specified values for the final breach dimensions, breach development time, and the surface 
area of the lake at the top of the dam and at the base of the final breach. 
3. The spreadsheet automatically calculates the evolving breach outflow hydrograph over a period of 
100 time-steps, and then the lake outflow hydrograph over an additional 100 
time-steps using three alternative forms of the broad-crested weir equation for trapezoidal breaches. 
4. Time-series plots of breach discharge (i.e. the outflow hydrograph), lake level, breach base level, and 
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effective head are generated automatically. The vertical scales of these graphs may need adjusting by 
the user, depending on the range of dam crest and breach base elevations. 
5. Values for the peak discharge, the time of peak discharge, and the lake elevation at this time are 
extracted from the spreadsheet. 
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